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Date:   Wed, 26 Jun 2019 16:28:35 -0700
From:   Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc:     Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
        Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>,
        linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and
 init_on_free=1 boot options
Message-Id: <20190626162835.0947684d36ef01639f969232@linux-foundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com>
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        <20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com>
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On Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:19:42 +0200 Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> wrote:

>  v8:
>   - addressed comments by Michal Hocko: revert kernel/kexec_core.c and
>     apply initialization in dma_pool_free()
>   - disable init_on_alloc/init_on_free if slab poisoning or page
>     poisoning are enabled, as requested by Qian Cai
>   - skip the redzone when initializing a freed heap object, as requested
>     by Qian Cai and Kees Cook
>   - use s->offset to address the freeptr (suggested by Kees Cook)
>   - updated the patch description, added Signed-off-by: tag

v8 failed to incorporate 

https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-fix.patch
and
https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-fix-2.patch

it's conventional to incorporate such fixes when preparing a new
version of a patch.