From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7434EC433E0 for ; Sat, 27 Jun 2020 23:49:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52B1B2076E for ; Sat, 27 Jun 2020 23:49:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="o+b6i4CJ" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726666AbgF0Xts (ORCPT ); Sat, 27 Jun 2020 19:49:48 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:39490 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726101AbgF0Xts (ORCPT ); Sat, 27 Jun 2020 19:49:48 -0400 Received: from [192.168.0.104] (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4CC9020B4901; Sat, 27 Jun 2020 16:49:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 4CC9020B4901 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1593301787; bh=1+BfB0kaqs85yBKZRHGZmmaia9PwxbpWHcmeSuerz4o=; h=Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=o+b6i4CJMLl8qkkQu/vzSl9WvZbpDzY9sX8aGMyC/vIXaBduJ1uuA2f5b+MKpMAzr 23I+TpBaHMraAkBhcRT8P5TVtkq8mvhlR6FLab5LMzXdoYJIEpHv4cHVjHGtGCOtVX zPQebNGXbjFTyRxDoFhvEWPBFRecP5Fn9So7WzCU= Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 09/11] ima: Move validation of the keyrings conditional into ima_validate_rule() To: Tyler Hicks , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Prakhar Srivastava , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org References: <20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> <20200626223900.253615-10-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Message-ID: <0e7012e7-e1df-466d-9d51-a691f779570a@linux.microsoft.com> Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2020 16:49:46 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200626223900.253615-10-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On 6/26/20 3:38 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote: > Use ima_validate_rule() to ensure that the combination of a hook > function and the keyrings conditional is valid and that the keyrings > conditional is not specified without an explicit KEY_CHECK func > conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no user-facing change. In addition to checking for func=KEY_CHECK and the keyrings conditional, the patch also validates the flags for other IMA hooks (such as KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, POLICY_CHECK, etc.) Would be good to mention that in the patch description. -lakshmi > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks > --- > > * v2 > - Allowed IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED, IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO, > IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED, and IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST conditionals to be > present in the rule entry flags for non-buffer hook functions. > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 +++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 8cdca2399d59..43d49ad958fb 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK: > case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK: > case POLICY_CHECK: > + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC | > + IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | > + IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | > + IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | > + IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | > + IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | > + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) > + return false; > + > break; > case KEXEC_CMDLINE: > if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) > @@ -1027,7 +1036,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > default: > return false; > } > - } > + } else if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) > + return false; > > return true; > } > @@ -1209,7 +1219,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1; > > if ((entry->keyrings) || > - (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) || > (keyrings_len < 2)) { > result = -EINVAL; > break; >