From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 13:02:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190218210215.GS50184@devbig004.ftw2.facebook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFqZXNvVb75K9ZemVObcBB+rntL38_VfY5P6jyAbuwjymt6MQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hello,
On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 11:03:58AM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has
> been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for
> this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with
> the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously...
> Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
> security_kernfs_needs_init() function, which would simply check if the
> list of registered kernfs_init_security hooks is empty.
>
> I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled -
> intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next
> respin if there are no objections to this approach.
Sounds good to me.
Thanks.
--
tejun
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-18 21:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-14 9:50 [PATCH v6 0/5] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 9:50 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 20:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-15 15:48 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 9:50 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 9:50 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 9:50 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 9:50 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-14 15:48 ` Tejun Heo
2019-02-15 15:45 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-15 15:50 ` Tejun Heo
2019-02-18 10:03 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-18 21:02 ` Tejun Heo [this message]
2019-02-19 0:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-19 14:10 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-19 14:21 ` Tejun Heo
2019-02-19 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-21 9:13 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-02-21 16:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-22 12:52 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
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