From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1F60C432C3 for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68FB7206CB for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726291AbfKMUOg (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:14:36 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:53806 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726270AbfKMUOg (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:14:36 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id xADKDOXN099858 for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:14:35 -0500 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2w8pr3m6vv-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:14:35 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:28 -0000 Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.59]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xADKERc939190698 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:27 GMT Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id B08E8A4053; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:27 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BBD9A4040; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:26 +0000 (GMT) Received: from dhcp-9-31-103-201.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.31.103.201]) by d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 20:14:26 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys From: Mimi Zohar To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , dhowells@redhat.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:14:26 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20191113184658.2862-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20191113184658.2862-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> <20191113184658.2862-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19111320-0020-0000-0000-00000385EEA7 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19111320-0021-0000-0000-000021DC00E3 Message-Id: <1573676066.4843.18.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-13_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911130165 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Wed, 2019-11-13 at 10:46 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > Measure keys loaded onto any keyring. > > This patch defines a new IMA policy func namely KEY_CHECK to > measure keys. Updated ima_match_rules() to check for KEY_CHECK > and ima_parse_rule() to handle KEY_CHECK. > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +++++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +++- > 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > index 29aaedf33246..066d32797500 100644 > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description: > base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] > [FIRMWARE_CHECK] > [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] > - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] > + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] > mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] > [[^]MAY_EXEC] > fsmagic:= hex value > @@ -113,3 +113,7 @@ Description: > Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures: > > appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig > + > + Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to measure all keys: > + > + measure func=KEY_CHECK > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index df4ca482fb53..fe6c698617bd 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) > hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \ > hook(POLICY_CHECK) \ > hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \ > + hook(KEY_CHECK) \ > hook(MAX_CHECK) > #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM, > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index d7e987baf127..12684e8d7124 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -655,6 +655,13 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > int action = 0; > u32 secid; > > + /* > + * If IMA is not yet initialized or IMA policy is empty > + * then there is no need to measure. > + */ > + if (!ima_policy_flag) > + return; > + This addition has nothing to do with defining a new IMA hook and should be a separate patch.  This can be posted independently of this patch set. Mimi > /* > * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are > * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index f19a895ad7cd..1525a28fd705 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > { > int i; > > - if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) { > + if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) { > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) > return true; > return false; > @@ -997,6 +997,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0) > entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; > + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) > + entry->func = KEY_CHECK; > else > result = -EINVAL; > if (!result)