From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: jbohac@suse.cz (Jiri Bohac) Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:08:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down In-Reply-To: <8846.1519309243@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <151024869793.28329.4817577607302613028.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <151024863544.28329.2436580122759221600.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <8846.1519309243@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Message-ID: <20180222190814.a5mavnqvii5i6ptf@dwarf.suse.cz> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 02:20:43PM +0000, David Howells wrote: > commit 87a39b258eca2e15884ee90c3fcd5758d6057b17 > Author: David Howells > Date: Thu Feb 22 13:42:04 2018 +0000 > > kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE > > This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down > kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images to be loaded with s/to be loaded/from being loaded/ (my own mistake :-)) Otherwise looks good. Thanks for improving my idea. Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac -- Jiri Bohac SUSE Labs, Prague, Czechia -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html