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[173.164.112.133]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r65-v6sm35307981pfj.5.2018.10.10.17.18.58 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:19:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , Casey Schaufler , John Johansen , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Tetsuo Handa , Mimi Zohar , Randy Dunlap , Jordan Glover , LSM , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:18:29 -0700 Message-Id: <20181011001846.30964-14-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from its enforcement). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: John Johansen --- security/loadpin/Kconfig | 4 ++-- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig index dd01aa91e521..a0d70d82b98e 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/Kconfig +++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ config SECURITY_LOADPIN have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or a CDROM. -config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot" depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN help If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter - "loadpin.enabled=1". + "loadpin.enforce=1". diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index 0716af28808a..a2dc146b6364 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation) kfree(pathname); } -static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED); +static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE); static struct super_block *pinned_root; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock); @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = { static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = { { - .procname = "enabled", - .data = &enabled, + .procname = "enforce", + .data = &enforce, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb) loadpin_sysctl_table)) pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n"); else - pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n"); + pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n"); } else pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n"); } @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */ if (!file) { - if (!enabled) { + if (!enforce) { report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored"); return 0; } @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about. * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning * failures before we have announced that pinning is - * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic. + * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic. */ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock); check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root); @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) } if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) { - if (unlikely(!enabled)) { + if (unlikely(!enforce)) { report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored"); return 0; } @@ -186,10 +186,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) { - pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis"); + pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n", + enforce ? "" : "not "); security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin"); } /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */ -module_param(enabled, int, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)"); +module_param(enforce, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning"); -- 2.17.1