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From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marciniszyn, Mike" <mike.marciniszyn@cornelisnetworks.com>,
	Guo Zhi <qtxuning1999@sjtu.edu.cn>,
	"Dalessandro, Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>,
	"dledford@redhat.com" <dledford@redhat.com>,
	"linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org" <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] infiniband hfi1: fix misuse of %x in ipoib_tx.c
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 19:46:57 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9cda0704-0e63-39b2-7874-fd679314eb2b@acm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YUwin2cn8X5GGjyY@unreal>

On 9/22/21 23:45, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> Isn't kptr_restrict sysctl is for that?

Hi Leon,

After I sent my email I discovered the following commit: 5ead723a20e0
("lib/vsprintf: no_hash_pointers prints all addresses as unhashed"; v5.12).
I think that commit does what we need?

Thanks,

Bart.


commit 5ead723a20e0447bc7db33dc3070b420e5f80aa6
Author: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Date:   Sun Feb 14 10:13:48 2021 -0600

     lib/vsprintf: no_hash_pointers prints all addresses as unhashed

     If the no_hash_pointers command line parameter is set, then
     printk("%p") will print pointers as unhashed, which is useful for
     debugging purposes.  This change applies to any function that uses
     vsprintf, such as print_hex_dump() and seq_buf_printf().

     A large warning message is displayed if this option is enabled.
     Unhashed pointers expose kernel addresses, which can be a security
     risk.

     Also update test_printf to skip the hashed pointer tests if the
     command-line option is set.

     Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
     Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
     Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
     Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
     Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
     Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
     Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
     Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210214161348.369023-4-timur@kernel.org

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-24  2:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-22 13:48 Guo Zhi
2021-09-22 17:51 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-22 18:05   ` Bart Van Assche
2021-09-23  6:45     ` Leon Romanovsky
2021-09-23 11:04       ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-23 11:44         ` Leon Romanovsky
2021-09-23 12:18           ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-24  2:46       ` Bart Van Assche [this message]
2021-09-24 14:43         ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-25  0:20           ` Guo Zhi
2021-09-23 11:03     ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-23 13:15       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-09-23  2:03   ` 郭志
2021-09-23 12:51   ` 郭志
2021-09-27 13:05 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-27 17:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-09-22 12:33 Guo Zhi
2021-09-22 12:37 ` Dennis Dalessandro
2021-09-24 14:46 ` Marciniszyn, Mike

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