From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marciniszyn, Mike" <mike.marciniszyn@cornelisnetworks.com>,
Guo Zhi <qtxuning1999@sjtu.edu.cn>,
"Dalessandro, Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>,
"dledford@redhat.com" <dledford@redhat.com>,
"linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org" <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] infiniband hfi1: fix misuse of %x in ipoib_tx.c
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 19:46:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9cda0704-0e63-39b2-7874-fd679314eb2b@acm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YUwin2cn8X5GGjyY@unreal>
On 9/22/21 23:45, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> Isn't kptr_restrict sysctl is for that?
Hi Leon,
After I sent my email I discovered the following commit: 5ead723a20e0
("lib/vsprintf: no_hash_pointers prints all addresses as unhashed"; v5.12).
I think that commit does what we need?
Thanks,
Bart.
commit 5ead723a20e0447bc7db33dc3070b420e5f80aa6
Author: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Date: Sun Feb 14 10:13:48 2021 -0600
lib/vsprintf: no_hash_pointers prints all addresses as unhashed
If the no_hash_pointers command line parameter is set, then
printk("%p") will print pointers as unhashed, which is useful for
debugging purposes. This change applies to any function that uses
vsprintf, such as print_hex_dump() and seq_buf_printf().
A large warning message is displayed if this option is enabled.
Unhashed pointers expose kernel addresses, which can be a security
risk.
Also update test_printf to skip the hashed pointer tests if the
command-line option is set.
Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210214161348.369023-4-timur@kernel.org
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-24 2:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-22 13:48 [PATCH] infiniband hfi1: fix misuse of %x in ipoib_tx.c Guo Zhi
2021-09-22 17:51 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-22 18:05 ` Bart Van Assche
2021-09-23 6:45 ` Leon Romanovsky
2021-09-23 11:04 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-23 11:44 ` Leon Romanovsky
2021-09-23 12:18 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-24 2:46 ` Bart Van Assche [this message]
2021-09-24 14:43 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-25 0:20 ` Guo Zhi
2021-09-23 11:03 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-23 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-09-23 2:03 ` 郭志
2021-09-23 12:51 ` 郭志
2021-09-27 13:05 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
2021-09-27 17:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-09-22 12:33 Guo Zhi
2021-09-22 12:37 ` Dennis Dalessandro
2021-09-24 14:46 ` Marciniszyn, Mike
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