From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>, David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Cc: "Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"kernel@pengutronix.de" <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Aymen Sghaier" <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Udit Agarwal" <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>,
"Jan Luebbe" <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
"Franck Lenormand" <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 12:11:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1171de9c-97b9-3936-707b-16ec34cf94d5@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YGDpA4yPWmTWEyx+@kernel.org>
Hello Jarkko,
On 28.03.21 22:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 27, 2021 at 01:41:24PM +0100, David Gstir wrote:
>> Generally speaking, I’d say trusting the CAAM RNG and trusting in it’s
>> other features are two separate things. However, reading through the CAAM
>> key blob spec I’ve got here, CAAM key blob keys (the keys that secure a blob’s
>> content) are generated using its internal RNG. So I’d save if the CAAM RNG
>> is insecure, so are generated key blobs. Maybe somebody with more insight
>> into the CAAM internals can verify that, but I don’t see any point in using
>> the kernel’s RNG as long as we let CAAM generate the key blob keys for us.
>
> Here's my long'ish analysis. Please read it to the end if by ever means
> possible, and apologies, I usually try to keep usually my comms short, but
> this requires some more meat than the usual.
Thanks for the write-up!
> The Bad News
> ============
>
> Now that we add multiple hardware trust sources for trusted keys, will
> there ever be a scenario where a trusted key is originally sealed with a
> backing hardware A, unsealed, and resealed with hardware B?
>
> The hardware and vendor neutral way to generate the key material would be
> unconditionally always just the kernel RNG.
>
> CAAM is actually worse than TCG because it's not even a standards body, if
> I got it right. Not a lot but at least a tiny fraction.
CAAM is how NXP calls the crypto accelerator built into some of its SoCs.
> This brings an open item in TEE patches: trusted_tee_get_random() is an
> issue in generating kernel material. I would rather replace that with
> kernel RNG *for now*, because the same open question applies also to ARM
> TEE. It's also a single company controlled backing technology.
>
> By all practical means, I do trust ARM TEE in my personal life but this is
> not important.
>
> CAAM *and* TEE backends break the golden rule of putting as little trust as
> possible to anything, even not anything weird is clear at sight, as
> security is essentially a game of known unknowns and unknown unknowns.
Agreed.
> The GOOD News
> =============
>
> So there's actually option (C) that also fixes the TPM trustd keys issue:
>
> Add a new kernel patch, which:
>
> 1. Adds the use of kernel RNG as a boot option.
> 2. If this boot option is not active, the subsystem will print a warning
> to klog denoting this.
> 3. Default is of course vendor RNG given the bad design issue in the TPM
> trusted keys, but the warning in klog will help to address it at least
> a bit.
Why should the TPM backend's choice influence later backends? We could add
a new option for key creation time, e.g.:
keyctl add trusted kmk "new keylen rng=kernel" @s
The default would be rng=vendor if available with a fallback to rng=kernel,
which should always be available.
> 4. Document all this to Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst.
Yes, backends would then document whether they support a rng=vendor or not.
> I'd prefer the choice between A, B and C be concluded rather sooner than
> later.
FWIW, my vote is for option C, with the change described above.
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> /Jarkko
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-29 10:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-16 17:01 [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-21 20:46 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:41 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] KEYS: trusted: implement fallback to kernel RNG Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 19:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-17 13:58 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 23:14 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 7:39 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-17 8:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:02 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:28 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-21 20:48 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:35 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-23 18:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24 9:26 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24 10:47 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-24 14:07 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-25 5:26 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-27 12:41 ` David Gstir
2021-03-28 20:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-29 10:11 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
2021-03-31 23:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-30 7:26 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-31 23:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01 7:41 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:47 ` Eric Biggers
2021-03-31 23:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-31 23:34 ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-01 1:11 ` Herbert Xu
2021-04-01 5:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01 6:03 ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-01 5:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-24 16:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-24 20:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24 21:58 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-02 1:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-03-31 18:35 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:15 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-16 23:10 ` [PATCH v1 0/3] " Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:08 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:04 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:20 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:28 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:53 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:57 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:05 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 11:13 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:16 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:04 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:16 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 18:36 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-31 18:49 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 19:36 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:06 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:20 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 18:26 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-01 12:55 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 13:30 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:52 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:59 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 14:12 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 11:11 ` David Howells
2021-03-21 20:01 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:34 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24 6:23 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-23 16:37 ` Ahmad Fatoum
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