From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D26AC433EF for ; Sun, 24 Oct 2021 06:08:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D8CF60F57 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 2021 06:08:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230489AbhJXGKy (ORCPT ); Sun, 24 Oct 2021 02:10:54 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59954 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230247AbhJXGKv (ORCPT ); Sun, 24 Oct 2021 02:10:51 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6BAB960EE9; Sun, 24 Oct 2021 06:08:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1635055711; bh=A/eEkTxQ++avYteQ4U92t1rGwrjLLBkWKx5I0QmfWVc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FG0QFd0sy1nzAGpCyixdQdwfL1sGdevi6kzsN0iOkU1ANhm1CxE4xB22rXzsV2Scs dxzR3r6D21K1hp/ubbHqi9jx98hXk9xaSe9WmFTDir6Ex6VmIReto93OzKMq5HIKdB 2sUVVJJg7ifnbFxPRdYJJSGLlgUoFWKnKT0eQM652bTQTQRO2UCRgVf4MGK9ddK5aF t+QQzzvWOzIsI3dioqPMLxWvmTK0pPv59L/J4RWuHEQH8ShGjttBgnqaa7UpE8iFqJ WMaJpq3J+Zfl0md6y3uQQLQwjqNSnJ+Xe212x95I4oIbM0p73UsmJ3RzIOi0cIWeOm Yv7NrCRm0Q/Rg== From: Leon Romanovsky To: Doug Ledford , Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Mark Zhang , Ira Weiny , John Fleck , Kaike Wan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, Mark Bloch , Mark Bloch Subject: [PATCH rdma-rc 1/2] RDMA/sa_query: Use strscpy_pad instead of memcpy to copy a string Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2021 09:08:20 +0300 Message-Id: <72ede0f6dab61f7f23df9ac7a70666e07ef314b0.1635055496.git.leonro@nvidia.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org From: Mark Zhang When copy the device name, the length of data memcpy copied exceeds the length of the source buffer, which cause the KASAN issue below. Use strscpy_pad instead. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] Read of size 64 at addr ffff88811a10f5e0 by task rping/140263 CPU: 3 PID: 140263 Comm: rping Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0xa0 kasan_report+0xcb/0x110 ? lock_downgrade+0xb0/0xc0 ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 memcpy+0x20/0x60 ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] ? init_mad+0xf0/0xf0 [ib_core] ? __nlmsg_put+0x9a/0xb0 ? ibnl_put_msg+0x90/0xd0 [ib_core] ib_nl_make_request+0x1c6/0x380 [ib_core] ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x320/0x320 [ib_core] ? netlink_has_listeners+0x114/0x210 send_mad+0x20a/0x220 [ib_core] ? ib_nl_make_request+0x380/0x380 [ib_core] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 ? value_read+0x20/0x80 [ib_core] ? ib_pack+0x140/0x2a0 [ib_core] ib_sa_path_rec_get+0x3e3/0x800 [ib_core] ? alloc_mad+0x390/0x390 [ib_core] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm] ? ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm] ? vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0 ? ksys_write+0x133/0x160 ? do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 ? lock_downgrade+0xc0/0xc0 cma_query_ib_route+0x29b/0x390 [rdma_cm] ? rdma_set_ib_path+0x150/0x150 [rdma_cm] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200 ? rdma_create_user_id+0x80/0x80 [rdma_cm] ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] ? rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm] ? ucma_disconnect+0x140/0x140 [rdma_ucm] ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm] ? ucma_copy_ib_route+0x1a0/0x1a0 [rdma_ucm] ? __fget_files+0x146/0x240 vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0 ksys_write+0x133/0x160 ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f26499aa90f Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 29 fd ff ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 5c fd ff ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007f26495f2dc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000007d0 RCX: 00007f26499aa90f RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007f26495f2e00 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00005632a8315440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f26495f2e00 R13: 00005632a83154e0 R14: 00005632a8315440 R15: 00005632a830a810 Allocated by task 131419: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 proc_self_get_link+0x8b/0x100 pick_link+0x4f1/0x5c0 step_into+0x2eb/0x3d0 walk_component+0xc8/0x2c0 link_path_walk+0x3b8/0x580 path_openat+0x101/0x230 do_filp_open+0x12e/0x240 do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x280 __x64_sys_openat+0xce/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811a10f5e0 kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 10f5e0, ffff88811a10f5f0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000007b6da7b1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88811a10f1e0 pfn:0x11a10f flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab|zone=2) raw: 8000000000000200 ffffea0004463040 0000001200000012 ffff8881000423c0 raw: ffff88811a10f1e0 000000008080007f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811a10f480: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff88811a10f500: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc >ffff88811a10f580: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff88811a10f600: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc ffff88811a10f680: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc Fixes: 2ca546b92a02 ("IB/sa: Route SA pathrecord query through netlink") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky --- drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c index 4220a545387f..74ecd7456a11 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c @@ -706,8 +706,9 @@ static void ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs(struct sk_buff *skb, /* Construct the family header first */ header = skb_put(skb, NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(*header))); - memcpy(header->device_name, dev_name(&query->port->agent->device->dev), - LS_DEVICE_NAME_MAX); + strscpy_pad(header->device_name, + dev_name(&query->port->agent->device->dev), + LS_DEVICE_NAME_MAX); header->port_num = query->port->port_num; if ((comp_mask & IB_SA_PATH_REC_REVERSIBLE) && -- 2.31.1