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From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, <linux_dti@icloud.com>,
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v7 12/14] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 17:34:06 -0800
Message-ID: <20181205013408.47725-13-namit@vmware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181205013408.47725-1-namit@vmware.com>

The return value of text_poke_early() and text_poke_bp() is useless.
Remove it.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c        | 11 ++++-------
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
index a75eed841eed..c90678fd391a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static inline void apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patch_site *start,
 #define __parainstructions_end	NULL
 #endif
 
-extern void *text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
+extern void text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 
 /*
  * Clear and restore the kernel write-protection flag on the local CPU.
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ extern void *text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 extern void *text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 extern void *text_poke_kgdb(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 extern int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
-extern void *text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler);
+extern void text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler);
 extern int after_bootmem;
 extern __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
 extern __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 18415e3b6000..2740ad2c6f21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len)
 
 extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[];
 extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[];
-void *text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
+void text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 
 /*
  * Are we looking at a near JMP with a 1 or 4-byte displacement.
@@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void)
  * instructions. And on the local CPU you need to be protected again NMI or MCE
  * handlers seeing an inconsistent instruction while you patch.
  */
-void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
-				       size_t len)
+void __init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
+				      size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -690,7 +690,6 @@ void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
 		 * that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs.
 		 */
 	}
-	return addr;
 }
 
 __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
@@ -893,7 +892,7 @@ int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
  *	  replacing opcode
  *	- sync cores
  */
-void *text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler)
+void text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler)
 {
 	unsigned char int3 = 0xcc;
 
@@ -935,7 +934,5 @@ void *text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler)
 	 * the writing of the new instruction.
 	 */
 	bp_patching_in_progress = false;
-
-	return addr;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-05  1:33 [PATCH v7 00/14] x86/alternative: text_poke() enhancements Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] x86/ftrace: Use text_poke_*() infrastructure Nadav Amit
2018-12-06  0:06   ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 16:28     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 13:09   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` Nadav Amit [this message]
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] module: Do not set nx for module memory before freeing Nadav Amit
2018-12-06  9:57   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-06 17:28     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 11:13   ` Andrea Parri
2018-12-06 18:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 18:56     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 20:21     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2018-12-06 20:29       ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-13 14:10   ` Jessica Yu
2018-12-13 17:25     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] module: Prevent module removal racing with text_poke() Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 10:01   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-06 10:03 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] x86/alternative: text_poke() enhancements Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-10  1:06   ` Nadav Amit

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