From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 15:49:05 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0ef26943-9619-3736-4452-fec536a8d169@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200220175250.10795-4-kpsingh@chromium.org>
On 2/20/2020 9:52 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Sorry about the heavy list pruning - the original set
blows thunderbird up.
>
> The BPF LSM programs are implemented as fexit trampolines to avoid the
> overhead of retpolines. These programs cannot be attached to security_*
> wrappers as there are quite a few security_* functions that do more than
> just calling the LSM callbacks.
>
> This was discussed on the lists in:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200123152440.28956-1-kpsingh@chromium.org/T/#m068becce588a0cdf01913f368a97aea4c62d8266
>
> Adding a NOP callback after all the static LSM callbacks are called has
> the following benefits:
>
> - The BPF programs run at the right stage of the security_* wrappers.
> - They run after all the static LSM hooks allowed the operation,
> therefore cannot allow an action that was already denied.
I still say that the special call-out to BPF is unnecessary.
I remain unconvinced by the arguments. You aren't doing anything
so special that the general mechanism won't work.
>
> There are some hooks which do not call call_int_hooks or
> call_void_hooks. It's not possible to call the bpf_lsm_* functions
> without checking if there is BPF LSM program attached to these hooks.
> This is added further in a subsequent patch. For now, these hooks are
> marked as NO_BPF (i.e. attachment of BPF programs is not possible).
>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> ---
> include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 3 +++
> 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f867f72f6aa9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H
> +#define _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H
> +
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
> +
> +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, NAME, ...) RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__);
> +#include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> +#undef LSM_HOOK
> +
> +#define RUN_BPF_LSM_VOID_PROGS(FUNC, ...) bpf_lsm_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__)
> +#define RUN_BPF_LSM_INT_PROGS(RC, FUNC, ...) ({ \
> + do { \
> + if (RC == 0) \
> + RC = bpf_lsm_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
> + } while (0); \
> + RC; \
> +})
> +
> +#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
> +
> +#define RUN_BPF_LSM_INT_PROGS(RC, FUNC, ...) (RC)
> +#define RUN_BPF_LSM_VOID_PROGS(FUNC, ...)
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
> +
> +#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index affb6941622e..abc847c9b9a1 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,22 @@
> #include <linux/filter.h>
> #include <linux/bpf.h>
> #include <linux/btf.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
> +
> +/* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a NOP
> + * function where a BPF program can be attached as an fexit trampoline.
> + */
> +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, NAME, ...) LSM_HOOK_##RET(NAME, __VA_ARGS__)
> +#define LSM_HOOK_int(NAME, ...) noinline int bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \
> +{ \
> + return 0; \
> +}
> +
> +#define LSM_HOOK_void(NAME, ...) \
> + noinline void bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) {}
> +
> +#include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> +#undef LSM_HOOK
>
> const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = {
> };
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 565bc9b67276..aa111392a700 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/msg.h>
> #include <net/flow.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
>
> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
>
> @@ -684,6 +685,7 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> \
> hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
> P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
> + RUN_BPF_LSM_VOID_PROGS(FUNC, __VA_ARGS__); \
> } while (0)
>
> #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
> @@ -696,6 +698,7 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> if (RC != 0) \
> break; \
> } \
> + RC = RUN_BPF_LSM_INT_PROGS(RC, FUNC, __VA_ARGS__); \
> } while (0); \
> RC; \
> })
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-20 23:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-20 17:52 [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs KP Singh
2020-02-20 23:49 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-02-21 11:44 ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 18:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-22 4:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-23 22:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-24 16:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-24 17:13 ` KP Singh
2020-02-24 18:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-24 21:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-24 22:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-25 5:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-25 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 19:31 ` KP Singh
2020-02-26 0:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-26 5:15 ` KP Singh
2020-02-26 15:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-25 19:29 ` KP Singh
2020-02-24 16:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-24 17:23 ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 2:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-21 11:47 ` KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 4/8] bpf: lsm: Add support for enabling/disabling BPF hooks KP Singh
2020-02-21 18:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 19:11 ` James Morris
2020-02-22 4:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 5/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-02-21 2:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-21 12:02 ` KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-02-25 6:45 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-02-21 19:19 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 19:41 ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 22:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 23:09 ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 23:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-22 0:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-22 1:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-22 3:36 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27 18:40 ` Dr. Greg
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