From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Nicholas Franck <nhfran2@tycho.nsa.gov>,
paul@paul-moore.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net,
keescook@chromium.org, serge@hallyn.com,
john.johansen@canonical.com, mortonm@chromium.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2019 11:46:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <16508448-aa29-1b7b-656a-0de41d8e68e0@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1907131430030.3804@namei.org>
On 7/12/2019 9:35 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Jul 2019, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
>>>> If we want to apply least privilege, then this is a desirable facility.
>>> The capability mechanism is object agnostic by design.
>> Some might argue that's a flawed design.
> Narrator: it's a flawed design.
>
>>>> I understand that doesn't mesh with Smack's mental modelbut it would
>>>> probably be useful to both SELinux and AppArmor, among others.
>>> I'm perfectly happy to have the information transmitted.
>>> I think a separate interface for doing so is appropriate.
>> As above, I don't see any way to do that that isn't just adding overhead.
>>
> Agreed, and even so, part of the point of LSM is to allow existing
> security models to be extended to meet a wider range of security
> requirements.
We bow to the wisdom of the Maintainer.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-13 18:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-12 17:34 [RFC PATCH] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable Nicholas Franck
2019-07-12 17:50 ` James Morris
2019-07-12 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH] security, capability: " Stephen Smalley
2019-07-15 18:42 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2019-07-12 17:58 ` [RFC PATCH] security,capability: " Casey Schaufler
2019-07-12 18:25 ` [RFC PATCH] security, capability: " Stephen Smalley
2019-07-12 19:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-12 20:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-12 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-13 4:35 ` James Morris
2019-07-13 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-07-13 4:29 ` James Morris
2019-07-16 14:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-07-16 14:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-16 15:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-16 15:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-16 14:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-24 20:12 ` Paul Moore
2019-07-16 14:16 ` [RFC PATCH] security,capability: " Serge E. Hallyn
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