linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
                   ` (25 more replies)
  0 siblings, 26 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.

Because of the changes to slot handling and the rework of
"display" I have not included the Reviewed-by tags from the
previous version.

v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
    - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
    - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
      with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
      LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
      lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
      slot value.
    - Validate slot values used in security.c
    - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
      it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
    - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
    - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
      the audit log

v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
    - Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
      meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
    - Improve consistency of constant naming.
    - Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
    - Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
    - Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
      otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
      stub, which does nothing useful.

Patches 0001-0003 complete the process of moving managment
of security blobs that might be shared from the individual
modules to the infrastructure.

Patches 0004-0014 replace system use of a "secid" with
a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
security modules to be held and reused later. At this
point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the
kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
hooks.

It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.

Patch 0015 provides a mechanism for a process to
identify which security module's hooks should be used
when displaying or converting a security context string.
A new interface /proc/.../attr/display contains the name
of the security module to show. Reading from this file
will present the name of the module, while writing to
it will set the value. Only names of active security
modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
is then stored in the task security blob.

Patch 0016 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.

This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.

Patches 0012-0021 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.

The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 0022.

Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from
AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.

The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
for containers.

Performance measurements to date have the change
within the "noise". Better benchmarks are in the
works.

https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v4-apparmor

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  1 +
 security/security.c               | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 58 ++++++++++++-------------------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  6 ++++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c    |  3 +-
 security/smack/smack.h            |  6 ++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 35 +++++--------------
 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f9222a04968d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	int	lbs_cred;
 	int	lbs_file;
 	int	lbs_inode;
+	int	lbs_superblock;
 	int	lbs_ipc;
 	int	lbs_msg_msg;
 	int	lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..86198e303203 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 }
 
@@ -300,12 +301,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 	for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
 		prepare_lsm(*lsm);
 
-	init_debug("cred blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
-	init_debug("file blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
-	init_debug("inode blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
-	init_debug("ipc blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
-	init_debug("msg_msg blob size  = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
-	init_debug("task blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+	init_debug("cred blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+	init_debug("file blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+	init_debug("inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+	init_debug("ipc blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+	init_debug("msg_msg blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 
 	/*
 	 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -603,6 +605,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
 		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
 }
 
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
+		sb->s_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (sb->s_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Hook list operation macros.
  *
@@ -776,12 +799,21 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *
 
 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+	int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sb_free(sb);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+	kfree(sb->s_security);
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
 }
 
 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..7478d8eda00a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (!isec)
 		return;
-	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	/*
 	 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
 	 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 
 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-
-	sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sbsec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 
 	mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -379,18 +375,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	sb->s_security = sbsec;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	sb->s_security = NULL;
-	kfree(sbsec);
-}
-
 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
 	const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
 };
@@ -507,7 +495,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
 
 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 
 	/*
 	 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
@@ -535,7 +523,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 
 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -648,7 +636,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
 	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
@@ -881,8 +869,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				    const struct super_block *newsb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 	char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 	char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 
@@ -914,8 +902,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 					unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+						selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 
 	int set_fscontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 	int set_context =	(oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
@@ -1085,7 +1074,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
 
 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
@@ -1377,7 +1366,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 
-	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
 		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -1767,7 +1756,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 				 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
 				 u32 *_new_isid)
 {
-	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+						selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
 
 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
 	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1798,7 +1788,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	int rc;
 
 	dsec = inode_security(dir);
-	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
 
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 
@@ -1947,7 +1937,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
-	sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
 			    sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
 }
@@ -2578,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
 }
 
-static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	superblock_free_security(sb);
-}
-
 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
 {
 	bool open_quote = false;
@@ -2653,7 +2638,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
 {
 	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	u32 sid;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2877,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	int rc;
 	char *context;
 
-	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
 
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
@@ -3115,7 +3100,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 	}
 
-	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -3296,13 +3281,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -6647,6 +6633,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
 };
 
 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6675,7 +6662,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 231262d8eac9..d08d7e5d2f93 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
 	return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
 }
 
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+					const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..e3f5d6aece66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
 	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
 	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cf52af77d15e..caecbcba9942 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
 	return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
 }
 
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+					const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+	return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
 /*
  * Is the directory transmuting?
  */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5c1613519d5a..807eff2ccce9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
  */
 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
-
-	sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (sbsp == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
 
 	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
 	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	/*
 	 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
 	 */
-	sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
- * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
- *
- */
-static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	kfree(sb->s_security);
-	sb->s_security = NULL;
-}
-
 struct smack_mnt_opts {
 	const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
 };
@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 {
 	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
-	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
  */
 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
 
-	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
 	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
 		return 0;
@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
  */
 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
-	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
 	int rc;
@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	 */
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
 		struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
-		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
 
 		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
 	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
 	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		goto unlockandout;
 
 	sbp = inode->i_sb;
-	sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
 	/*
 	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
 	 * if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
 };
 
 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <jojn.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  1 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h   |  6 ++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c           | 38 ++++-----------
 security/security.c               | 36 +++++++++++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  5 ++
 security/selinux/netlabel.c       | 23 ++++-----
 security/smack/smack.h            |  5 ++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/smack/smack_netfilter.c  |  8 ++--
 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f9222a04968d..b353482ea348 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	int	lbs_cred;
 	int	lbs_file;
 	int	lbs_inode;
+	int	lbs_sock;
 	int	lbs_superblock;
 	int	lbs_ipc;
 	int	lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *peer;
 };
 
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 #define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
 #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
 	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 49d664ddff44..2716e7731279 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
 	return error;
 }
 
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
-	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
  */
 static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
-	SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
 	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
-	kfree(ctx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 				       struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
 
 	new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
 	new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		label = aa_get_current_label();
 
 	if (sock->sk) {
-		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
 
 		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 		ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!skb->secmark)
 		return 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (ctx->peer)
 		return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
  */
 static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!ctx->label)
 		ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				      struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!skb->secmark)
 		return 0;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
 	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
 	.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
 };
 
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
 
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-	ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 	if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
 				    skb->secmark, sk))
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 86198e303203..2c0834db7976 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 }
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 	init_debug("inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	init_debug("ipc blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
 	init_debug("msg_msg blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
 		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
 }
 
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+		sock->sk_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+	if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
  * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sk_free(sk);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
 }
 
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7478d8eda00a..5d74ed35b728 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 
@@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 
 	if (sock->sk) {
-		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
 		sksec->sclass = sclass;
 		sksec->sid = sid;
 		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 				     struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
 
 	sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
 	sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u16 family;
 	int err;
 
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	int err;
 
 	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 					      struct sock *other,
 					      struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	int err;
@@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 					struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 
@@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       u16 family)
 {
 	int err = 0;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					    char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen,
+					    unsigned int len)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
-	if (!sksec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
-	sk->sk_security = sksec;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
-	sk->sk_security = NULL;
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
-	kfree(sksec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
 	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
 	if (!sk)
 		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
 	else {
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 		*secid = sksec->sid;
 	}
@@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 		inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
 	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 				      struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
 				  struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
 	 * the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	int err;
 	u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
 	u32 connsid;
@@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 				   const struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
 	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
 	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
 	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
 	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 perm;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
-		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		sid = sksec->sid;
 	} else
 		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		u32 skb_sid;
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 
-		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
 		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	} else {
 		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
 		 * associated socket. */
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	}
@@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
 };
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
 	return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
 }
 
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
 static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
 							const struct sock *sk,
 							u32 sid)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
 
 	if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
 	if (sk != NULL) {
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
 			return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
 	struct sockaddr *addr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (family == PF_INET)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
 }
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
 	if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
 						struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
 					 struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
 	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index caecbcba9942..4ac4bf3310d7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
 	return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
 }
 
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
 					const struct super_block *superblock)
 {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 807eff2ccce9..fd69e1bd841b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 		if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 
 		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
 			isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 
 	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
 		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
 		/*
 		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-	struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
-	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
-	if (ssp == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 
 	/*
 	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 	}
 	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 
-	sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /**
  * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
  * @sk: the socket
@@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
  */
 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
 
 	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
-#endif
-	kfree(sk->sk_security);
 }
+#endif
 
 /**
 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	int rc;
 	int sk_lbl;
 	struct smack_known *hkp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
 	unsigned short port = 0;
 
@@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 				int act)
 {
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 	unsigned short port;
 	struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
 		ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
 		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
 	}
@@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 		                   struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
 
 	asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
 	bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 		return 0;
 
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 #endif
 
 	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_known *okp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+	struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc = 0;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
  */
 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
 #endif
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	struct smack_known *rsp;
 #endif
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 	int slen = 1;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
 		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
 		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
 		break;
 	case PF_INET:
@@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
 		 */
 		if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
-			ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+			ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 		if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
 		return;
 
-	ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	ssp->smk_in = skp;
 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr;
 	struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 				 const struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
 };
 
@@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
-		ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
 	}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
-		ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>

Move management of the key->security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <jojn.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  1 +
 security/security.c               | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 23 +++++-------------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  7 ++++++
 security/smack/smack.h            |  7 ++++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 33 ++++++++++++-------------
 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b353482ea348..3fe39abccc8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	int	lbs_sock;
 	int	lbs_superblock;
 	int	lbs_ipc;
+	int	lbs_key;
 	int	lbs_msg_msg;
 	int	lbs_task;
 };
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2c0834db7976..7cfedb90210a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
 		blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 	init_debug("file blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
 	init_debug("inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	init_debug("ipc blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	init_debug("key blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 	init_debug("msg_msg blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
 	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
+		key->security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (key->security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
 /**
  * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
  * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+	int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_key_free(key);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 {
 	call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+	kfree(key->security);
+	key->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5d74ed35b728..c83ec2652eda 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
 			     unsigned long flags)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
-	ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ksec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
 
 	tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 	if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
 	else
 		ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
 
-	k->security = ksec;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
-{
-	struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
-
-	k->security = NULL;
-	kfree(ksec);
-}
-
 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 				  const struct cred *cred,
 				  unsigned perm)
@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
-	ksec = key->security;
+	ksec = selinux_key(key);
 
 	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
 			    sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 
 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 {
-	struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
 	char *context = NULL;
 	unsigned len;
 	int rc;
@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
 	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 29f02b8f8f31..3b78aa4ee98f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
 	return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
 static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
 {
 	return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 4ac4bf3310d7..7cc3a3382fee 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
 	return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
 /*
  * Is the directory transmuting?
  */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fd69e1bd841b..e9560b078efe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			   unsigned long flags)
 {
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
 
-	key->security = skp;
+	*blob = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
- * @key: the object
- *
- * Clear the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
-	key->security = NULL;
-}
-
 /**
  * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
  * @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 				const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
+	struct smack_known **blob;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct key *keyp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
 	 * it may do so.
 	 */
-	if (keyp->security == NULL)
+	blob = smack_key(keyp);
+	skp = *blob;
+	if (skp == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	/*
 	 * This should not occur
@@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 		request |= MAY_READ;
 	if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
 		request |= MAY_WRITE;
-	rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
  */
 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+	struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
 	size_t length;
 	char *copy;
 
-	if (key->security == NULL) {
+	if (skp == NULL) {
 		*_buffer = NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
 	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
  /* key management security hooks */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:39   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.

The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.

A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 12 +++++--
 include/linux/security.h   | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c    |  4 ++-
 security/commoncap.c       |  7 +++-
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c |  8 ++++-
 security/safesetid/lsm.c   |  8 ++++-
 security/security.c        | 31 ++++++++++++++----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  5 ++-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  4 ++-
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c   |  8 ++++-
 security/yama/yama_lsm.c   |  4 ++-
 11 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3fe39abccc8f..fe1fb7a69ee5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 } __randomize_layout;
 
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+	const char	*lsm;	/* Name of the LSM */
+	int		slot;	/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
 /*
  * Security module hook list structure.
  * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
 	struct hlist_node		list;
 	struct hlist_head		*head;
 	union security_list_options	hook;
-	char				*lsm;
+	struct lsm_id			*lsmid;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
@@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
 extern char *lsm_names;
 
 extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
-				char *lsm);
+			       struct lsm_id *lsmid);
 
 #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR	BIT(0)
 #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE	BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..5bb8b9a6fa84 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -76,6 +76,72 @@ enum lsm_event {
 	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+	u32     secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID		-1	/* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED		-2	/* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED	-3	/* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+		blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+		if (blob->secid[i] != 0)
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+		if (bloba->secid[i] != blobb->secid[i])
+			return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
 /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
 extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		       int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2716e7731279..6d2eefc9b7c1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1138,6 +1138,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
 };
 
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = { .lsm="apparmor", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
+
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1679,7 +1681,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 		goto buffers_out;
 	}
 	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
-				"apparmor");
+				&apparmor_lsmid);
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
 	apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index afd9679ca866..305a6088c81e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {
+	.lsm="capability",
+	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
 static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 static int __init capability_init(void)
 {
 	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
-				"capability");
+			   &capability_lsmid);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a64169..13db59d5327e 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
 }
 
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid = {
+	.lsm="loadpin",
+	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
 static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforce ? "" : "not ");
-	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+			   &loadpin_lsmid);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index cecd38e2ac80..ca34badde4cf 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid = {
+	.lsm="safesetid",
+	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
 {
 	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
-			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+			   &safesetid_lsmid);
 
 	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
 	safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7cfedb90210a..27e2db3d6b04 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+	init_debug("lsmblob size         = %lu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
 
 	/*
 	 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
 	return !strcmp(last, lsm);
 }
 
-static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
+static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
 {
 	char *cp;
 
@@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __initdata;
+
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
  * @hooks: the hooks to add
  * @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
  *
  * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
  */
 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
-				char *lsm)
+			       struct lsm_id *lsmid)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+			   lsmid->slot);
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+		hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
 		hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
 	}
-	if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+
+	if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
 		panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
 }
 
@@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
-		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
 			continue;
 		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
 	}
@@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
-		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
 			continue;
 		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c83ec2652eda..8c93b07bb353 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6622,6 +6622,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
 };
 
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
+
 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6877,7 +6879,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 
 	hashtab_cache_init();
 
-	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+			   &selinux_lsmid);
 
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e9560b078efe..ad646b865295 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4553,6 +4553,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
 };
 
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
+
 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4743,7 +4745,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	/*
 	 * Register with LSM
 	 */
-	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
 	smack_enabled = 1;
 
 	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 716c92ec941a..57e6b845ea51 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid = {
+	.lsm="tomoyo",
+	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
 /*
  * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
  * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
 
 	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+			   &tomoyo_lsmid);
 	pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
 	s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
 	atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index efac68556b45..2263822a4af7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -425,6 +425,8 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid = { .lsm="yama", .slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED };
+
 static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -482,7 +484,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
 static int __init yama_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
 	yama_init_sysctl();
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:45   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
                   ` (20 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
away when other interfaces get converted.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                |  7 +++++--
 kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
 security/security.c                 | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5bb8b9a6fa84..4f8b478bc3a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1761,7 +1761,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -1777,8 +1778,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					    u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..8786b95b60bd 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 			pid_t pid;
 			u32 sid;
+			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,8 +1355,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+							&blob, f->type,
+							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
 				}
 				break;
 			case AUDIT_EXE:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..18ee5556c086 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
 								   f->lsm_rule);
 			}
@@ -645,15 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								n->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +670,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..5a337239d9e4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..e7b8ce942950 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
+		struct lsmblob blob;
 		int retried = 0;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 27e2db3d6b04..46ca4b85ad96 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
 /*
  * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
  */
-static int lsm_slot __initdata;
+static int lsm_slot;
 
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2433,9 +2433,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					       field, op, lsmrule);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:47   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
                   ` (19 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change it's only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/cred.h     |  3 ++-
 include/linux/security.h |  5 +++--
 kernel/cred.c            | 10 ++++++----
 security/security.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index efb6edf32de7..9a21c376ed97 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 
 struct cred;
 struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
 
 /*
  * COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
 extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
 extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
 extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
 extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4f8b478bc3a1..313e45a3cac3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -971,7 +971,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
 {
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+					 struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 45d77284aed0..71c14dda107e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
 /**
  * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
  * @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
  *
  * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
  * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
  */
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+	return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
 
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
  */
 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
 {
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	return set_security_override(new, secid);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 46ca4b85ad96..f9c8e1926a0b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1627,9 +1627,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
 
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:48   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
                   ` (18 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
code is brought in line with the lsmblob.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h |  7 +++++--
 include/net/af_unix.h    |  2 +-
 include/net/scm.h        |  8 +++++---
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c   |  8 +++++---
 net/unix/af_unix.c       |  6 +++---
 security/security.c      | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 313e45a3cac3..dcf20da87d1b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
 				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1418,7 +1419,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
 
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+						   struct sk_buff *skb,
+						   struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
 	kgid_t			gid;
 	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-	u32			secid;		/* Security ID		*/
+	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Security LSM data	*/
 #endif
 	u32			consumed;
 } __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
 	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
 	struct scm_creds	creds;		/* Skb credentials	*/
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-	u32			secid;		/* Passed security ID 	*/
+	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Passed LSM data	*/
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
 {
-	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
 }
 #else
 static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
 	int err;
 
 	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
-		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
+		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+					       &secdata, &seclen);
 
 		if (!err) {
 			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 82f341e84fae..2a5c868ce135 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct lsmblob lb;
 	char *secdata;
-	u32 seclen, secid;
+	u32 seclen;
 	int err;
 
-	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
-	err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
+	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ddb838a1b74c..c50a004a1389 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+	UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob;
 }
 
 static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+	scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob;
 }
 
 static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+	return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob));
 }
 #else
 static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f9c8e1926a0b..4e1eb2a54064 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2120,10 +2120,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
 				optval, optlen, len);
 }
 
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
-			     skb, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+			     list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
+						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:50   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other
interfaces have yet to be converted.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h          |  5 +++--
 kernel/cred.c                     |  4 +---
 net/netfilter/nft_meta.c          | 13 ++++++-------
 net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c        |  5 ++++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------
 security/security.c               | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dcf20da87d1b..30337f1a9056 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+			     struct lsmblob *blob);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1230,7 +1231,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
 
 static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 					   u32 seclen,
-					   u32 *secid)
+					   struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 71c14dda107e..d70a2c02ced4 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
 {
 	struct lsmblob blob;
-	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
 	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 987d2d6ce624..054fb4b48d51 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -576,21 +576,20 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
 
 static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
 {
-	u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	int err;
 
-	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (!tmp_secid)
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
+	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(blob.secid[0]);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
+	priv->secid = blob.secid[0];
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index f16202d26c20..8081fadc30e9 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -49,13 +49,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
 
 static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
 {
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	int err;
 
 	info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
 	info->secid = 0;
 
 	err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
-				       &info->secid);
+				       &blob);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EINVAL)
 			pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	/* scaffolding during the transition */
+	info->secid = blob.secid[0];
 	if (!info->secid) {
 		pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
 				    info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c92894c3e40a..2976370e41aa 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *addr;
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,12 +919,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
 		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
 				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
-				  &secid);
+				  &blob);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
+	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
-				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
 				 &audit_info);
 }
 
@@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	void *addr;
 	void *mask;
 	u32 addr_len;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,12 +969,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
 		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
 				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
-				  &secid);
+				  &blob);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
+	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
-				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
 				 &audit_info);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4e1eb2a54064..ad9aaa46ed04 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1982,10 +1982,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+			     struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:51   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c                |  4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h                |  5 +++--
 include/net/scm.h                       |  5 ++---
 kernel/audit.c                          |  9 +++++++--
 kernel/auditsc.c                        | 14 ++++++++++----
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  3 +--
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  8 ++++++--
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 +++-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  8 ++++++--
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  6 +++---
 security/security.c                     | 16 +++++++++++++---
 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8685882da64c..1962f6b8abd0 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 
 	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
 		u32 secid;
+		struct lsmblob blob;
 
 		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
-		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 			return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 30337f1a9056..7b4667cc4930 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
 			 size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
 			     struct lsmblob *blob);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1224,7 +1224,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index e2e71c4bf9d0..31ae605fcc0a 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
 	int err;
 
 	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
-		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
-		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
-					       &secdata, &seclen);
+		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
+					       &seclen);
 
 		if (!err) {
 			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c89ea48c70a6..d0338411d75d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		len = 0;
 		if (audit_sig_sid) {
-			err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+			struct lsmblob blob;
+
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 18ee5556c086..d31914088a82 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 	int rc = 0;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
 	if (!ab)
@@ -956,7 +957,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
 	if (sid) {
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
@@ -1198,7 +1200,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 		if (osid) {
 			char *ctx = NULL;
 			u32 len;
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+			struct lsmblob blob;
+
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
@@ -1349,9 +1354,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 	if (n->osid != 0) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
+		struct lsmblob blob;
 
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
-			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
 			if (call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 2a5c868ce135..e05f4ef68bd8 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
-	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
-	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
+	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 66c596d287a5..ca0968f13240 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
 	int len, ret;
 	char *secctx;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
 	int len, ret;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c2ae14c720b4..c793103f3cd7 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	int ret;
 	u32 len;
 	char *secctx;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..59211bff90ab 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
 {
 	u32 seclen = 0;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+	struct lsmblob blob;
+
 	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
 		return 0;
 
 	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 
-	if (skb->secmark)
-		security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+	if (skb->secmark) {
+		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+	}
 
 	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 #endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 2976370e41aa..2d8dd5b84457 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	char *secctx = NULL;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
 	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 unlhsh_add_return:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
 					     &secctx,
 					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
+		if (entry != NULL)
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
 			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 					  addr, mask);
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
+		if (entry != NULL)
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
 			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1090,6 +1098,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 	u32 secid;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
 			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1144,7 +1153,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 		secid = addr6->secid;
 	}
 
-	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_cb_failure;
 	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 4676f5bb16ae..2ccc6567e2a2 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
 		return NULL;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
 			 audit_info->sessionid);
 
+	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
 	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
-				     &secctx,
-				     &secctx_len) == 0) {
+	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ad9aaa46ed04..0c7784a243e7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1975,10 +1975,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
-				seclen);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					      secdata, seclen);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:53   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditsc.c         |  5 ++++-
 security/security.c      | 12 +++++++++---
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7b4667cc4930..41dc3053094e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1102,9 +1102,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+					 struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
 }
 
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d31914088a82..148733ec3c72 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2268,11 +2268,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
 	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
-	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
+	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
 	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0c7784a243e7..5245d4d1e799 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1795,10 +1795,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
 }
 
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+	}
 }
 
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:55   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c              |  4 +---
 include/linux/security.h              |  7 +++---
 kernel/audit.c                        |  6 ++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                  |  4 +---
 kernel/auditsc.c                      | 22 ++++++++++++------
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |  5 +++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |  6 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 33 +++++++++++++++------------
 security/security.c                   | 12 +++++++---
 10 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 1962f6b8abd0..144ac4f1c24f 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	t->priority = task_nice(current);
 
 	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
-		u32 secid;
 		struct lsmblob blob;
 
-		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
 		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 41dc3053094e..cfd7cf4b0be9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1029,9 +1029,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+					  struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d0338411d75d..a0205f3c23c7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2075,14 +2075,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
-	u32 sid;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-	if (!sid)
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
 		return 0;
 
-	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
 	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 8786b95b60bd..8f244c98bb57 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 			pid_t pid;
-			u32 sid;
 			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
-					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 							&blob, f->type,
 							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 148733ec3c72..7112fe31684d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
-	u32 sid;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			   logged upon error */
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				if (need_sid) {
-					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
@@ -2365,12 +2363,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2387,6 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
 	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2397,7 +2399,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
 	}
 
 	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
@@ -2410,7 +2414,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2431,7 +2437,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 2d8dd5b84457..2294aa9471e6 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1552,11 +1552,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+	audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..ab88baaaa50d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,11 @@
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+	struct lsmblob blob;
+
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+	audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5fb7127bbe68..85c7692fc4a3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
 				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..fefa848cf0c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -335,12 +335,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  */
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -363,10 +364,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
-				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -387,10 +390,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -499,7 +503,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -521,9 +525,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
-				   MAY_READ, func);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+				   size, MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5245d4d1e799..2f123003b0b3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1712,10 +1712,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
 }
 
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:56   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditsc.c                    |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  4 +---
 security/security.c                 | 11 +++++++++--
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cfd7cf4b0be9..2d81cac418e3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
@@ -858,9 +858,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+					   struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
 }
 
 static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7112fe31684d..54797c0fc3b7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1910,13 +1910,17 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
+	struct lsmblob blob;
+
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e7b8ce942950..92ee3d984c73 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
-		u32 osid;
 		struct lsmblob blob;
 		int retried = 0;
 
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
-			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2f123003b0b3..91388553d3d7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1404,9 +1404,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+	}
 }
 
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:57   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accomodate multiple possible LSM audit users.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h          |  2 +-
 kernel/audit.c                    | 14 +++++-------
 kernel/audit.h                    |  5 +++--
 kernel/auditsc.c                  | 37 +++++++++++--------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  8 +++----
 security/security.c               | 12 +++++++---
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2d81cac418e3..d310fa3942ce 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a0205f3c23c7..1b51e907f131 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static u32	audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
 /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
 kuid_t		audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
 pid_t		audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32		audit_sig_sid = 0;
+struct lsmblob	audit_sig_lsm;
 
 /* Records can be lost in several ways:
    0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	}
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		len = 0;
-		if (audit_sig_sid) {
-			struct lsmblob blob;
-
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
-			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+						       &len);
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
 		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!sig_data) {
-			if (audit_sig_sid)
+			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
 				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
 		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
-		if (audit_sig_sid) {
+		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
 			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
 			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 		}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 958d5b8fc1b3..29e29c6f4afb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	kuid_t		    target_auid;
 	kuid_t		    target_uid;
 	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
-	u32		    target_sid;
+	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
 	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
 
 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
 extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
 
 extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
 
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 54797c0fc3b7..c7aa39bda5cc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
 	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
-	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	struct lsmblob	target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
 	int			pid_count;
 };
@@ -938,14 +938,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 }
 
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
-				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
-				 u32 sid, char *comm)
+				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+				 unsigned int sessionid,
+				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 	int rc = 0;
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
 	if (!ab)
@@ -954,9 +954,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
-	if (sid) {
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
@@ -1527,7 +1526,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 						  axs->target_auid[i],
 						  axs->target_uid[i],
 						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
-						  axs->target_sid[i],
+						  &axs->target_lsm[i],
 						  axs->target_comm[i]))
 				call_panic = 1;
 	}
@@ -1536,7 +1535,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
 				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
 				  context->target_sessionid,
-				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+				  &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
 			call_panic = 1;
 
 	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1713,7 +1712,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 	context->aux = NULL;
 	context->aux_pids = NULL;
 	context->target_pid = 0;
-	context->target_sid = 0;
+	lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
 	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
 	context->type = 0;
 	context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2367,15 +2366,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
-	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2392,7 +2388,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
 	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2403,9 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
-		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
 	}
 
 	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
@@ -2418,9 +2411,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
-		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
-		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2441,9 +2432,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
-	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index fefa848cf0c7..1afb75a893af 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -363,7 +363,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
@@ -373,9 +372,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
-				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 91388553d3d7..3180a6f30625 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1627,10 +1627,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
 }
 
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+			continue;
+		hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:58   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 10 ++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  9 +++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 27 +++++++++++----------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 12 ++++++------
 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 5a337239d9e4..73b3b15dec5c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+		   int *pcr);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags, int *pcr);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..94b2a4840d81 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+		   int *pcr)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 85c7692fc4a3..3ff7aae81829 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
  */
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
 				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1afb75a893af..0588dd9a88db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
 					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
 
@@ -366,16 +365,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
-				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
-				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -393,8 +390,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -526,9 +522,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
-				   size, MAY_READ, func);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 92ee3d984c73..dbad256aa7b4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
-			    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+			    const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
 			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
@@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags, int *pcr)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
 		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
                     ` (2 more replies)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 3 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
active.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
 security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
 	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		0666),
 	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
 	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
+	ATTR(NULL, "display",		0666),
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 	DIR("smack",			0555,
 	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
 
 char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_task = sizeof(int),	/* slot number for the "display" LSM */
+};
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
 
 /*
  * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
  */
 static int lsm_slot;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
 
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
 	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
 		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
 			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+		lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
 		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
 		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
 			   lsmid->slot);
@@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
  */
 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
 {
+	int *display;
+
 	if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
 		task->security = NULL;
 		return 0;
@@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
 	task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (task->security == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
+	 * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+	 * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+	 */
+	display = task->security;
+	*display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 
 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
+	int *odisplay = current->security;
+	int *ndisplay;
 	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
 
-	if (rc)
+	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
+
 	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
-	if (unlikely(rc))
+	if (unlikely(rc)) {
 		security_task_free(task);
-	return rc;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	ndisplay = task->security;
+	if (ndisplay && odisplay)
+		*ndisplay = *odisplay;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
 				char **value)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int *display = current->security;
+	int slot = 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+		/*
+		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+		 */
+		if (lsm_slot == 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+			slot = *display;
+		*value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*value)
+			return strlen(*value);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
 		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
 			continue;
+		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+			continue;
 		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
 	}
 	return -EINVAL;
@@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
 			 size_t size)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	char *term;
+	char *cp;
+	int *display = current->security;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+	int slot = 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+		/*
+		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+		 */
+		if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memcpy(cp, value, size);
+
+		term = strchr(cp, ' ');
+		if (term == NULL)
+			term = strchr(cp, '\n');
+		if (term != NULL)
+			*term = '\0';
+
+		for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+			if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+				*display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+				rc = size;
+				break;
+			}
+
+		kfree(cp);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
 		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
 			continue;
+		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+			continue;
 		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
 	}
 	return -EINVAL;
@@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
+	int *display = current->security;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
-		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
-					      secdata, seclen);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			return rc;
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					secdata, seclen);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
 			     struct lsmblob *blob)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
+	int *display = current->security;
 
 	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
-		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
-					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			return rc;
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+			return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
-	call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int *display = current->security;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
+		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+			return;
+		}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
@@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
 				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
-				optval, optlen, len);
+	int *display = current->security;
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+			     list)
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+			return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+								 optlen, len);
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
 
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c                | 10 +++++--
 fs/kernfs/dir.c                         |  9 ++++--
 fs/kernfs/inode.c                       |  7 +++--
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                       |  8 +++--
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                       |  7 +++--
 include/linux/security.h                | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/net/scm.h                       |  4 ++-
 kernel/audit.c                          | 14 ++++++---
 kernel/auditsc.c                        | 12 ++++++--
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  4 ++-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  4 ++-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 ++-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         | 13 ++++++---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 19 +++++++++---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  4 ++-
 security/security.c                     | 12 ++++----
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c              | 14 ++++++---
 17 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 144ac4f1c24f..89e574be34cc 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2876,6 +2876,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
 	char *secctx = NULL;
 	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
 
 	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
 	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3158,7 +3159,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
 					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
 					    secctx, secctx_sz);
-		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
 		secctx = NULL;
 	}
 	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3479,8 +3481,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
 	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
 err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
-	if (secctx)
-		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+	if (secctx) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	}
 err_get_secctx_failed:
 	kfree(tcomplete);
 	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index b84d635567d3..92afad387237 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	kfree_const(kn->name);
 
 	if (kn->iattr) {
-		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
-			security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
-						kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
+		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
+			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
+					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
+			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+		}
 		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
 		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 0c1fd945ce42..02cde9dac5ee 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 {
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	void *secdata;
 	u32 secdata_len = 0;
 	int error;
@@ -368,8 +369,10 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
 	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
 
-	if (secdata)
-		security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
+	if (secdata) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
+	}
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 4dbb0ee23432..af1c0db29c39 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -131,8 +131,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 static inline void
 nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
 {
-	if (label)
-		security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+	if (label) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	}
 }
 static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
 {
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 3de42a729093..bb3db033e144 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2420,6 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 	__be32 status;
 	int err;
 	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
+	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
 	void *context = NULL;
 	int contextlen;
 	bool contextsupport = false;
@@ -2919,8 +2920,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 
 out:
 #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
-	if (context)
-		security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+	if (context) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
 	kfree(acl);
 	if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d310fa3942ce..046012a7255f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -76,6 +76,41 @@ enum lsm_event {
 	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
 };
 
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+	char	*context;	/* Provided by the module */
+	u32	len;
+	int	slot;		/* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+				   u32 size, int slot)
+{
+	cp->slot = slot;
+	cp->context = context;
+
+	if (context == NULL || size == 0)
+		cp->len = 0;
+	else
+		cp->len = strlen(context);
+}
+
 /*
  * Data exported by the security modules
  *
@@ -449,7 +484,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
 			     struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
 
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1240,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
 }
 
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 31ae605fcc0a..6c7c3c229e4a 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
 {
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	char *secdata;
 	u32 seclen;
 	int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
 
 		if (!err) {
 			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
-			security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 	}
 }
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1b51e907f131..f844a2a642e6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
 	char			*ctx = NULL;
 	u32			len;
+	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
 
 	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
 	if (err)
@@ -1437,15 +1438,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		}
 		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!sig_data) {
-			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
-				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+			}
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
 		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
 		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
 			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
 		}
 		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
 				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2074,6 +2078,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
 	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2087,7 +2092,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	}
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
 	return 0;
 
 error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c7aa39bda5cc..9fab0e7d90c3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -960,7 +961,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
 		}
 	}
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1172,6 +1174,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 
 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 {
+	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	int i;
 
@@ -1205,7 +1208,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
 			}
 		}
 		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
 		struct lsmblob blob;
+		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
 
 		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1360,7 +1365,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				*call_panic = 2;
 		} else {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index e05f4ef68bd8..7834c357b60b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	struct lsmblob lb;
 	char *secdata;
 	u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return;
 
 	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
-	security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
 }
 
 static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index ca0968f13240..6954e6600583 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	int len, ret;
 	char *secctx;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
 	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 
 	ret = 0;
 nla_put_failure:
-	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
 	return ret;
 }
 #else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c793103f3cd7..79158ad0486e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	u32 len;
 	char *secctx;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
 	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 
 	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
 
-	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
 }
 #else
 static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 59211bff90ab..fe8403ef4e89 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
 	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
 	bool csum_verify;
+	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
 	char *secdata = NULL;
 	u32 seclen = 0;
 
@@ -629,8 +630,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	}
 
 	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
-	if (seclen)
-		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+	if (seclen) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	}
 	return skb;
 
 nla_put_failure:
@@ -638,8 +641,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
 nlmsg_failure:
-	if (seclen)
-		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+	if (seclen) {
+		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	}
 	return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 2294aa9471e6..15b1945853be 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	char *secctx = NULL;
 	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -457,7 +458,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 					     &secctx,
 					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+			/* scaffolding */
+			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
 		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -516,7 +520,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+			/* scaffolding */
+			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
 		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -553,6 +559,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -580,7 +587,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
 		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1094,6 +1102,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
 	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	void *data;
 	u32 secid;
 	char *secctx;
@@ -1161,7 +1170,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
 			  secctx_len,
 			  secctx);
-	security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_cb_failure;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 2ccc6567e2a2..94aea4985b74 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 					       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	char *secctx;
 	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
 	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
-		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
 	}
 
 	return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 82e29c477fa4..3563b1e2f8f9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2116,17 +2116,19 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int *display = current->security;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
-		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
-		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
-			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+		if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+			hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+			memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
 			return;
 		}
+
+	pr_warn("%s context \"%s\" from slot %d not released\n", __func__,
+		cp->context, cp->slot);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ad646b865295..3d571c438dfa 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4439,11 +4439,16 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
- * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
- * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+/**
+ * smack_release_secctx - do everything necessary to free a context
+ * @secdata: Unused
+ * @seclen: Unused
+ *
+ * Do nothing but hold a slot in the hooks list.
  */
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
 
 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
@@ -4685,6 +4690,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
                     ` (2 more replies)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 3 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
 include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
 include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
 kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
 kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
 security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
 12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
 	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
 	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
-	char *secctx = NULL;
-	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
-	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 
 	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
 	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		struct lsmblob blob;
 
 		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
-		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 			return_error_param = ret;
 			return_error_line = __LINE__;
 			goto err_get_secctx_failed;
 		}
-		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
 	}
 
 	trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
@@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		t->buffer = NULL;
 		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
 	}
-	if (secctx) {
+	if (lsmctx.context) {
 		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
 				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
 				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
-				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+				    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
 
 		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
 		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
 					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
-					    secctx, secctx_sz);
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-		secctx = NULL;
+					    lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
+		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
 	}
 	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
 	t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
 	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
 err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
-	if (secctx) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-	}
+	if (lsmctx.context)
+		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
 err_get_secctx_failed:
 	kfree(tcomplete);
 	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 046012a7255f..7255825aa697 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
 			 size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
 			     struct lsmblob *blob);
 void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 }
 
 static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
-					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 6c7c3c229e4a..4a6ad8caf423 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -93,17 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
 {
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	char *secdata;
-	u32 seclen;
 	int err;
 
 	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
-		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
-					       &seclen);
+		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
 
 		if (!err) {
-			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
-			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
+				 context.len, context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f844a2a642e6..436c23429319 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
 	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
 	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
-	char			*ctx = NULL;
 	u32			len;
-	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
+	struct lsmcontext	context;
 
 	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
 	if (err)
@@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		len = 0;
 		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
-			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
-						       &len);
+			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+						       &context);
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
 		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!sig_data) {
-			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
-				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
-				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-			}
+			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+				security_release_secctx(&context);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
 		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
 		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
-			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
-			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
-			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
 				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	unsigned len;
 	int error;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
-	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
 	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
-	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
 	return 0;
 
 error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 9fab0e7d90c3..0478680cd0a8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	u32 len;
+	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
 	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
-			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
 		}
 	}
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 
 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 {
-	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	int i;
 
@@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
 				 context->ipc.mode);
 		if (osid) {
-			char *ctx = NULL;
-			u32 len;
+			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
 			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
 				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
 			}
 		}
@@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
 				 MINOR(n->rdev));
 	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		char *ctx = NULL;
-		u32 len;
 		struct lsmblob blob;
-		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 
 		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
 			if (call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 2;
 		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
-			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 7834c357b60b..80ae0c5a1301 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct lsmcontext context;
 	struct lsmblob lb;
-	char *secdata;
-	u32 seclen;
 	int err;
 
 	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
-	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
 	if (err)
 		return;
 
-	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
-	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
 	security_release_secctx(&context);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 6954e6600583..403307ff0fff 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
 	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
-	int len, ret;
-	char *secctx;
+	int ret;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
 	if (ret)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 	if (!nest_secctx)
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 
-	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
 
 	ret = 0;
 nla_put_failure:
-	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
 	security_release_secctx(&context);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
 	int len, ret;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
 	if (ret)
 		return 0;
 
+	len = context.len;
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
+
 	return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
 	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
 #else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 79158ad0486e..fcb51ab2bb8b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
 	int ret;
-	u32 len;
-	char *secctx;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
-	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
 	if (ret)
 		return;
 
-	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
 
-	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
 	security_release_secctx(&context);
 }
 #else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index fe8403ef4e89..6da00c7add5b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
 	u32 seclen = 0;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
 		return 0;
@@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
 
 	if (skb->secmark) {
 		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
-		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+		*secdata = context.context;
 	}
 
 	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	seclen = context.len;
 #endif
 	return seclen;
 }
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 15b1945853be..4716e0011ba5 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	char *secctx = NULL;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
 		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
-					     &secctx,
-					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
-			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			/* scaffolding */
-			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 		if (entry != NULL)
 			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
-					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
-			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			/* scaffolding */
-			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 		if (entry != NULL)
 			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
-					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
-			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
-			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
 		}
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 	struct lsmcontext context;
 	void *data;
 	u32 secid;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 	}
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
-	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_cb_failure;
 	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
 			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
-			  secctx_len,
-			  secctx);
-	/* scaffolding */
-	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+			  context.len,
+			  context.context);
 	security_release_secctx(&context);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 94aea4985b74..2d1307f65250 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 
 	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
 	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
-		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
-		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
 		security_release_secctx(&context);
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3563b1e2f8f9..97b468f6e6a9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2081,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int *display = current->security;
@@ -2089,10 +2089,13 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
-		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
+		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
 			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
 					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
-					secdata, seclen);
+					&cp->context, &cp->len);
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
                     ` (2 more replies)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 3 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_dentry_init_security() interface to
fill an lsmcontext structure instead of a void * data area
and a length. The lone caller of this interface is NFS4,
which may make copies of the data using its own mechanisms.
A rework of the nfs4 code to use the lsmcontext properly
is a significant project, so the coward's way out is taken,
and the lsmcontext data from security_dentry_init_security()
is copied, then released directly.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c        | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/security.h |  7 +++----
 security/security.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index af1c0db29c39..952f805965bb 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
 nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
 {
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	int err;
 
 	if (label == NULL)
@@ -122,21 +123,26 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		return NULL;
 
 	err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
-				&dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
-	if (err == 0)
-		return label;
+					    &dentry->d_name, &context);
+
+	if (err)
+		return NULL;
+
+	label->label = kmemdup(context.context, context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (label->label == NULL)
+		label = NULL;
+	else
+		label->len = context.len;
+
+	security_release_secctx(&context);
+
+	return label;
 
-	return NULL;
 }
 static inline void
 nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
 {
-	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
-
-	if (label) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-	}
+	kfree(label->label);
 }
 static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
 {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7255825aa697..2674eb70c2d7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
 				int len, void **mnt_opts);
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
-					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
-					u32 *ctxlen);
+					const struct qstr *name,
+					struct lsmcontext *ctx);
 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					struct qstr *name,
 					const struct cred *old,
@@ -724,8 +724,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
 						 int mode,
 						 const struct qstr *name,
-						 void **ctx,
-						 u32 *ctxlen)
+						 struct lsmcontext *ctx)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 97b468f6e6a9..61cdc6bcd32e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1024,11 +1024,22 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
-					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
-					u32 *ctxlen)
+				  const struct qstr *name,
+				  struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
-				name, ctx, ctxlen);
+	int *display = current->security;
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
+			     list)
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
+		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+			return hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode,
+					name, (void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
+		}
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:36   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook. A lsmcontext is used within kernfs to store
the security information as well.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/dir.c             |  8 ++------
 fs/kernfs/inode.c           | 34 ++++++++++++----------------------
 fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  3 +--
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c           | 23 +++++++++--------------
 include/linux/security.h    |  5 +++--
 security/security.c         | 14 ++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index 92afad387237..1d000289d8b7 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,12 +532,8 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	kfree_const(kn->name);
 
 	if (kn->iattr) {
-		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
-		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
-			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
-					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
-			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-		}
+		if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context)
+			security_release_secctx(&kn->iattr->ia_context);
 		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
 		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 02cde9dac5ee..ffbf7863306d 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -135,21 +135,14 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
-				  u32 *secdata_len)
+static void kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,
+				   struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
-	void *old_secdata;
-	size_t old_secdata_len;
+	struct lsmcontext old_context;
 
-	old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
-	old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
-
-	attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
-	attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
-
-	*secdata = old_secdata;
-	*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
-	return 0;
+	old_context = attrs->ia_context;
+	attrs->ia_context = *cp;
+	*cp = old_context;
 }
 
 ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -192,8 +185,8 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
 		 * persistent copy in kernfs_node.
 		 */
 		set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
-		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
-					    attrs->ia_secdata_len);
+		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_context.context,
+					    attrs->ia_context.len);
 	}
 
 	if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
@@ -350,8 +343,6 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	void *secdata;
-	u32 secdata_len = 0;
 	int error;
 
 	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
@@ -361,18 +352,17 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &context);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
 	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
-	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+	kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &context);
 	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
 
-	if (secdata) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
+	if (context.context)
 		security_release_secctx(&context);
-	}
+
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 0b7d197a904c..844a028d282f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
 
 struct kernfs_iattrs {
 	struct iattr		ia_iattr;
-	void			*ia_secdata;
-	u32			ia_secdata_len;
+	struct lsmcontext	ia_context;
 
 	struct simple_xattrs	xattrs;
 };
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index bb3db033e144..1209083565dd 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
 #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
 static inline __be32
 nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
-			    void *context, int len)
+			    struct lsmcontext *context)
 {
 	__be32 *p;
 
-	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
 	if (!p)
 		return nfserr_resource;
 
@@ -2318,13 +2318,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 	 */
 	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
 	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
-	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
 	return 0;
 }
 #else
 static inline __be32
 nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
-			    void *context, int len)
+			    struct lsmcontext *context)
 { return 0; }
 #endif
 
@@ -2420,9 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 	__be32 status;
 	int err;
 	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
-	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
-	void *context = NULL;
-	int contextlen;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	bool contextsupport = false;
 	struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
 	u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
@@ -2479,7 +2477,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 	     bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
 		if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
 			err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
-						&context, &contextlen);
+						       &context);
 		else
 			err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -2908,8 +2906,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 	}
 
 	if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
-		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
-								contextlen);
+		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
 		if (status)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2920,10 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
 
 out:
 #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
-	if (context) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-	}
+	if (context.context)
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
 #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
 	kfree(acl);
 	if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2674eb70c2d7..c16aea55be97 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 61cdc6bcd32e..45b9f905f5c0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2164,9 +2164,19 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+	int *display = current->security;
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list)
+		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
+		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+			return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode,
+					(void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
+		}
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 6da00c7add5b..69efb688383f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,12 +305,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 	return -1;
 }
 
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
 {
-	u32 seclen = 0;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
-	struct lsmcontext context;
 
 	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
 		return 0;
@@ -318,15 +316,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
 	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 
 	if (skb->secmark) {
+		/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */
 		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
-		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
-		*secdata = context.context;
+		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
 	}
 
 	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
-	seclen = context.len;
+	return context->len;
+#else
+	return 0;
 #endif
-	return seclen;
 }
 
 static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -402,8 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
 	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
 	bool csum_verify;
-	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
-	char *secdata = NULL;
+	struct lsmcontext context;
 	u32 seclen = 0;
 
 	size =    nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
@@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	}
 
 	if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
-		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
+		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
 		if (seclen)
 			size += nla_total_size(seclen);
 	}
@@ -605,7 +603,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	    nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 
-	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 
 	if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -633,10 +631,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	}
 
 	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
-	if (seclen) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-	}
+	if (seclen)
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
 	return skb;
 
 nla_put_failure:
@@ -644,10 +640,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
 nlmsg_failure:
-	if (seclen) {
-		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
-		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
-	}
+	if (seclen)
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
revision of LSM interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 kernel/audit.h   |  6 +++---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 40 +++++++++++++---------------------------
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	kuid_t			uid;
 	kgid_t			gid;
 	dev_t			rdev;
-	u32			osid;
+	struct lsmblob		olsm;
 	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
 	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
 	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	kuid_t		    target_auid;
 	kuid_t		    target_uid;
 	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
-	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
+	struct lsmblob	    target_lsm;
 	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 			kuid_t			uid;
 			kgid_t			gid;
 			umode_t			mode;
-			u32			osid;
+			struct lsmblob		olsm;
 			int			has_perm;
 			uid_t			perm_uid;
 			gid_t			perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0478680cd0a8..ec8872430fb6 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
-					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								&blob,
+								&name->olsm,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
-						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								&blob,
+								&n->olsm,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
@@ -955,7 +952,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
 	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
 		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
@@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				context->socketcall.args[i]);
 		break; }
 	case AUDIT_IPC: {
-		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+		struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
 				 context->ipc.mode);
-		if (osid) {
+		if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
 			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
-			struct lsmblob blob;
 
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
@@ -1346,13 +1341,11 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
 				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
 				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		struct lsmblob blob;
+	if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
 		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 			if (call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 2;
 		} else {
@@ -1906,17 +1899,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	struct lsmblob blob;
-
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
-	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
@@ -2266,14 +2255,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
 	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
-	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
-	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
 	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accomodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/net/netlabel.h              |  8 ++--
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c               |  6 ++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c        |  6 +--
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c   | 57 +++++++++++------------------
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h   |  2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  1 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c         |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  4 +-
 security/smack/smack.h              |  1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  5 ++-
 security/smack/smackfs.c            | 10 +++--
 12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..6c550455e69f 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
  * @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
  * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
  * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
  *
  * Description:
  * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
 			struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
 			u32 lvl;
 		} mls;
-		u32 secid;
+		struct lsmblob lsmblob;
 	} attr;
 };
 
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 				const void *addr,
 				const void *mask,
 				u16 family,
-				u32 secid,
+				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
 				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
 				const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 					      const void *addr,
 					      const void *mask,
 					      u16 family,
-					      u32 secid,
+					      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
 					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index f0165c5f376b..eb4939f38a14 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1481,7 +1481,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 
 	buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
 	buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
-	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
+	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0];
 
 	return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
 }
@@ -1501,7 +1502,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 				 const unsigned char *tag,
 				 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
+	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0] = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ee3e5b6471a6..724d44943543 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
  * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
  * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
  * @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
  * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 				const void *addr,
 				const void *mask,
 				u16 family,
-				u32 secid,
+				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
 				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	u32 addr_len;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
 				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
-				 secid, audit_info);
+				 lsmblob, audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 4716e0011ba5..57ede7781c8f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
 #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
 	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
 struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
 
 	struct netlbl_af4list list;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
 #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
 	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
 struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
 
 	struct netlbl_af6list list;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
  * @iface: the associated interface entry
  * @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
  * @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
  *
  * Description:
  * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
 static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				   const struct in_addr *addr,
 				   const struct in_addr *mask,
-				   u32 secid)
+				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
 	entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
 	entry->list.valid = 1;
-	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
  * @iface: the associated interface entry
  * @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
  * @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
  *
  * Description:
  * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				   const struct in6_addr *addr,
 				   const struct in6_addr *mask,
-				   u32 secid)
+				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
 	entry->list.mask = *mask;
 	entry->list.valid = 1;
-	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		      const void *addr,
 		      const void *mask,
 		      u32 addr_len,
-		      u32 secid,
+		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
 		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
 	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
 		const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
 
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
 		if (audit_buf != NULL)
 			netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
 						  dev_name,
@@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
 		const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
 
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
 		if (audit_buf != NULL)
 			netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
 						  dev_name,
@@ -451,8 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 unlhsh_add_return:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
 					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -487,7 +485,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,10 +504,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
-		if (entry != NULL)
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
 					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -551,7 +546,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -570,10 +564,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 					  addr, mask);
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
-		if (entry != NULL)
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
 					 context.context);
 			security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -927,9 +919,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
-	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
-				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
+				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
 				 &audit_info);
 }
 
@@ -977,10 +968,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		return ret_val;
 
-	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
-				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
-				 &audit_info);
+				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob, &audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1092,8 +1081,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct lsmcontext context;
 	void *data;
-	u32 secid;
-	struct lsmblob blob;
+	struct lsmblob *lsmb;
 
 	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
 			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1131,7 +1119,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 		if (ret_val != 0)
 			goto list_cb_failure;
 
-		secid = addr4->secid;
+		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
 	} else {
 		ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
 					   NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1145,11 +1133,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 		if (ret_val != 0)
 			goto list_cb_failure;
 
-		secid = addr6->secid;
+		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
 	}
 
-	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
-	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto list_cb_failure;
 	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1500,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      &iface->addr4_list);
 		if (addr4 == NULL)
 			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
-		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
 		break;
 	}
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1513,7 +1500,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      &iface->addr6_list);
 		if (addr6 == NULL)
 			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
-		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
 		break;
 	}
 #endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 3a9e5dc9511b..dcff99695c97 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		      const void *addr,
 		      const void *mask,
 		      u32 addr_len,
-		      u32 secid,
+		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
 		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
 			 const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8c93b07bb353..d90dfce15d44 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6622,7 +6622,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
 };
 
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
 
 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b5b7c5aade8c..f0ca3879ba48 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 
 extern int selinux_enabled;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
 
 /* Policy capabilities */
 enum {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..120d50c1bcac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
 		return NULL;
 
 	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
-	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+	    (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
 		return secattr;
 
 	return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e3f5d6aece66..4ca0e006c3cc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
-		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+		*sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		rc = -EIDRM;
 		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3666,7 +3666,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
-	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
 	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
 	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 7cc3a3382fee..039bf5de56b4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
  * Shared data.
  */
 extern int smack_enabled;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3d571c438dfa..a8d56ce00918 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3741,7 +3741,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		/*
 		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
 		 */
-		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+		return smack_from_secid(
+				sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
 	/*
 	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
 	 * for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4558,7 +4559,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
 };
 
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
 
 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index faf2ea3968b3..6a4c468c200c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
 static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
 	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
 	struct sockaddr_in newname;
 	char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
 	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
 	 */
-	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+		lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+		lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
 		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
-			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
-			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+			&audit_info);
+	}
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = count;
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
                     ` (2 more replies)
  2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  25 siblings, 3 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 6d2eefc9b7c1..fb5798683ae1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1079,22 +1079,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 	return error;
 }
 
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
-					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
-	/* TODO: requires secid support */
-	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
 /**
  * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
  * @sk: child sock
@@ -1195,8 +1179,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 #endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
 		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
-		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1707,7 +1689,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
 	.name = "apparmor",
-	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
 	.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
 	.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
 	.init = apparmor_init,
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 21:04 ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 21:25   ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
  2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:11PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> This patchset provides the changes required for
> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> 
> Because of the changes to slot handling and the rework of
> "display" I have not included the Reviewed-by tags from the
> previous version.
> 
> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
>     - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
>     - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
>       with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
>       LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
>       lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
>       slot value.
>     - Validate slot values used in security.c
>     - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
>       it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
>     - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
>     - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
>       the audit log

I think you missed adding my and John's Reviewed-bys from v3?

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-26 23:04     ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 21:25   ` Casey Schaufler
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook, Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 2:04 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:11PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>


here v

>> Because of the changes to slot handling and the rework of
>> "display" I have not included the Reviewed-by tags from the
>> previous version.


>>
>> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
>>     - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
>>     - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
>>       with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
>>       LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
>>       lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
>>       slot value.
>>     - Validate slot values used in security.c
>>     - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
>>       it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
>>     - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
>>     - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
>>       the audit log
> 
> I think you missed adding my and John's Reviewed-bys from v3?
> 
Casey stated why above


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-26 21:25   ` Casey Schaufler
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-26 21:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey

On 6/26/2019 2:04 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:11PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
>> Because of the changes to slot handling and the rework of
>> "display" I have not included the Reviewed-by tags from the
>> previous version.
>>
>> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
>>     - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
>>     - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
>>       with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
>>       LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
>>       lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
>>       slot value.
>>     - Validate slot values used in security.c
>>     - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
>>       it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
>>     - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
>>     - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
>>       the audit log
> I think you missed adding my and John's Reviewed-bys from v3?

See the sentence just before "v4:". I thought that the changes
where sufficient to require re-review. If you don't think they
are, I will happily accept the Reviewed-bys.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-26 23:04     ` Kees Cook
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Johansen
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 02:11:23PM -0700, John Johansen wrote:
> On 6/26/19 2:04 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:11PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> This patchset provides the changes required for
> >> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> >>
> 
> 
> here v
> 
> >> Because of the changes to slot handling and the rework of
> >> "display" I have not included the Reviewed-by tags from the
> >> previous version.
> 
> 
> >>
> >> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
> >>     - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
> >>     - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
> >>       with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
> >>       LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
> >>       lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
> >>       slot value.
> >>     - Validate slot values used in security.c
> >>     - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
> >>       it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
> >>     - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
> >>     - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
> >>       the audit log
> > 
> > I think you missed adding my and John's Reviewed-bys from v3?
> > 
> Casey stated why above

Oops! Thanks! I skimmed too fast and only read the "v4" log. :P

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:45   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:16PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
> 
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
> temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
> away when other interfaces get converted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                |  7 +++++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
>  security/security.c                 | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 5bb8b9a6fa84..4f8b478bc3a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1761,7 +1761,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
>  int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> +			      void *lsmrule);
>  void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
>  
>  #else
> @@ -1777,8 +1778,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> -					    void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> +					    u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 63f8b3f26fab..8786b95b60bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
>  			pid_t pid;
>  			u32 sid;
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			switch (f->type) {
>  			case AUDIT_PID:
> @@ -1354,8 +1355,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> -						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> +					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> +							&blob, f->type,
> +							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>  				}
>  				break;
>  			case AUDIT_EXE:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d1eab1d4a930..18ee5556c086 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int i, need_sid = 1;
>  	u32 sid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	unsigned int sessionid;
>  
>  	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> @@ -630,7 +631,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
> -				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> +				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> +								   f->type,
>  								   f->op,
>  								   f->lsm_rule);
>  			}
> @@ -645,15 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				/* Find files that match */
>  				if (name) {
> +					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> -								name->osid,
> +								&blob,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule);
>  				} else if (ctx) {
>  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> +						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
> -								n->osid,
> +								&blob,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -665,7 +670,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
>  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
>  					break;
> -				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> +				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> +				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
>  							      f->type, f->op,
>  							      f->lsm_rule))
>  					++result;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d213e835c498..5a337239d9e4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> -					     void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> +					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>  {
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e0cc323f948f..e7b8ce942950 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>  		int rc = 0;
>  		u32 osid;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  		int retried = 0;
>  
>  		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> @@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
>  			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> -			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
>  							rule->lsm[i].rule);
> @@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
>  							rule->lsm[i].rule);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 27e2db3d6b04..46ca4b85ad96 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>  /*
>   * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>   */
> -static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> +static int lsm_slot;

This should be __ro_after_init now.

>  
>  /**
>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -2433,9 +2433,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>  	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>  }
>  
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> +			      void *lsmrule)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					       field, op, lsmrule);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */

Thanks for the WARN()s! :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:47   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:17PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
> structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
> module stacking. Change it's only caller, set_security_override,
> to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
> set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
> parameter type.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/cred.h     |  3 ++-
>  include/linux/security.h |  5 +++--
>  kernel/cred.c            | 10 ++++++----
>  security/security.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index efb6edf32de7..9a21c376ed97 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  
>  struct cred;
>  struct inode;
> +struct lsmblob;
>  
>  /*
>   * COW Supplementary groups list
> @@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
>  extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
>  extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
>  extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
> -extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
> +extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
>  extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
>  extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
>  extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 4f8b478bc3a1..313e45a3cac3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
>  int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
>  void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
>  int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
> @@ -971,7 +971,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
>  {
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
> +static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
> +					 struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 45d77284aed0..71c14dda107e 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
>  /**
>   * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
>   * @new: The credentials to alter
> - * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
> + * @blob: The LSM security information to set
>   *
>   * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
>   * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
>   */
> -int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
> +	return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>  
> @@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>   */
>  int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	u32 secid;
>  	int ret;
>  
> @@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	return set_security_override(new, secid);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 46ca4b85ad96..f9c8e1926a0b 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1627,9 +1627,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>  
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:48   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:18PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 +++++--
>  include/net/af_unix.h    |  2 +-
>  include/net/scm.h        |  8 +++++---
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c   |  8 +++++---
>  net/unix/af_unix.c       |  6 +++---
>  security/security.c      | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 313e45a3cac3..dcf20da87d1b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
>  int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> +				     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
>  void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
>  void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1418,7 +1419,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
>  	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> +						   struct sk_buff *skb,
> +						   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
>  	kgid_t			gid;
>  	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> -	u32			secid;		/* Security ID		*/
> +	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Security LSM data	*/
>  #endif
>  	u32			consumed;
>  } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
>  	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
>  	struct scm_creds	creds;		/* Skb credentials	*/
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> -	u32			secid;		/* Passed security ID 	*/
> +	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Passed LSM data	*/
>  #endif
>  };
>  
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
> -	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> +	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
>  }
>  #else
>  static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> +		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> +					       &secdata, &seclen);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 82f341e84fae..2a5c868ce135 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob lb;
>  	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen, secid;
> +	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
> -	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> +	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> +	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index ddb838a1b74c..c50a004a1389 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> +	UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob;
>  }
>  
>  static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> +	scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob;
>  }
>  
>  static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> +	return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob));
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f9c8e1926a0b..4e1eb2a54064 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2120,10 +2120,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				optval, optlen, len);
>  }
>  
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> +				     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> -			     skb, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> +			     list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> +						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			break;
> +	}
> +	return rc;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:50   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:19PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
> of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
> string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
> appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other
> interfaces have yet to be converted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h          |  5 +++--
>  kernel/cred.c                     |  4 +---
>  net/netfilter/nft_meta.c          | 13 ++++++-------
>  net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c        |  5 ++++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------
>  security/security.c               | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index dcf20da87d1b..30337f1a9056 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> +			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>  
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> @@ -1230,7 +1231,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>  
>  static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
>  					   u32 seclen,
> -					   u32 *secid)
> +					   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 71c14dda107e..d70a2c02ced4 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>  int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  {
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	u32 secid;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> +	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>  	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index 987d2d6ce624..054fb4b48d51 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -576,21 +576,20 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>  
>  static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
>  {
> -	u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	int err;
>  
> -	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> +	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	if (!tmp_secid)
> -		return -ENOENT;
> -
> -	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> +	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> +	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(blob.secid[0]);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> +	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> +	priv->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index f16202d26c20..8081fadc30e9 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -49,13 +49,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
>  
>  static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
>  	info->secid = 0;
>  
>  	err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> -				       &info->secid);
> +				       &blob);
>  	if (err) {
>  		if (err == -EINVAL)
>  			pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
>  		return err;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* scaffolding during the transition */
> +	info->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	if (!info->secid) {
>  		pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
>  				    info->secctx);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index c92894c3e40a..2976370e41aa 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	void *addr;
>  	void *mask;
>  	u32 addr_len;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>  
>  	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -919,12 +919,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
>  		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
>  				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> -				  &secid);
> +				  &blob);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> +	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> +				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> @@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	void *addr;
>  	void *mask;
>  	u32 addr_len;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>  
>  	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -968,12 +969,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
>  		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
>  				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> -				  &secid);
> +				  &blob);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> +	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> +				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 4e1eb2a54064..ad9aaa46ed04 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1982,10 +1982,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>  
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> +			     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> +					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:51   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:20PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
> instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
> using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
> callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
> possibility that more than one module may be called upon
> to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
> audit code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                |  4 +++-
>  include/linux/security.h                |  5 +++--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  5 ++---
>  kernel/audit.c                          |  9 +++++++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 14 ++++++++++----
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  3 +--
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  8 ++++++--
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 +++-
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  8 ++++++--
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++----
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  6 +++---
>  security/security.c                     | 16 +++++++++++++---
>  12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 8685882da64c..1962f6b8abd0 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  
>  	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
>  		u32 secid;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>  			return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 30337f1a9056..7b4667cc4930 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> @@ -1224,7 +1224,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> +					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index e2e71c4bf9d0..31ae605fcc0a 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> -					       &secdata, &seclen);
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> +					       &seclen);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index c89ea48c70a6..d0338411d75d 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
>  		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
> @@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	u32 sid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
>  	if (!sid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>  			goto error_path;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 18ee5556c086..d31914088a82 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
>  	if (!ab)
> @@ -956,7 +957,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (sid) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1198,7 +1200,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  		if (osid) {
>  			char *ctx = NULL;
>  			u32 len;
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
> @@ -1349,9 +1354,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
>  		char *ctx = NULL;
>  		u32 len;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
> -			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 2a5c868ce135..e05f4ef68bd8 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 66c596d287a5..ca0968f13240 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
>  	int len, ret;
>  	char *secctx;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>  	int len, ret;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index c2ae14c720b4..c793103f3cd7 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 len;
>  	char *secctx;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 0dcc3592d053..59211bff90ab 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  {
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  
> -	if (skb->secmark)
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
> +	if (skb->secmark) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> +	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  #endif
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2976370e41aa..2d8dd5b84457 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
>  	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
> @@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  unlhsh_add_return:
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx,
>  					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> @@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
> @@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> +		if (entry != NULL)
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>  			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  					  addr, mask);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> +		if (entry != NULL)
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>  			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -1090,6 +1098,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	u32 secid;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
>  			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
> @@ -1144,7 +1153,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		secid = addr6->secid;
>  	}
>  
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 4676f5bb16ae..2ccc6567e2a2 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
>  		return NULL;
> @@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
>  			 audit_info->sessionid);
>  
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
> -				     &secctx,
> -				     &secctx_len) == 0) {
> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
>  		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
>  	}
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index ad9aaa46ed04..0c7784a243e7 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1975,10 +1975,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
> -				seclen);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					      secdata, seclen);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:53   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:21PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
> for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
> audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
> later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c         |  5 ++++-
>  security/security.c      | 12 +++++++++---
>  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 7b4667cc4930..41dc3053094e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
>  void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
>  void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
>  int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
> @@ -1102,9 +1102,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> +					 struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d31914088a82..148733ec3c72 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2268,11 +2268,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
>  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
>  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
>  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
>  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> -	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
> +	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> +	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
>  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 0c7784a243e7..5245d4d1e799 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1795,10 +1795,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
>  	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
>  }
>  
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:55   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
> LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
> possible secids for possible reporting.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c              |  4 +---
>  include/linux/security.h              |  7 +++---
>  kernel/audit.c                        |  6 ++---
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                  |  4 +---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                      | 22 ++++++++++++------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |  5 +++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |  6 ++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 33 +++++++++++++++------------
>  security/security.c                   | 12 +++++++---
>  10 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 1962f6b8abd0..144ac4f1c24f 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->priority = task_nice(current);
>  
>  	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
> -		u32 secid;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
>  		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 41dc3053094e..cfd7cf4b0be9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
>  int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
>  int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1029,9 +1029,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
> +					  struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index d0338411d75d..a0205f3c23c7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2075,14 +2075,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
> -	u32 sid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -	if (!sid)
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
>  	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 8786b95b60bd..8f244c98bb57 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
>  			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
>  			pid_t pid;
> -			u32 sid;
>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			switch (f->type) {
> @@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
>  							&blob, f->type,
>  							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 148733ec3c72..7112fe31684d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int i, need_sid = 1;
> -	u32 sid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	unsigned int sessionid;
>  
> @@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			   logged upon error */
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				if (need_sid) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
> -				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
>  				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
>  								   f->type,
>  								   f->op,
> @@ -2365,12 +2363,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
>  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
> +	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2387,6 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
>  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
>  	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
>  	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> @@ -2397,7 +2399,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
> +		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> @@ -2410,7 +2414,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> +		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2431,7 +2437,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> +	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2d8dd5b84457..2294aa9471e6 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1552,11 +1552,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
>  	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
>  	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
> +	audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
>  	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 4a397cde1a48..ab88baaaa50d 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -48,7 +48,11 @@
>  static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until secid is converted */
> +	audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>  	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 5fb7127bbe68..85c7692fc4a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
>  int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
>  	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
>  				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 357edd140c09..fefa848cf0c7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -335,12 +335,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>   */
>  int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
> -					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
> +		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -363,10 +364,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> -				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> @@ -387,10 +390,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   */
>  int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
>  }
> @@ -499,7 +503,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
>  {
>  	enum ima_hooks func;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
>  		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -521,9 +525,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  	}
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
> -				   MAY_READ, func);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
> +				   size, MAY_READ, func);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5245d4d1e799..2f123003b0b3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1712,10 +1712,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
>  }
>  
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:56   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:23PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
> lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
> callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
> for IMA and audit.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                    |  6 +++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  4 +---
>  security/security.c                 | 11 +++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index cfd7cf4b0be9..2d81cac418e3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
>  int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
>  int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
>  int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
>  int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
>  int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
> @@ -858,9 +858,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
> +					   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 7112fe31684d..54797c0fc3b7 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1910,13 +1910,17 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
>  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
>  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
>  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
>  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
>  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
> -	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
> +	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> +	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
>  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
>  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
>  		return;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e7b8ce942950..92ee3d984c73 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		return false;
>  	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>  		int rc = 0;
> -		u32 osid;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  		int retried = 0;
>  
> @@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2f123003b0b3..91388553d3d7 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1404,9 +1404,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
>  
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:57   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:24PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
> lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
> in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
> to accomodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h          |  2 +-
>  kernel/audit.c                    | 14 +++++-------
>  kernel/audit.h                    |  5 +++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                  | 37 +++++++++++--------------------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  8 +++----
>  security/security.c               | 12 +++++++---
>  6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2d81cac418e3..d310fa3942ce 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
>  int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
> -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
> +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index a0205f3c23c7..1b51e907f131 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static u32	audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
>  /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
>  kuid_t		audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
>  pid_t		audit_sig_pid = -1;
> -u32		audit_sig_sid = 0;
> +struct lsmblob	audit_sig_lsm;
>  
>  /* Records can be lost in several ways:
>     0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
> @@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	}
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
> -		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> -			struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> +						       &len);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (audit_sig_sid)
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
>  				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
> -		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>  			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
>  			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
>  		}
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 958d5b8fc1b3..29e29c6f4afb 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
>  #include <linux/tty.h>
>  
> @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	kuid_t		    target_auid;
>  	kuid_t		    target_uid;
>  	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
> -	u32		    target_sid;
> +	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
>  	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  
>  	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
>  
>  extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
>  extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
> -extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
> +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
>  
>  extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 54797c0fc3b7..c7aa39bda5cc 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
>  	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> -	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> +	struct lsmblob	target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  	int			pid_count;
>  };
> @@ -938,14 +938,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
>  }
>  
>  static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> -				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
> -				 u32 sid, char *comm)
> +				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> +				 unsigned int sessionid,
> +				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
>  	if (!ab)
> @@ -954,9 +954,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> -	if (sid) {
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1527,7 +1526,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  						  axs->target_auid[i],
>  						  axs->target_uid[i],
>  						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
> -						  axs->target_sid[i],
> +						  &axs->target_lsm[i],
>  						  axs->target_comm[i]))
>  				call_panic = 1;
>  	}
> @@ -1536,7 +1535,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
>  				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
>  				  context->target_sessionid,
> -				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
> +				  &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
>  			call_panic = 1;
>  
>  	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
> @@ -1713,7 +1712,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
>  	context->aux = NULL;
>  	context->aux_pids = NULL;
>  	context->target_pid = 0;
> -	context->target_sid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
>  	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
>  	context->type = 0;
>  	context->fds[0] = -1;
> @@ -2367,15 +2366,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
>  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
> -	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2392,7 +2388,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
>  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
>  	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
>  	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> @@ -2403,9 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
> -		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> @@ -2418,9 +2411,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> -		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2441,9 +2432,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> -	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index fefa848cf0c7..1afb75a893af 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -363,7 +363,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	u32 secid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> @@ -373,9 +372,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
> -				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
> +	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
> +				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 91388553d3d7..3180a6f30625 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1627,10 +1627,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
>  	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
>  }
>  
> -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
> +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-26 23:58   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:25PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
> call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
> to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 10 ++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  9 +++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 27 +++++++++++----------------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 12 ++++++------
>  5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 5a337239d9e4..73b3b15dec5c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
>  };
>  
>  /* LIM API function definitions */
> -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
> +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
> +		   int *pcr);
>  int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> @@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
>  const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
>  
>  /* IMA policy related functions */
> -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
> +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> +		     int flags, int *pcr);
>  void ima_init_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index c7505fb122d4..94b2a4840d81 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>   * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
>   * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
>   * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
> - * @secid: secid of the task being validated
> + * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
>   * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
>   *        MAY_APPEND)
>   * @func: caller identifier
> @@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>   * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
>   *
>   */
> -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
> +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
> +		   int *pcr)
>  {
>  	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
>  
>  	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
>  
> -	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
> +	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 85c7692fc4a3..3ff7aae81829 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
>   */
>  int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
> -	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
> +	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
>  				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 1afb75a893af..0588dd9a88db 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
>  }
>  
>  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> -			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
> -			       enum ima_hooks func)
> +			       struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
> +			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
> @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
>  	 * Included is the appraise submask.
>  	 */
> -	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
> +	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr);
>  	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
>  			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
>  	if (!action && !violation_check)
> @@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
>  		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
> -		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
>  					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
>  
> @@ -366,16 +365,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> -				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> +	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
> +				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
>  	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
> -				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
> +	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
> +				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -393,8 +390,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
>  }
> @@ -526,9 +522,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
> -				   size, MAY_READ, func);
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
> +				   MAY_READ, func);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 92ee3d984c73..dbad256aa7b4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
>   * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
>   */
>  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> -			    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> +			    const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
>  			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
>  {
>  	int i;
> @@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
> @@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
>   * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
>   * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
>   *        being made
> - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
> + * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
>   * @func: IMA hook identifier
>   * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
>   * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
> @@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
>   * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
>   * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
>   */
> -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
> +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> +		     int flags, int *pcr)
>  {
>  	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
>  	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
> @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>  		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
>  			continue;
>  
> -		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
> +		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask))
>  			continue;
>  
>  		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:33   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:26PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
> active.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
>  security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>  	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		0666),
>  	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
>  	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "display",		0666),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>  	DIR("smack",			0555,
>  	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>  
>  char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	.lbs_task = sizeof(int),	/* slot number for the "display" LSM */
> +};
>  
>  /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>  static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>  
>  /*
>   * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
>   */
>  static int lsm_slot;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>  
>  /**
>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>  		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>  			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> +		lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
>  		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>  		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>  			   lsmid->slot);
> @@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>   */
>  static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
> +	int *display;
> +
>  	if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
>  		task->security = NULL;
>  		return 0;
> @@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>  	task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (task->security == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> +	 * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> +	 * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> +	 */
> +	display = task->security;
> +	*display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>  
>  int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
>  {
> +	int *odisplay = current->security;
> +	int *ndisplay;
>  	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>  
> -	if (rc)
> +	if (unlikely(rc))
>  		return rc;
> +
>  	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> -	if (unlikely(rc))
> +	if (unlikely(rc)) {
>  		security_task_free(task);
> -	return rc;
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	ndisplay = task->security;
> +	if (ndisplay && odisplay)
> +		*ndisplay = *odisplay;
> +
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>  				char **value)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> +			slot = *display;
> +		*value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (*value)
> +			return strlen(*value);
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>  		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>  	}
>  	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	char *term;
> +	char *cp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int rc = -EINVAL;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (cp == NULL)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		memcpy(cp, value, size);
> +
> +		term = strchr(cp, ' ');
> +		if (term == NULL)
> +			term = strchr(cp, '\n');
> +		if (term != NULL)
> +			*term = '\0';
> +
> +		for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> +			if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> +				*display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> +				rc = size;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +		kfree(cp);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>  		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>  	}
>  	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					      secdata, seclen);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> +					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					secdata, seclen);
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> -					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> +						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
> -	call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +			return;
> +		}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>  
> @@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> -				optval, optlen, len);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> +			     list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> +								 optlen, len);
> +	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
>  
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:27PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 10 +++++--
>  fs/kernfs/dir.c                         |  9 ++++--
>  fs/kernfs/inode.c                       |  7 +++--
>  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                       |  8 +++--
>  fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                       |  7 +++--
>  include/linux/security.h                | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  4 ++-
>  kernel/audit.c                          | 14 ++++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 12 ++++++--
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         | 13 ++++++---
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 19 +++++++++---
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  4 ++-
>  security/security.c                     | 12 ++++----
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c              | 14 ++++++---
>  17 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 144ac4f1c24f..89e574be34cc 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2876,6 +2876,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3158,7 +3159,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
>  					    secctx, secctx_sz);
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  		secctx = NULL;
>  	}
>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
> @@ -3479,8 +3481,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> -	if (secctx)
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> +	if (secctx) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> index b84d635567d3..92afad387237 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> @@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  	kfree_const(kn->name);
>  
>  	if (kn->iattr) {
> -		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
> -			security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> -						kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
> +		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
> +			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> +					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +		}
>  		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
>  		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
>  	}
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> index 0c1fd945ce42..02cde9dac5ee 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> @@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  {
>  	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
>  	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *secdata;
>  	u32 secdata_len = 0;
>  	int error;
> @@ -368,8 +369,10 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
>  	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
>  
> -	if (secdata)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
> +	if (secdata) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
> +	}
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index 4dbb0ee23432..af1c0db29c39 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -131,8 +131,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  static inline void
>  nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> -	if (label)
> -		security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +
> +	if (label) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  }
>  static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index 3de42a729093..bb3db033e144 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2420,6 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	__be32 status;
>  	int err;
>  	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  	void *context = NULL;
>  	int contextlen;
>  	bool contextsupport = false;
> @@ -2919,8 +2920,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  
>  out:
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> -	if (context)
> -		security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
> +	if (context) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
>  	kfree(acl);
>  	if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d310fa3942ce..046012a7255f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,41 @@ enum lsm_event {
>  	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * A "security context" is the text representation of
> + * the information used by LSMs.
> + * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
> + * it is useful for.
> + */
> +struct lsmcontext {
> +	char	*context;	/* Provided by the module */
> +	u32	len;
> +	int	slot;		/* Identifies the module */
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
> + * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
> + * @context: Initial context, or NULL
> + * @size: Size of context, or 0
> + * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
> + *
> + * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
> + * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
> + * lsmcontext integration is complete.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
> +				   u32 size, int slot)
> +{
> +	cp->slot = slot;
> +	cp->context = context;
> +
> +	if (context == NULL || size == 0)
> +		cp->len = 0;
> +	else
> +		cp->len = strlen(context);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Data exported by the security modules
>   *
> @@ -449,7 +484,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
> -void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> +void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
>  int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1240,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 31ae605fcc0a..6c7c3c229e4a 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secdata;
>  	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
> @@ -102,7 +103,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -			security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  	}
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 1b51e907f131..f844a2a642e6 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
>  	char			*ctx = NULL;
>  	u32			len;
> +	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>  	if (err)
> @@ -1437,15 +1438,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> -				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> +				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +			}
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>  			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  		}
>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> @@ -2074,6 +2078,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> @@ -2087,7 +2092,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	}
>  
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> -	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index c7aa39bda5cc..9fab0e7d90c3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> @@ -960,7 +961,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  		}
>  	}
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1172,6 +1174,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>  
>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -1205,7 +1208,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> +				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
>  		}
>  		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> @@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  		char *ctx = NULL;
>  		u32 len;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
> +		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> @@ -1360,7 +1365,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index e05f4ef68bd8..7834c357b60b 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	struct lsmblob lb;
>  	char *secdata;
>  	u32 seclen;
> @@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		return;
>  
>  	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -	security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index ca0968f13240..6954e6600583 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	int len, ret;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>  	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> @@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  
>  	ret = 0;
>  nla_put_failure:
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index c793103f3cd7..79158ad0486e 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	u32 len;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>  	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> @@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  
>  	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
>  
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 59211bff90ab..fe8403ef4e89 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
>  	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
>  	bool csum_verify;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  	char *secdata = NULL;
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  
> @@ -629,8 +630,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
> -	if (seclen)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	if (seclen) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  	return skb;
>  
>  nla_put_failure:
> @@ -638,8 +641,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	kfree_skb(skb);
>  	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
>  nlmsg_failure:
> -	if (seclen)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	if (seclen) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2294aa9471e6..15b1945853be 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -457,7 +458,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  					     &secctx,
>  					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			/* scaffolding */
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -516,7 +520,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			/* scaffolding */
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -553,6 +559,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -580,7 +587,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -1094,6 +1102,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
>  	u32 secid;
>  	char *secctx;
> @@ -1161,7 +1170,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
>  			  secctx_len,
>  			  secctx);
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +	/* scaffolding */
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 2ccc6567e2a2..94aea4985b74 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  					       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
>  	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	}
>  
>  	return audit_buf;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 82e29c477fa4..3563b1e2f8f9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2116,17 +2116,19 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
> -void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> -		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> -			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +		if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
> +			memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>  			return;
>  		}
> +
> +	pr_warn("%s context \"%s\" from slot %d not released\n", __func__,
> +		cp->context, cp->slot);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>  
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index ad646b865295..3d571c438dfa 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4439,11 +4439,16 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -/*
> - * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
> - * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
> - * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
> +/**
> + * smack_release_secctx - do everything necessary to free a context
> + * @secdata: Unused
> + * @seclen: Unused
> + *
> + * Do nothing but hold a slot in the hooks list.
>   */
> +static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +{
> +}
>  
>  static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  {
> @@ -4685,6 +4690,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:28PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>  			return_error_param = ret;
>  			return_error_line = __LINE__;
>  			goto err_get_secctx_failed;
>  		}
> -		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  	}
>  
>  	trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
> @@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		t->buffer = NULL;
>  		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
>  	}
> -	if (secctx) {
> +	if (lsmctx.context) {
>  		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> -				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +				    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  
>  		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
> -					    secctx, secctx_sz);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -		secctx = NULL;
> +					    lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  	}
>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
>  	t->buffer->transaction = t;
> @@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> -	if (secctx) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (lsmctx.context)
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 046012a7255f..7255825aa697 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> -					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 6c7c3c229e4a..4a6ad8caf423 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -93,17 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> -					       &seclen);
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
> -			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> +				 context.len, context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  	}
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f844a2a642e6..436c23429319 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
>  	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
> -	char			*ctx = NULL;
>  	u32			len;
> -	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext	context;
>  
>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>  	if (err)
> @@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> -						       &len);
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> +						       &context);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -			}
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> +				security_release_secctx(&context);
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> @@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>  
>  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  {
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>  			goto error_path;
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 9fab0e7d90c3..0478680cd0a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	u32 len;
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  	int rc = 0;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>  
>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  {
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
>  		if (osid) {
> -			char *ctx = NULL;
> -			u32 len;
> +			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
>  				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
>  		}
> @@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		char *ctx = NULL;
> -		u32 len;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
> -		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> +		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 7834c357b60b..80ae0c5a1301 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	struct lsmblob lb;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 6954e6600583..403307ff0fff 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> -	int len, ret;
> -	char *secctx;
> +	int ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	if (!nest_secctx)
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
> -	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
> +	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>  
>  	ret = 0;
>  nla_put_failure:
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> @@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>  	int len, ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	len = context.len;
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
>  	return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
>  	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 79158ad0486e..fcb51ab2bb8b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>  static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	u32 len;
> -	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return;
>  
> -	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
> +	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>  
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index fe8403ef4e89..6da00c7add5b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  
>  	if (skb->secmark) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> +		*secdata = context.context;
>  	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> +	seclen = context.len;
>  #endif
>  	return seclen;
>  }
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 15b1945853be..4716e0011ba5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> @@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx,
> -					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
>  	u32 secid;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> @@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	}
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
> -			  secctx_len,
> -			  secctx);
> -	/* scaffolding */
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			  context.len,
> +			  context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 94aea4985b74..2d1307f65250 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> @@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3563b1e2f8f9..97b468f6e6a9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2081,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  	int *display = current->security;
> @@ -2089,10 +2089,13 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
>  			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>  					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					secdata, seclen);
> +					&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-28 10:07   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:29PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_dentry_init_security() interface to
> fill an lsmcontext structure instead of a void * data area
> and a length. The lone caller of this interface is NFS4,
> which may make copies of the data using its own mechanisms.
> A rework of the nfs4 code to use the lsmcontext properly
> is a significant project, so the coward's way out is taken,
> and the lsmcontext data from security_dentry_init_security()
> is copied, then released directly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c        | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 +++----
>  security/security.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index af1c0db29c39..952f805965bb 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
>  nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (label == NULL)
> @@ -122,21 +123,26 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		return NULL;
>  
>  	err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
> -				&dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
> -	if (err == 0)
> -		return label;
> +					    &dentry->d_name, &context);
> +
> +	if (err)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	label->label = kmemdup(context.context, context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (label->label == NULL)
> +		label = NULL;
> +	else
> +		label->len = context.len;
> +
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
> +	return label;
>  
> -	return NULL;
>  }
>  static inline void
>  nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -
> -	if (label) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	kfree(label->label);
>  }
>  static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 7255825aa697..2674eb70c2d7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>  int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
>  				int len, void **mnt_opts);
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -					u32 *ctxlen);
> +					const struct qstr *name,
> +					struct lsmcontext *ctx);
>  int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>  					struct qstr *name,
>  					const struct cred *old,
> @@ -724,8 +724,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
>  						 int mode,
>  						 const struct qstr *name,
> -						 void **ctx,
> -						 u32 *ctxlen)
> +						 struct lsmcontext *ctx)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 97b468f6e6a9..61cdc6bcd32e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1024,11 +1024,22 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  }
>  
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -					u32 *ctxlen)
> +				  const struct qstr *name,
> +				  struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
> -				name, ctx, ctxlen);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
> +			     list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> +			return hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode,
> +					name, (void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
> +
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:36   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:30PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
> a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
> This provides the information about which LSM created the
> context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
> correct hook. A lsmcontext is used within kernfs to store
> the security information as well.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  fs/kernfs/dir.c             |  8 ++------
>  fs/kernfs/inode.c           | 34 ++++++++++++----------------------
>  fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  3 +--
>  fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c           | 23 +++++++++--------------
>  include/linux/security.h    |  5 +++--
>  security/security.c         | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> index 92afad387237..1d000289d8b7 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> @@ -532,12 +532,8 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  	kfree_const(kn->name);
>  
>  	if (kn->iattr) {
> -		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> -					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -		}
> +		if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context)
> +			security_release_secctx(&kn->iattr->ia_context);
>  		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
>  		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
>  	}
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> index 02cde9dac5ee..ffbf7863306d 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> @@ -135,21 +135,14 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
> -				  u32 *secdata_len)
> +static void kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,
> +				   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	void *old_secdata;
> -	size_t old_secdata_len;
> +	struct lsmcontext old_context;
>  
> -	old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
> -	old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
> -
> -	attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
> -	attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
> -
> -	*secdata = old_secdata;
> -	*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
> -	return 0;
> +	old_context = attrs->ia_context;
> +	attrs->ia_context = *cp;
> +	*cp = old_context;
>  }
>  
>  ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
> @@ -192,8 +185,8 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
>  		 * persistent copy in kernfs_node.
>  		 */
>  		set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
> -		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
> -					    attrs->ia_secdata_len);
> +		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_context.context,
> +					    attrs->ia_context.len);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
> @@ -350,8 +343,6 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
>  	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	void *secdata;
> -	u32 secdata_len = 0;
>  	int error;
>  
>  	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
> @@ -361,18 +352,17 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
> -	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
> +	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &context);
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
> -	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
> +	kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &context);
>  	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
>  
> -	if (secdata) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
> +	if (context.context)
>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
> -	}
> +
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> index 0b7d197a904c..844a028d282f 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
>  
>  struct kernfs_iattrs {
>  	struct iattr		ia_iattr;
> -	void			*ia_secdata;
> -	u32			ia_secdata_len;
> +	struct lsmcontext	ia_context;
>  
>  	struct simple_xattrs	xattrs;
>  };
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index bb3db033e144..1209083565dd 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
>  static inline __be32
>  nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> -			    void *context, int len)
> +			    struct lsmcontext *context)
>  {
>  	__be32 *p;
>  
> -	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> +	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
>  	if (!p)
>  		return nfserr_resource;
>  
> @@ -2318,13 +2318,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
>  	 */
>  	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
>  	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
> -	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
> +	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline __be32
>  nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> -			    void *context, int len)
> +			    struct lsmcontext *context)
>  { return 0; }
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -2420,9 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	__be32 status;
>  	int err;
>  	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -	void *context = NULL;
> -	int contextlen;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	bool contextsupport = false;
>  	struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
>  	u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
> @@ -2479,7 +2477,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	     bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
>  		if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
>  			err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
> -						&context, &contextlen);
> +						       &context);
>  		else
>  			err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  		contextsupport = (err == 0);
> @@ -2908,8 +2906,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	}
>  
>  	if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
> -		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
> -								contextlen);
> +		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
>  		if (status)
>  			goto out;
>  	}
> @@ -2920,10 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  
>  out:
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> -	if (context) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (context.context)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
>  	kfree(acl);
>  	if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2674eb70c2d7..c16aea55be97 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
>  int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
>  int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>  
>  static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> @@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 61cdc6bcd32e..45b9f905f5c0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2164,9 +2164,19 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
>  
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> +			return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode,
> +					(void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
> pointers, and remove scaffolding.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 6da00c7add5b..69efb688383f 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -305,12 +305,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
>  	return -1;
>  }
>  
> -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
>  {
> -	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -318,15 +316,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  
>  	if (skb->secmark) {
> +		/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> -		*secdata = context.context;
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
>  	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> -	seclen = context.len;
> +	return context->len;
> +#else
> +	return 0;
>  #endif
> -	return seclen;
>  }
>  
>  static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
> @@ -402,8 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
>  	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
>  	bool csum_verify;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -	char *secdata = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  
>  	size =    nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
> @@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
> -		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
> +		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
>  		if (seclen)
>  			size += nla_total_size(seclen);
>  	}
> @@ -605,7 +603,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	    nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
> -	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
> +	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
>  	if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
> @@ -633,10 +631,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
> -	if (seclen) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (seclen)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return skb;
>  
>  nla_put_failure:
> @@ -644,10 +640,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	kfree_skb(skb);
>  	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
>  nlmsg_failure:
> -	if (seclen) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (seclen)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:32PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
> a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
> to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
> removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
> revision of LSM interfaces.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  kernel/audit.h   |  6 +++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c | 40 +++++++++++++---------------------------
>  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
>  	kuid_t			uid;
>  	kgid_t			gid;
>  	dev_t			rdev;
> -	u32			osid;
> +	struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
>  	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
>  	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	kuid_t		    target_auid;
>  	kuid_t		    target_uid;
>  	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
> -	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
> +	struct lsmblob	    target_lsm;
>  	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  
>  	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  			kuid_t			uid;
>  			kgid_t			gid;
>  			umode_t			mode;
> -			u32			osid;
> +			struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  			int			has_perm;
>  			uid_t			perm_uid;
>  			gid_t			perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 0478680cd0a8..ec8872430fb6 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				/* Find files that match */
>  				if (name) {
> -					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&name->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule);
>  				} else if (ctx) {
>  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> -						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&n->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
>  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
>  					break;
> -				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> -				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> +				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
>  							      f->type, f->op,
>  							      f->lsm_rule))
>  					++result;
> @@ -955,7 +952,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
>  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> @@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				context->socketcall.args[i]);
>  		break; }
>  	case AUDIT_IPC: {
> -		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> +		struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
>  
>  		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
>  				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
> -		if (osid) {
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
>  			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt)) {
> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> @@ -1346,13 +1341,11 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
> -	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		struct lsmblob blob;
> +	if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
>  		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1906,17 +1899,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
>  {
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
> -
>  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
>  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
>  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
>  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
>  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
> -	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> -	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
>  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
>  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
>  		return;
> @@ -2266,14 +2255,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
>  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
>  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
>  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
>  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> -	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> -	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
>  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:33PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
> the internal storage is used to pass information between
> these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
> to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
> callers to accomodate the change. This requires that the
> modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
> correct secid when using netlabel.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  include/net/netlabel.h              |  8 ++--
>  net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c               |  6 ++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c        |  6 +--
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c   | 57 +++++++++++------------------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h   |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/hooks.c            |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/include/security.h |  1 +
>  security/selinux/netlabel.c         |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  4 +-
>  security/smack/smack.h              |  1 +
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  5 ++-
>  security/smack/smackfs.c            | 10 +++--
>  12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
> index 72d6435fc16c..6c550455e69f 100644
> --- a/include/net/netlabel.h
> +++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
> @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
>   * @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
>   * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
>   * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
> - * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
> + * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
> @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
>  			struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
>  			u32 lvl;
>  		} mls;
> -		u32 secid;
> +		struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  	} attr;
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  				const void *addr,
>  				const void *mask,
>  				u16 family,
> -				u32 secid,
> +				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
>  int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
>  				const char *dev_name,
> @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  					      const void *addr,
>  					      const void *mask,
>  					      u16 family,
> -					      u32 secid,
> +					      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	return -ENOSYS;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> index f0165c5f376b..eb4939f38a14 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> @@ -1481,7 +1481,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
>  
>  	buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
>  	buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
> -	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
> +	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
> +	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0];
>  
>  	return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
>  }
> @@ -1501,7 +1502,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
>  				 const unsigned char *tag,
>  				 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
>  {
> -	secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
> +	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
> +	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0] = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
>  	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
>  
>  	return 0;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> index ee3e5b6471a6..724d44943543 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
>   * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
>   * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
>   * @family: address family
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
>   * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
>   *
>   * Description:
> @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  				const void *addr,
>  				const void *mask,
>  				u16 family,
> -				u32 secid,
> +				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	u32 addr_len;
> @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
>  				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> -				 secid, audit_info);
> +				 lsmblob, audit_info);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 4716e0011ba5..57ede7781c8f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
>  #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
>  	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
>  struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  
>  	struct netlbl_af4list list;
>  	struct rcu_head rcu;
> @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
>  #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
>  	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
>  struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  
>  	struct netlbl_af6list list;
>  	struct rcu_head rcu;
> @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
>   * @iface: the associated interface entry
>   * @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
>   * @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
> @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
>  static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  				   const struct in_addr *addr,
>  				   const struct in_addr *mask,
> -				   u32 secid)
> +				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
> @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  	entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
>  	entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
>  	entry->list.valid = 1;
> -	entry->secid = secid;
> +	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
> @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>   * @iface: the associated interface entry
>   * @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
>   * @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  				   const struct in6_addr *addr,
>  				   const struct in6_addr *mask,
> -				   u32 secid)
> +				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  	entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
>  	entry->list.mask = *mask;
>  	entry->list.valid = 1;
> -	entry->secid = secid;
> +	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		      const void *addr,
>  		      const void *mask,
>  		      u32 addr_len,
> -		      u32 secid,
> +		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
> @@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
>  	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
> @@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
>  		const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
>  
> -		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
> +		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
>  		if (audit_buf != NULL)
>  			netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
>  						  dev_name,
> @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
>  		const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
>  
> -		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
> +		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
>  		if (audit_buf != NULL)
>  			netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
>  						  dev_name,
> @@ -451,8 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  unlhsh_add_return:
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -487,7 +485,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
> @@ -507,10 +504,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> -		if (entry != NULL)
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -551,7 +546,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -570,10 +564,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  					  addr, mask);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> -		if (entry != NULL)
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -927,9 +919,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> -	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> +				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> @@ -977,10 +968,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> -	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> -				 &audit_info);
> +				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob, &audit_info);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -1092,8 +1081,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
> -	u32 secid;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmblob *lsmb;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
>  			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
> @@ -1131,7 +1119,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		if (ret_val != 0)
>  			goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> -		secid = addr4->secid;
> +		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
>  	} else {
>  		ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
>  					   NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
> @@ -1145,11 +1133,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		if (ret_val != 0)
>  			goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> -		secid = addr6->secid;
> +		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
>  	}
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> @@ -1500,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					      &iface->addr4_list);
>  		if (addr4 == NULL)
>  			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
> -		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
> +		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
>  		break;
>  	}
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> @@ -1513,7 +1500,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					      &iface->addr6_list);
>  		if (addr6 == NULL)
>  			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
> -		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
> +		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
>  		break;
>  	}
>  #endif /* IPv6 */
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> index 3a9e5dc9511b..dcff99695c97 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		      const void *addr,
>  		      const void *mask,
>  		      u32 addr_len,
> -		      u32 secid,
> +		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
>  int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
>  			 const char *dev_name,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 8c93b07bb353..d90dfce15d44 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6622,7 +6622,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
>  };
>  
> -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index b5b7c5aade8c..f0ca3879ba48 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
>  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
>  
>  extern int selinux_enabled;
> +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
>  
>  /* Policy capabilities */
>  enum {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index c40914a157b7..120d50c1bcac 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
>  		return NULL;
>  
>  	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
> -	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
> +	    (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
>  		return secattr;
>  
>  	return NULL;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index e3f5d6aece66..4ca0e006c3cc 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
>  	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
>  		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
>  	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
> -		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
> +		*sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
>  	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
>  		rc = -EIDRM;
>  		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
> @@ -3666,7 +3666,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
>  	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
> +	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
>  	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
>  	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
>  	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index 7cc3a3382fee..039bf5de56b4 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
>   * Shared data.
>   */
>  extern int smack_enabled;
> +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
>  extern int smack_cipso_direct;
>  extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
>  extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 3d571c438dfa..a8d56ce00918 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3741,7 +3741,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
>  		/*
>  		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
>  		 */
> -		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
> +		return smack_from_secid(
> +				sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
>  	/*
>  	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
>  	 * for the packet fall back on the network
> @@ -4558,7 +4559,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>  };
>  
> -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index faf2ea3968b3..6a4c468c200c 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
>  static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
>  	struct sockaddr_in newname;
>  	char *smack;
> @@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
>  	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
>  	 */
> -	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
> +	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
> +		lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
>  		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
> -			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
> -			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
> +			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
> +			&audit_info);
> +	}
>  
>  	if (rc == 0)
>  		rc = count;
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-26 23:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:34PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
> mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
> "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
> it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
> hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
> interferes in the multiple LSM case.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 6d2eefc9b7c1..fb5798683ae1 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1079,22 +1079,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> -/**
> - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
> - * @sock: the peer socket
> - * @skb: packet data
> - * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
> - *
> - * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
> - */
> -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> -					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> -
> -{
> -	/* TODO: requires secid support */
> -	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> -}
> -
>  /**
>   * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
>   * @sk: child sock
> @@ -1195,8 +1179,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  #endif
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
>  		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> -		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
> @@ -1707,7 +1689,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>  
>  DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
>  	.name = "apparmor",
> -	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
> +	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
>  	.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
>  	.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
>  	.init = apparmor_init,
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-26 23:39   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27 17:43     ` Casey Schaufler
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
> 
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
> 
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 12 +++++--
>  include/linux/security.h   | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c    |  4 ++-
>  security/commoncap.c       |  7 +++-
>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c |  8 ++++-
>  security/safesetid/lsm.c   |  8 ++++-
>  security/security.c        | 31 ++++++++++++++----
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |  5 ++-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  4 ++-
>  security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c   |  8 ++++-
>  security/yama/yama_lsm.c   |  4 ++-
>  11 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 3fe39abccc8f..fe1fb7a69ee5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>  } __randomize_layout;
>  
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> +	const char	*lsm;	/* Name of the LSM */
> +	int		slot;	/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
>  /*
>   * Security module hook list structure.
>   * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>  	struct hlist_node		list;
>  	struct hlist_head		*head;
>  	union security_list_options	hook;
> -	char				*lsm;
> +	struct lsm_id			*lsmid;
>  } __randomize_layout;
>  
>  /*
> @@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>  extern char *lsm_names;
>  
>  extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> -				char *lsm);
> +			       struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>  
>  #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR	BIT(0)
>  #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE	BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 49f2685324b0..5bb8b9a6fa84 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,72 @@ enum lsm_event {
>  	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> +	u32     secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID		-1	/* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED		-2	/* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED	-3	/* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> +		blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> +		if (blob->secid[i] != 0)
> +			return true;
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> +		if (bloba->secid[i] != blobb->secid[i])
> +			return false;
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>  /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>  extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>  		       int cap, unsigned int opts);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 2716e7731279..6d2eefc9b7c1 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1138,6 +1138,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
>  };
>  
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = { .lsm="apparmor", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };

__lsm_ro_after_init


> +
>  static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1679,7 +1681,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>  		goto buffers_out;
>  	}
>  	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> -				"apparmor");
> +				&apparmor_lsmid);
>  
>  	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
>  	apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index afd9679ca866..305a6088c81e 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {

__lsm_ro_after_init

> +	.lsm="capability",
> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  static int __init capability_init(void)
>  {
>  	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> -				"capability");
> +			   &capability_lsmid);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index 055fb0a64169..13db59d5327e 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
>  	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
>  }
>  
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid = {

__lsm_ro_after_init


> +	.lsm="loadpin",
> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>  {
>  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
> -	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> +	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> +			   &loadpin_lsmid);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index cecd38e2ac80..ca34badde4cf 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid = {

__lsm_ro_after_init


> +	.lsm="safesetid",
> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
> @@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>  static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
>  {
>  	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> -			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> +			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> +			   &safesetid_lsmid);
>  
>  	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
>  	safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7cfedb90210a..27e2db3d6b04 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
>  	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
>  	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>  	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> +	init_debug("lsmblob size         = %lu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
>  	return !strcmp(last, lsm);
>  }
>  
> -static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
> +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>  {
>  	char *cp;
>  
> @@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> +
>  /**
>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
>   * @hooks: the hooks to add
>   * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
>   *
>   * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
>   */
>  void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> -				char *lsm)
> +			       struct lsm_id *lsmid)
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> +	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> +		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> +			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> +		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> +		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> +			   lsmid->slot);
> +	}

It might be nice (but not required) to add back in the list of hooks that need
secids as a cross check of LSMLOB_NOT_NEEDED. It would allow us to catch
bad registrations upfront instead of crashing the kernel when the hook gets
used.


> +
>  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> -		hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> +		hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
>  		hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
>  	}
> -	if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> +
> +	if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>  		panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> -		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> +		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>  	}
> @@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> -		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> +		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>  	}
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index c83ec2652eda..8c93b07bb353 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6622,6 +6622,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
>  };
>  
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
> @@ -6877,7 +6879,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>  
>  	hashtab_cache_init();
>  
> -	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> +	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> +			   &selinux_lsmid);
>  
>  	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
>  		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index e9560b078efe..ad646b865295 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4553,6 +4553,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>  };
>  
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };

__lsm_ro_after_init

> +
>  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4743,7 +4745,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
>  	/*
>  	 * Register with LSM
>  	 */
> -	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> +	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
>  	smack_enabled = 1;
>  
>  	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index 716c92ec941a..57e6b845ea51 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid = {

__lsm_ro_after_init

> +	.lsm="tomoyo",
> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
>  /*
>   * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
>   * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>  	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>  
>  	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
> -	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> +	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> +			   &tomoyo_lsmid);
>  	pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
>  	s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>  	atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index efac68556b45..2263822a4af7 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -425,6 +425,8 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid = { .lsm="yama", .slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED };

__lsm_ro_after_init

> +
>  static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -482,7 +484,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
>  static int __init yama_init(void)
>  {
>  	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> -	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> +	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
>  	yama_init_sysctl();
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 

I like the change,

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:45   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
> 
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
> temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
> away when other interfaces get converted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                |  7 +++++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
>  security/security.c                 | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 5bb8b9a6fa84..4f8b478bc3a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1761,7 +1761,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
>  int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> +			      void *lsmrule);
>  void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
>  
>  #else
> @@ -1777,8 +1778,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> -					    void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> +					    u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 63f8b3f26fab..8786b95b60bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
>  			pid_t pid;
>  			u32 sid;
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			switch (f->type) {
>  			case AUDIT_PID:
> @@ -1354,8 +1355,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> -						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> +					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> +							&blob, f->type,
> +							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>  				}
>  				break;
>  			case AUDIT_EXE:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d1eab1d4a930..18ee5556c086 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int i, need_sid = 1;
>  	u32 sid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	unsigned int sessionid;
>  
>  	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> @@ -630,7 +631,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
> -				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> +				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> +								   f->type,
>  								   f->op,
>  								   f->lsm_rule);
>  			}
> @@ -645,15 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				/* Find files that match */
>  				if (name) {
> +					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> -								name->osid,
> +								&blob,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule);
>  				} else if (ctx) {
>  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> +						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
> -								n->osid,
> +								&blob,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -665,7 +670,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
>  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
>  					break;
> -				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> +				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> +				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
>  							      f->type, f->op,
>  							      f->lsm_rule))
>  					++result;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d213e835c498..5a337239d9e4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> -					     void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> +					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>  {
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e0cc323f948f..e7b8ce942950 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>  		int rc = 0;
>  		u32 osid;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  		int retried = 0;
>  
>  		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> @@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
>  			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> -			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
>  							rule->lsm[i].rule);
> @@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
>  							rule->lsm[i].rule);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 27e2db3d6b04..46ca4b85ad96 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>  /*
>   * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>   */
> -static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> +static int lsm_slot;
>  
>  /**
>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -2433,9 +2433,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>  	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>  }
>  
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> +			      void *lsmrule)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					       field, op, lsmrule);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:47   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
> structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
> module stacking. Change it's only caller, set_security_override,
> to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
> set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
> parameter type.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  include/linux/cred.h     |  3 ++-
>  include/linux/security.h |  5 +++--
>  kernel/cred.c            | 10 ++++++----
>  security/security.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index efb6edf32de7..9a21c376ed97 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  
>  struct cred;
>  struct inode;
> +struct lsmblob;
>  
>  /*
>   * COW Supplementary groups list
> @@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
>  extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
>  extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
>  extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
> -extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
> +extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
>  extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
>  extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
>  extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 4f8b478bc3a1..313e45a3cac3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
>  int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
>  void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
>  int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
> @@ -971,7 +971,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
>  {
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
> +static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
> +					 struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 45d77284aed0..71c14dda107e 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
>  /**
>   * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
>   * @new: The credentials to alter
> - * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
> + * @blob: The LSM security information to set
>   *
>   * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
>   * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
>   */
> -int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
> +	return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>  
> @@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>   */
>  int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	u32 secid;
>  	int ret;
>  
> @@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	return set_security_override(new, secid);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 46ca4b85ad96..f9c8e1926a0b 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1627,9 +1627,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>  
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:48   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 +++++--
>  include/net/af_unix.h    |  2 +-
>  include/net/scm.h        |  8 +++++---
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c   |  8 +++++---
>  net/unix/af_unix.c       |  6 +++---
>  security/security.c      | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 313e45a3cac3..dcf20da87d1b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
>  int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> +				     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
>  void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
>  void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1418,7 +1419,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
>  	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> +						   struct sk_buff *skb,
> +						   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
>  	kgid_t			gid;
>  	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> -	u32			secid;		/* Security ID		*/
> +	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Security LSM data	*/
>  #endif
>  	u32			consumed;
>  } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
>  	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
>  	struct scm_creds	creds;		/* Skb credentials	*/
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> -	u32			secid;		/* Passed security ID 	*/
> +	struct lsmblob		lsmblob;	/* Passed LSM data	*/
>  #endif
>  };
>  
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
> -	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> +	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
>  }
>  #else
>  static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> +		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> +					       &secdata, &seclen);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 82f341e84fae..2a5c868ce135 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob lb;
>  	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen, secid;
> +	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
> -	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> +	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> +	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index ddb838a1b74c..c50a004a1389 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> +	UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob;
>  }
>  
>  static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> +	scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob;
>  }
>  
>  static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -	return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> +	return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob));
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f9c8e1926a0b..4e1eb2a54064 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2120,10 +2120,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				optval, optlen, len);
>  }
>  
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> +				     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> -			     skb, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> +			     list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> +						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			break;
> +	}
> +	return rc;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:50   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
> of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
> string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
> appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other
> interfaces have yet to be converted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  include/linux/security.h          |  5 +++--
>  kernel/cred.c                     |  4 +---
>  net/netfilter/nft_meta.c          | 13 ++++++-------
>  net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c        |  5 ++++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------
>  security/security.c               | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>  6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index dcf20da87d1b..30337f1a9056 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> +			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>  
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> @@ -1230,7 +1231,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>  
>  static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
>  					   u32 seclen,
> -					   u32 *secid)
> +					   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 71c14dda107e..d70a2c02ced4 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>  int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
>  {
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	u32 secid;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> +	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>  	return set_security_override(new, &blob);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index 987d2d6ce624..054fb4b48d51 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -576,21 +576,20 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>  
>  static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
>  {
> -	u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	int err;
>  
> -	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> +	err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	if (!tmp_secid)
> -		return -ENOENT;
> -
> -	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> +	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> +	err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(blob.secid[0]);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> +	/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> +	priv->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index f16202d26c20..8081fadc30e9 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -49,13 +49,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
>  
>  static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
>  	info->secid = 0;
>  
>  	err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> -				       &info->secid);
> +				       &blob);
>  	if (err) {
>  		if (err == -EINVAL)
>  			pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
>  		return err;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* scaffolding during the transition */
> +	info->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	if (!info->secid) {
>  		pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
>  				    info->secctx);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index c92894c3e40a..2976370e41aa 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	void *addr;
>  	void *mask;
>  	u32 addr_len;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>  
>  	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -919,12 +919,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
>  		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
>  				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> -				  &secid);
> +				  &blob);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> +	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> +				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> @@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	void *addr;
>  	void *mask;
>  	u32 addr_len;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>  
>  	/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -968,12 +969,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
>  		                  nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
>  				  nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> -				  &secid);
> +				  &blob);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> +	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> +				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 4e1eb2a54064..ad9aaa46ed04 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1982,10 +1982,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>  
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> +			     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> +					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:51   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
> instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
> using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
> callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
> possibility that more than one module may be called upon
> to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
> audit code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                |  4 +++-
>  include/linux/security.h                |  5 +++--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  5 ++---
>  kernel/audit.c                          |  9 +++++++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 14 ++++++++++----
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  3 +--
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  8 ++++++--
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 +++-
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  8 ++++++--
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++----
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  6 +++---
>  security/security.c                     | 16 +++++++++++++---
>  12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 8685882da64c..1962f6b8abd0 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  
>  	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
>  		u32 secid;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>  			return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 30337f1a9056..7b4667cc4930 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> @@ -1224,7 +1224,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> +					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index e2e71c4bf9d0..31ae605fcc0a 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> -					       &secdata, &seclen);
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> +					       &seclen);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index c89ea48c70a6..d0338411d75d 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
>  		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
> @@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	u32 sid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
>  	if (!sid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>  			goto error_path;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 18ee5556c086..d31914088a82 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
>  	if (!ab)
> @@ -956,7 +957,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (sid) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1198,7 +1200,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  		if (osid) {
>  			char *ctx = NULL;
>  			u32 len;
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +			struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
> @@ -1349,9 +1354,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
>  		char *ctx = NULL;
>  		u32 len;
> +		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
> -			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 2a5c868ce135..e05f4ef68bd8 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 66c596d287a5..ca0968f13240 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
>  	int len, ret;
>  	char *secctx;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>  	int len, ret;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index c2ae14c720b4..c793103f3cd7 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 len;
>  	char *secctx;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 0dcc3592d053..59211bff90ab 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  {
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  
> -	if (skb->secmark)
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
> +	if (skb->secmark) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> +	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  #endif
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2976370e41aa..2d8dd5b84457 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
>  	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
> @@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  unlhsh_add_return:
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
> +		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx,
>  					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> @@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
> @@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> +		if (entry != NULL)
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>  			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  					  addr, mask);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> +		if (entry != NULL)
> +			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>  			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -1090,6 +1098,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	u32 secid;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
>  			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
> @@ -1144,7 +1153,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		secid = addr6->secid;
>  	}
>  
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 4676f5bb16ae..2ccc6567e2a2 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
>  		return NULL;
> @@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
>  			 audit_info->sessionid);
>  
> +	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
> -				     &secctx,
> -				     &secctx_len) == 0) {
> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
>  		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
>  	}
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index ad9aaa46ed04..0c7784a243e7 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1975,10 +1975,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
> -				seclen);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					      secdata, seclen);
> +		if (rc != 0)
> +			return rc;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:53   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
> for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
> audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
> later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c         |  5 ++++-
>  security/security.c      | 12 +++++++++---
>  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 7b4667cc4930..41dc3053094e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
>  void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
>  void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
>  int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
> @@ -1102,9 +1102,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> +					 struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d31914088a82..148733ec3c72 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2268,11 +2268,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
>  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
>  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
>  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
>  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> -	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
> +	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> +	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
>  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 0c7784a243e7..5245d4d1e799 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1795,10 +1795,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
>  	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
>  }
>  
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:55   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
> LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
> possible secids for possible reporting.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c              |  4 +---
>  include/linux/security.h              |  7 +++---
>  kernel/audit.c                        |  6 ++---
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                  |  4 +---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                      | 22 ++++++++++++------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |  5 +++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |  6 ++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 33 +++++++++++++++------------
>  security/security.c                   | 12 +++++++---
>  10 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 1962f6b8abd0..144ac4f1c24f 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->priority = task_nice(current);
>  
>  	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
> -		u32 secid;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
>  		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 41dc3053094e..cfd7cf4b0be9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
>  int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
>  int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1029,9 +1029,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
> +					  struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index d0338411d75d..a0205f3c23c7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2075,14 +2075,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
> -	u32 sid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -	if (!sid)
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
>  	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 8786b95b60bd..8f244c98bb57 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
>  			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
>  			pid_t pid;
> -			u32 sid;
>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			switch (f->type) {
> @@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> -					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
>  							&blob, f->type,
>  							f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 148733ec3c72..7112fe31684d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int i, need_sid = 1;
> -	u32 sid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	unsigned int sessionid;
>  
> @@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			   logged upon error */
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				if (need_sid) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
> -				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
>  				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
>  								   f->type,
>  								   f->op,
> @@ -2365,12 +2363,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
>  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
> +	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2387,6 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
>  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
>  	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
>  	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> @@ -2397,7 +2399,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
> +		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> @@ -2410,7 +2414,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> +		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2431,7 +2437,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> +	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2d8dd5b84457..2294aa9471e6 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1552,11 +1552,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
>  	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
>  	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
>  	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
> +	audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
>  	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 4a397cde1a48..ab88baaaa50d 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -48,7 +48,11 @@
>  static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until secid is converted */
> +	audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
>  	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>  	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 5fb7127bbe68..85c7692fc4a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
>  int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
>  	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
>  				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 357edd140c09..fefa848cf0c7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -335,12 +335,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>   */
>  int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
> -					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
> +		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -363,10 +364,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> -				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> @@ -387,10 +390,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   */
>  int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
>  }
> @@ -499,7 +503,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
>  {
>  	enum ima_hooks func;
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
>  		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -521,9 +525,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  	}
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
> -				   MAY_READ, func);
> +	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
> +				   size, MAY_READ, func);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5245d4d1e799..2f123003b0b3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1712,10 +1712,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
>  }
>  
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:56   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
> lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
> callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
> for IMA and audit.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                    |  6 +++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  4 +---
>  security/security.c                 | 11 +++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index cfd7cf4b0be9..2d81cac418e3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
>  int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
>  int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
>  int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
>  int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
>  int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
> @@ -858,9 +858,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
> +					   struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 7112fe31684d..54797c0fc3b7 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1910,13 +1910,17 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob blob;
> +
>  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
>  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
>  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
>  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
>  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
> -	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
> +	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> +	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
>  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
>  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
>  		return;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e7b8ce942950..92ee3d984c73 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		return false;
>  	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>  		int rc = 0;
> -		u32 osid;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  		int retried = 0;
>  
> @@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> +			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2f123003b0b3..91388553d3d7 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1404,9 +1404,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
>  
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:57   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
> lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
> in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
> to accomodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h          |  2 +-
>  kernel/audit.c                    | 14 +++++-------
>  kernel/audit.h                    |  5 +++--
>  kernel/auditsc.c                  | 37 +++++++++++--------------------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  8 +++----
>  security/security.c               | 12 +++++++---
>  6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2d81cac418e3..d310fa3942ce 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
>  int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
> -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
> +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index a0205f3c23c7..1b51e907f131 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static u32	audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
>  /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
>  kuid_t		audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
>  pid_t		audit_sig_pid = -1;
> -u32		audit_sig_sid = 0;
> +struct lsmblob	audit_sig_lsm;
>  
>  /* Records can be lost in several ways:
>     0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
> @@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	}
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
> -		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> -			struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> +						       &len);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (audit_sig_sid)
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
>  				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
> -		if (audit_sig_sid) {
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>  			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
>  			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
>  		}
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 958d5b8fc1b3..29e29c6f4afb 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
>  #include <linux/tty.h>
>  
> @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	kuid_t		    target_auid;
>  	kuid_t		    target_uid;
>  	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
> -	u32		    target_sid;
> +	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
>  	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  
>  	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
>  
>  extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
>  extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
> -extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
> +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
>  
>  extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 54797c0fc3b7..c7aa39bda5cc 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
>  	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> -	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> +	struct lsmblob	target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
>  	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  	int			pid_count;
>  };
> @@ -938,14 +938,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
>  }
>  
>  static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> -				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
> -				 u32 sid, char *comm)
> +				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> +				 unsigned int sessionid,
> +				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
>  	if (!ab)
> @@ -954,9 +954,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> -	if (sid) {
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1527,7 +1526,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  						  axs->target_auid[i],
>  						  axs->target_uid[i],
>  						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
> -						  axs->target_sid[i],
> +						  &axs->target_lsm[i],
>  						  axs->target_comm[i]))
>  				call_panic = 1;
>  	}
> @@ -1536,7 +1535,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
>  				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
>  				  context->target_sessionid,
> -				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
> +				  &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
>  			call_panic = 1;
>  
>  	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
> @@ -1713,7 +1712,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
>  	context->aux = NULL;
>  	context->aux_pids = NULL;
>  	context->target_pid = 0;
> -	context->target_sid = 0;
> +	lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
>  	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
>  	context->type = 0;
>  	context->fds[0] = -1;
> @@ -2367,15 +2366,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
>  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
> -	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2392,7 +2388,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
>  	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
>  	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
>  	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> @@ -2403,9 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
> -		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> @@ -2418,9 +2411,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> -		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> +		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2441,9 +2432,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> -	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index fefa848cf0c7..1afb75a893af 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -363,7 +363,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	u32 secid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> @@ -373,9 +372,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
> -	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
> -				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
> +	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
> +	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> +	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
> +				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 91388553d3d7..3180a6f30625 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1627,10 +1627,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
>  	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
>  }
>  
> -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
> +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
> -	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
> +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> +			continue;
> +		hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> +	}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-26 23:58   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-26 23:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
> call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
> to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 10 ++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  9 +++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 27 +++++++++++----------------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 12 ++++++------
>  5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 5a337239d9e4..73b3b15dec5c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
>  };
>  
>  /* LIM API function definitions */
> -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
> +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
> +		   int *pcr);
>  int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> @@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
>  const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
>  
>  /* IMA policy related functions */
> -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
> +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> +		     int flags, int *pcr);
>  void ima_init_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index c7505fb122d4..94b2a4840d81 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>   * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
>   * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
>   * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
> - * @secid: secid of the task being validated
> + * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
>   * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
>   *        MAY_APPEND)
>   * @func: caller identifier
> @@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>   * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
>   *
>   */
> -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
> +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		   struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
> +		   int *pcr)
>  {
>  	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
>  
>  	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
>  
> -	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
> +	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 85c7692fc4a3..3ff7aae81829 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
>   */
>  int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
> -	u32 secid;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
> -	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
> +	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
>  				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 1afb75a893af..0588dd9a88db 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
>  }
>  
>  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> -			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
> -			       enum ima_hooks func)
> +			       struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
> +			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
> @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
>  	 * Included is the appraise submask.
>  	 */
> -	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
> +	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr);
>  	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
>  			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
>  	if (!action && !violation_check)
> @@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
>  		security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
> -		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> +		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
>  					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
>  
> @@ -366,16 +365,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> -				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> +	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
> +				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
>  	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
> -				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
> +	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
> +				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -393,8 +390,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
>  }
> @@ -526,9 +522,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> -	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
> -				   size, MAY_READ, func);
> +	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
> +				   MAY_READ, func);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 92ee3d984c73..dbad256aa7b4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
>   * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
>   */
>  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> -			    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> +			    const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
>  			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
>  {
>  	int i;
> @@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,
> @@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
>   * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
>   * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
>   *        being made
> - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
> + * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
>   * @func: IMA hook identifier
>   * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
>   * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
> @@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
>   * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
>   * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
>   */
> -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
> -		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
> +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
> +		     struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> +		     int flags, int *pcr)
>  {
>  	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
>  	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
> @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>  		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
>  			continue;
>  
> -		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
> +		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask))
>  			continue;
>  
>  		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:28     ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, keescook,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:

> With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
> mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
> "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
> it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
> hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
> interferes in the multiple LSM case.

So now if I build a kernel with SELinux and AppArmor selected, with 
SELinux registered first, I now need to use apparmor=0 at the kernel 
command line to preserve existing behavior (just SELinux running).

This should at least be documented.

I wonder if this will break existing users, though.  Who has both 
currently selected and depends on only one of them being active?

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
  25 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  2:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, Kees Cook,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:

> This patchset provides the changes required for
> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.

I get a kernel oops with this patchset when running the SELinux testsuite 
(binder test) with:

$ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm 
capability,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,tomoyo


[  485.357377] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
[  485.360727] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
[  485.361480] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
[  485.362164] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001080
[  485.362927] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[  485.363143] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  485.363581] PGD 800000044e17b067 P4D 800000044e17b067 PUD 44b796067 PMD 0 
[  485.364226] kernel BUG at drivers/android/binder_alloc.c:1139!
[  485.364865] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  485.366430] CPU: 1 PID: 4224 Comm: manager Not tainted 5.1.0+ #7
[  485.367290] Hardware name: LENOVO 20HGS3KS0S/20HGS3KS0S, BIOS N1WET44W (1.23 ) 01/24/2018
[  485.367900] RIP: 0010:binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy+0x88/0x210
[  485.368515] Code: 00 65 48 8b 2c 25 00 5c 01 00 41 bd 00 10 00 00 48 89 
eb eb 3d 83 f8 08 0f 83 e3 00 00 00 a8 04 0f 
85 45 01 00 00 85 c0 74 0e <41> 0f b6 08 88 0e a8 02 0f 85 5d 01 00 00 83 
ab a8 19 00 00 01 49
[  485.369170] RSP: 0018:ffffaf3ac1f9bb88 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  485.369804] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8d3c84340000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  485.370470] RDX: ffff8d3c8db74cc0 RSI: ffff8d3c8b425000 RDI: ffff8d3c89844978
[  485.371132] RBP: ffff8d3c84340000 R08: 0000000000001080 R09: 0000000000000002
[  485.371887] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8d3c89844978 R12: 0000000000000001
[  485.372656] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff8d3c865d6300 R15: ffffffffa1a719c8
[  485.373340] FS:  00007fae657a8680(0000) GS:ffff8d3c91480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  485.374017] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  485.374710] CR2: 0000000000001080 CR3: 000000044d482002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[  485.375423] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  485.376122] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  485.376823] Call Trace:
[  485.377514]  binder_transaction+0x371/0x2320
[  485.378231]  ? printk+0x58/0x6f
[  485.378940]  ? common_lsm_audit+0x162/0x800
[  485.379641]  ? __check_object_size+0x41/0x15d
[  485.380347]  ? binder_thread_read+0x9e4/0x1460
[  485.381065]  ? binder_update_ref_for_handle+0x83/0x1a0
[  485.381759]  binder_thread_write+0x2ae/0xfc0
[  485.382472]  ? tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x66/0x1d0
[  485.383150]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[  485.383839]  binder_ioctl+0x659/0x836
[  485.384531]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x405/0x660
[  485.385194]  ? __fput+0x157/0x230
[  485.385850]  ksys_ioctl+0x5e/0x90
[  485.386473]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[  485.387137]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x150
[  485.387782]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9


Looks to be:
(gdb) list *(binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy + 0x88)
0xffffffff817e2cb8 is in binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy 
(./include/linux/string.h:355).
350			if (q_size < size)
351				__read_overflow2();
352		}
353		if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
354			fortify_panic(__func__);
355		return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
356	}
357


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:51     ` Kees Cook
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  2:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, Kees Cook,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:

> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> 
> > This patchset provides the changes required for
> > the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> 
> I get a kernel oops with this patchset when running the SELinux testsuite 
> (binder test) with:
> 
> $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm 
> capability,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,tomoyo
> 
> 
> [  485.357377] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> [  485.360727] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> [  485.361480] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> [  485.362164] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001080
> [  485.362927] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
> [  485.363143] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [  485.363581] PGD 800000044e17b067 P4D 800000044e17b067 PUD 44b796067 PMD 0 
> [  485.364226] kernel BUG at drivers/android/binder_alloc.c:1139!

It's this BUG_ON:

static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
                                        bool to_buffer,
                                        struct binder_buffer *buffer,
                                        binder_size_t buffer_offset,
                                        void *ptr,
                                        size_t bytes)
{
        /* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */
        BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes));


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27  3:28     ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-27  3:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 12:22:13PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> 
> > With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
> > mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
> > "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
> > it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
> > hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
> > interferes in the multiple LSM case.
> 
> So now if I build a kernel with SELinux and AppArmor selected, with 
> SELinux registered first, I now need to use apparmor=0 at the kernel 
> command line to preserve existing behavior (just SELinux running).
> 
> This should at least be documented.
> 
> I wonder if this will break existing users, though.  Who has both 
> currently selected and depends on only one of them being active?

I don't think this will change a system using SELinux, right? There
would be no policy loaded for AppArmor so its hooks would be no-op.

But maybe I'm not thinking hard enough?

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:28     ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27  3:49       ` James Morris
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27  3:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris, Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, keescook,
	penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 7:22 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> 
>> With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
>> mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
>> "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
>> it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
>> hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
>> interferes in the multiple LSM case.
> 
> So now if I build a kernel with SELinux and AppArmor selected, with 
> SELinux registered first, I now need to use apparmor=0 at the kernel 
> command line to preserve existing behavior (just SELinux running).
> 

AppArmor can be built-in (compiled) without being on the Enabled list.
If you had apparmor in your enabled list along with selinux before,
it would attempt to enabled and fail with the message

  exclusive disabled: apparmor

now it will be enabled but it does match what is documented in
the lsm enabled description

    A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
    Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
    controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.


what isn't documented is the exclusive behavior and it does
make sense to have which LSMs are exclusive documented somewhere.


> This should at least be documented.
> 
> I wonder if this will break existing users, though.  Who has both 
> currently selected and depends on only one of them being active?
> 

thankfully even if you had apparmor in your lsm enabled list before,
this likely isn't enough to change the system behavior. You will
also need some apparmor policy installed and enough of the
usersoace to load it. Otherwise while apparmor will be enabled it
will come up in unconfined mode.

Even the interfaces /proc/*/attr/* will default to the first
major LSM in the list (in your example selinux). Apparmor's
labeling won't be visible without a task explicitly opting in
to it.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  4:10       ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:51     ` Kees Cook
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  3:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, Kees Cook,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:

> On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > 
> > > This patchset provides the changes required for
> > > the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> > 
> > I get a kernel oops with this patchset when running the SELinux testsuite 
> > (binder test) with:
> > 
> > $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm 
> > capability,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,tomoyo

Confirming there's no oops when Tomoyo is un-selected in the kernel 
config.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-27  3:49       ` James Morris
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  3:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Johansen
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:

> AppArmor can be built-in (compiled) without being on the Enabled list.
> If you had apparmor in your enabled list along with selinux before,
> it would attempt to enabled and fail with the message
> 
>   exclusive disabled: apparmor
> 
> now it will be enabled but it does match what is documented in
> the lsm enabled description
> 
>     A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
>     Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
>     controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.

Ok -- I suspect the only people who have SELinux and AppArmor selected are 
doing testing / development.


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27  3:51     ` Kees Cook
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-27  3:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 12:46:01PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > 
> > > This patchset provides the changes required for
> > > the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> > 
> > I get a kernel oops with this patchset when running the SELinux testsuite 
> > (binder test) with:
> > 
> > $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm 
> > capability,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,tomoyo
> > 
> > 
> > [  485.357377] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> > [  485.360727] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> > [  485.361480] binder: 4224 RLIMIT_NICE not set
> > [  485.362164] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001080
> > [  485.362927] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
> > [  485.363143] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [  485.363581] PGD 800000044e17b067 P4D 800000044e17b067 PUD 44b796067 PMD 0 
> > [  485.364226] kernel BUG at drivers/android/binder_alloc.c:1139!
> 
> It's this BUG_ON:
> 
> static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
>                                         bool to_buffer,
>                                         struct binder_buffer *buffer,
>                                         binder_size_t buffer_offset,
>                                         void *ptr,
>                                         size_t bytes)
> {
>         /* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */
>         BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes));

Before:

        if (secctx) {
                size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
                                    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
                                    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
                                    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));

                t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
                binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
                                            t->buffer, buf_offset,
                                            secctx, secctx_sz);
                security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
                secctx = NULL;
        }

After:

        if (lsmctx.context) {
                size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
                                    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
                                    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
                                    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));

                t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
                binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
                                            t->buffer, buf_offset,
                                            lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
                security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
        }

Which changes the "src" and "bytes" argument, assuming the size
calculation for buf_offset is the same. But, a quick shows:

-       char *secctx = NULL;
-       u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+       struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
...
-       if (secctx) {
+       if (lsmctx.context) {

lsmctx.context isn't being initialized, and it was passed by reference,
so compiler won't complain. I'll find the patch and comment. Totally
missed it in review!

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-27  3:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:28PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;

As James found, this needs to be zero initialized:

struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };

otherwise...

>  
>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>  			return_error_param = ret;
>  			return_error_line = __LINE__;
>  			goto err_get_secctx_failed;
>  		}
> -		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  	}
>  
>  	trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
> @@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		t->buffer = NULL;
>  		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
>  	}
> -	if (secctx) {
> +	if (lsmctx.context) {

This test may read stack trash.

Unless you built with the stack zeroing plugin or compiler. ;)

-Kees

>  		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> -				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +				    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  
>  		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
> -					    secctx, secctx_sz);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -		secctx = NULL;
> +					    lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  	}
>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
>  	t->buffer->transaction = t;
> @@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> -	if (secctx) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (lsmctx.context)
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 046012a7255f..7255825aa697 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> -					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 6c7c3c229e4a..4a6ad8caf423 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -93,17 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> -					       &seclen);
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
> -			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> +				 context.len, context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  	}
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f844a2a642e6..436c23429319 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
>  	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
> -	char			*ctx = NULL;
>  	u32			len;
> -	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext	context;
>  
>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>  	if (err)
> @@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> -						       &len);
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> +						       &context);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -			}
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> +				security_release_secctx(&context);
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> @@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>  
>  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  {
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>  			goto error_path;
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 9fab0e7d90c3..0478680cd0a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	u32 len;
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  	int rc = 0;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>  
>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  {
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
>  		if (osid) {
> -			char *ctx = NULL;
> -			u32 len;
> +			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
>  				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
>  		}
> @@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		char *ctx = NULL;
> -		u32 len;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
> -		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> +		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 7834c357b60b..80ae0c5a1301 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	struct lsmblob lb;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 6954e6600583..403307ff0fff 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> -	int len, ret;
> -	char *secctx;
> +	int ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	if (!nest_secctx)
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
> -	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
> +	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>  
>  	ret = 0;
>  nla_put_failure:
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> @@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>  	int len, ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	len = context.len;
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
>  	return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
>  	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 79158ad0486e..fcb51ab2bb8b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>  static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	u32 len;
> -	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return;
>  
> -	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
> +	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>  
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index fe8403ef4e89..6da00c7add5b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  
>  	if (skb->secmark) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> +		*secdata = context.context;
>  	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> +	seclen = context.len;
>  #endif
>  	return seclen;
>  }
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 15b1945853be..4716e0011ba5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> @@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx,
> -					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
>  	u32 secid;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> @@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	}
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
> -			  secctx_len,
> -			  secctx);
> -	/* scaffolding */
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			  context.len,
> +			  context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 94aea4985b74..2d1307f65250 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> @@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3563b1e2f8f9..97b468f6e6a9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2081,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  	int *display = current->security;
> @@ -2089,10 +2089,13 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
>  			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>  					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					secdata, seclen);
> +					&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.20.1
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27  4:10       ` James Morris
  2019-06-27 17:07         ` Kees Cook
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27  4:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, Kees Cook,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:

> Confirming there's no oops when Tomoyo is un-selected in the kernel 
> config.

n/m, the problem is still there.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-27 17:17       ` Kees Cook
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-27 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey

On 6/26/2019 8:53 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:28PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
>> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
>> along with the context and context length. This allows
>> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
>> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
>> returned data from the new structure.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
>> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
>> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
>> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
>> -	char *secctx = NULL;
>> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
>> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> As James found, this needs to be zero initialized:
>
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };

Thanks! I'll incorporate this in v5. It's great to
have y'all checking it out.
??


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27  4:10       ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27 17:07         ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 18:10           ` James Morris
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-27 17:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 02:10:18PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:
> 
> > Confirming there's no oops when Tomoyo is un-selected in the kernel 
> > config.
> 
> n/m, the problem is still there.

Were you able to test my fix for this? I wonder if what I found was just
a coincidence.

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-27 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-27 17:17       ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 17:36         ` Casey Schaufler
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-27 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 09:29:25AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/26/2019 8:53 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:28PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> >> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> >> along with the context and context length. This allows
> >> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> >> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> >> returned data from the new structure.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> ---
> >>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
> >>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
> >>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
> >>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
> >>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
> >>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
> >>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
> >>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
> >>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
> >>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
> >>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
> >>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
> >>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> >> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> >> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> >>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
> >>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
> >>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> >> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> >> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> >> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> >> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> > As James found, this needs to be zero initialized:
> >
> > struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
> 
> Thanks! I'll incorporate this in v5. It's great to
> have y'all checking it out.

I looked through other removed NULL assignments, and I think I see some
other issues...

                binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
                                            t->buffer, buf_offset,
-                                           secctx, secctx_sz);
-               security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
-               secctx = NULL;
+                                           lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
+               security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);

The new security_release_secctx() performs the zeroing if there is a
slot match... should it be unconditional? (And should the no-op version
also zero?)

@@ -2420,8 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct
svc_fh *fhp,
        __be32 status;
        int err;
        struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
-       void *context = NULL;
-       int contextlen;
+       struct lsmcontext context;

This needs the same = { } to retain the same meaning.

And here:

@@ -1191,8 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
        struct audit_buffer     *ab;
        u16                     msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
        struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
-       char                    *ctx = NULL;
        u32                     len;
+       struct lsmcontext       context;

And here:

@@ -2069,24 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char
*key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
-       char *ctx = NULL;
-       unsigned len;
        int error;
-       u32 sid;
+       struct lsmblob le;
+       struct lsmcontext context;

and here:

 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t
pid,
-                                kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int
                                 sessionid,
-                                u32 sid, char *comm)
+                                kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+                                unsigned int sessionid,
+                                struct lsmblob *l, char *comm)
 {
        struct audit_buffer *ab;
-       char *ctx = NULL;
-       u32 len;
+       struct lsmcontext lsmctx;

Maybe here?

-               if (osid) {
-                       char *ctx = NULL;
-                       u32 len;
-                       if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len))
                        {
-                               audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+               if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
+                       struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+                       if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt))
                                *call_panic = 1;

and:

-       if (n->osid != 0) {
-               char *ctx = NULL;
-               u32 len;
+       if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
+               struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 

and:

@@ -395,7 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct
nfqnl_instance *queue,
        enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
        struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
        bool csum_verify;
-       char *secdata = NULL;
+       struct lsmcontext context;

and:

@@ -387,8 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
        struct net_device *dev;
        struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
        struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
-       char *secctx = NULL;
-       u32 secctx_len;
+       struct lsmcontext context;


Sorry I forgot to check those the first time through!

-- 
Kees Cook

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-27 17:17       ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 17:36         ` Casey Schaufler
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-27 17:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
	john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey

On 6/27/2019 10:17 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 09:29:25AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 6/26/2019 8:53 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:22:28PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
>>>> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
>>>> along with the context and context length. This allows
>>>> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
>>>> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
>>>> returned data from the new structure.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>>>>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>>>>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>>>>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>>>>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>>>>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>>>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>>>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>>>>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>>>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>>>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>>>>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>>>>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
>>>> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
>>>> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>>>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>>>>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>>>>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
>>>> -	char *secctx = NULL;
>>>> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
>>>> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>>>> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>>> As James found, this needs to be zero initialized:
>>>
>>> struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
>> Thanks! I'll incorporate this in v5. It's great to
>> have y'all checking it out.
> I looked through other removed NULL assignments, and I think I see some
> other issues...
>
>                 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>                                             t->buffer, buf_offset,
> -                                           secctx, secctx_sz);
> -               security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> -               secctx = NULL;
> +                                           lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> +               security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>
> The new security_release_secctx() performs the zeroing if there is a
> slot match... should it be unconditional? (And should the no-op version
> also zero?)

I don't see a reason not to zero in all cases. I'll change that.

>
> @@ -2420,8 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct
> svc_fh *fhp,
>         __be32 status;
>         int err;
>         struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> -       void *context = NULL;
> -       int contextlen;
> +       struct lsmcontext context;
>
> This needs the same = { } to retain the same meaning.

I'm going to have security_secid_to_secctx() initialize
the lsmcontext. There's no case where it should be used
to update an existing context, and it makes more sense to
do it in one place than to make all the callers worry
about it.

> And here:
>
> @@ -1191,8 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>         struct audit_buffer     *ab;
>         u16                     msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
>         struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
> -       char                    *ctx = NULL;
>         u32                     len;
> +       struct lsmcontext       context;
>
> And here:
>
> @@ -2069,24 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char
> *key)
>  
>  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  {
> -       char *ctx = NULL;
> -       unsigned len;
>         int error;
> -       u32 sid;
> +       struct lsmblob le;
> +       struct lsmcontext context;
>
> and here:
>
>  static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t
> pid,
> -                                kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int
>                                  sessionid,
> -                                u32 sid, char *comm)
> +                                kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> +                                unsigned int sessionid,
> +                                struct lsmblob *l, char *comm)
>  {
>         struct audit_buffer *ab;
> -       char *ctx = NULL;
> -       u32 len;
> +       struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> Maybe here?
>
> -               if (osid) {
> -                       char *ctx = NULL;
> -                       u32 len;
> -                       if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len))
>                         {
> -                               audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> +               if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
> +                       struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> +                       if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt))
>                                 *call_panic = 1;
>
> and:
>
> -       if (n->osid != 0) {
> -               char *ctx = NULL;
> -               u32 len;
> +       if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
> +               struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>
> and:
>
> @@ -395,7 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct
> nfqnl_instance *queue,
>         enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
>         struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
>         bool csum_verify;
> -       char *secdata = NULL;
> +       struct lsmcontext context;
>
> and:
>
> @@ -387,8 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>         struct net_device *dev;
>         struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>         struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> -       char *secctx = NULL;
> -       u32 secctx_len;
> +       struct lsmcontext context;
>
>
> Sorry I forgot to check those the first time through!
>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  2019-06-26 23:39   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-27 17:43     ` Casey Schaufler
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-27 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Johansen, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/2019 4:39 PM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
>> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
>> security modules built into the system that would
>> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
>> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
>> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
>> slots.
>>
>> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
>> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
>> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
>> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 12 +++++--
>>  include/linux/security.h   | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  security/apparmor/lsm.c    |  4 ++-
>>  security/commoncap.c       |  7 +++-
>>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c |  8 ++++-
>>  security/safesetid/lsm.c   |  8 ++++-
>>  security/security.c        | 31 ++++++++++++++----
>>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |  5 ++-
>>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  4 ++-
>>  security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c   |  8 ++++-
>>  security/yama/yama_lsm.c   |  4 ++-
>>  11 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 3fe39abccc8f..fe1fb7a69ee5 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>>  } __randomize_layout;
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * Information that identifies a security module.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_id {
>> +	const char	*lsm;	/* Name of the LSM */
>> +	int		slot;	/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
>> +};
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * Security module hook list structure.
>>   * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
>> @@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>>  	struct hlist_node		list;
>>  	struct hlist_head		*head;
>>  	union security_list_options	hook;
>> -	char				*lsm;
>> +	struct lsm_id			*lsmid;
>>  } __randomize_layout;
>>  
>>  /*
>> @@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>>  extern char *lsm_names;
>>  
>>  extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> -				char *lsm);
>> +			       struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>>  
>>  #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR	BIT(0)
>>  #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE	BIT(1)
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 49f2685324b0..5bb8b9a6fa84 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -76,6 +76,72 @@ enum lsm_event {
>>  	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>>  };
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * Data exported by the security modules
>> + *
>> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
>> + */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
>> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> +	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
>> +
>> +struct lsmblob {
>> +	u32     secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID		-1	/* Not a valid LSM slot number */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED		-2	/* Slot requested on initialization */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED	-3	/* Slot not requested */
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
>> + * @secid: The initial secid value
>> + *
>> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
>> + */
>> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
>> +{
>> +	int i;
>> +
>> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> +		blob->secid[i] = secid;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> +	int i;
>> +
>> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> +		if (blob->secid[i] != 0)
>> +			return true;
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
>> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
>> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
>> +{
>> +	int i;
>> +
>> +	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> +		if (bloba->secid[i] != blobb->secid[i])
>> +			return false;
>> +	return true;
>> +}
>> +
>>  /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>>  extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>>  		       int cap, unsigned int opts);
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> index 2716e7731279..6d2eefc9b7c1 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> @@ -1138,6 +1138,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
>>  };
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = { .lsm="apparmor", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -1679,7 +1681,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>>  		goto buffers_out;
>>  	}
>>  	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
>> -				"apparmor");
>> +				&apparmor_lsmid);
>>  
>>  	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
>>  	apparmor_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> index afd9679ca866..305a6088c81e 100644
>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> @@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>>  
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>> +	.lsm="capability",
>> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
>> @@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  static int __init capability_init(void)
>>  {
>>  	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
>> -				"capability");
>> +			   &capability_lsmid);
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> index 055fb0a64169..13db59d5327e 100644
>> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> @@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
>>  	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
>>  }
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid = {
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>
>> +	.lsm="loadpin",
>> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
>> @@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>>  {
>>  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>>  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
>> -	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>> +	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
>> +			   &loadpin_lsmid);
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> index cecd38e2ac80..ca34badde4cf 100644
>> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> @@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
>>  	}
>>  }
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid = {
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>
>> +	.lsm="safesetid",
>> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
>> @@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>>  static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
>>  {
>>  	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
>> -			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
>> +			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
>> +			   &safesetid_lsmid);
>>  
>>  	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
>>  	safesetid_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 7cfedb90210a..27e2db3d6b04 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
>>  	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
>>  	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>>  	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> +	init_debug("lsmblob size         = %lu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>>  
>>  	/*
>>  	 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
>> @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
>>  	return !strcmp(last, lsm);
>>  }
>>  
>> -static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
>> +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>>  {
>>  	char *cp;
>>  
>> @@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>> + */
>> +static int lsm_slot __initdata;
>> +
>>  /**
>>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
>>   * @hooks: the hooks to add
>>   * @count: the number of hooks to add
>> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
>> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
>>   *
>>   * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
>> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
>> + * for it in the lsmblob.
>>   */
>>  void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> -				char *lsm)
>> +			       struct lsm_id *lsmid)
>>  {
>>  	int i;
>>  
>> +	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>> +		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>> +			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>> +		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>> +		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>> +			   lsmid->slot);
>> +	}
> It might be nice (but not required) to add back in the list of hooks that need
> secids as a cross check of LSMLOB_NOT_NEEDED. It would allow us to catch
> bad registrations upfront instead of crashing the kernel when the hook gets
> used.

I considered leaving that check in, but my experience with
creating the list leads me to expect it to become a headache
of the 3rd order when hooks are added or changed by anyone
who hasn't been involved in this protracted process. It's not
always obvious that a hook needs to be on the list. Hmm.
That makes me think that a bit of documentation on when to
use LSMBLOB_NEEDED vs LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED is needed. 

>> +
>>  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
>> -		hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
>> +		hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
>>  		hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
>>  	}
>> -	if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>> +
>> +	if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>>  		panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
>>  }
>>  
>> @@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>  
>>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>> -		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> +		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>>  			continue;
>>  		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>>  	}
>> @@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>  
>>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>> -		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> +		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>>  			continue;
>>  		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>>  	}
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index c83ec2652eda..8c93b07bb353 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -6622,6 +6622,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
>>  };
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
>> @@ -6877,7 +6879,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>>  
>>  	hashtab_cache_init();
>>  
>> -	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
>> +	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
>> +			   &selinux_lsmid);
>>  
>>  	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
>>  		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index e9560b078efe..ad646b865295 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -4553,6 +4553,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>>  };
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -4743,7 +4745,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
>>  	/*
>>  	 * Register with LSM
>>  	 */
>> -	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>> +	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
>>  	smack_enabled = 1;
>>  
>>  	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> index 716c92ec941a..57e6b845ea51 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> @@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>>  	}
>>  }
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid = {
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>> +	.lsm="tomoyo",
>> +	.slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
>>   * registering TOMOYO.
>> @@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>>  	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>>  
>>  	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
>> -	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
>> +	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
>> +			   &tomoyo_lsmid);
>>  	pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
>>  	s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>>  	atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
>> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> index efac68556b45..2263822a4af7 100644
>> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> @@ -425,6 +425,8 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
>>  	return rc;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid = { .lsm="yama", .slot=LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED };
> __lsm_ro_after_init
>
>> +
>>  static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
>>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -482,7 +484,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
>>  static int __init yama_init(void)
>>  {
>>  	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
>> -	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
>> +	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
>>  	yama_init_sysctl();
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>
> I like the change,
>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27 17:07         ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 18:10           ` James Morris
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 02:10:18PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> > On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, James Morris wrote:
> > 
> > > Confirming there's no oops when Tomoyo is un-selected in the kernel 
> > > config.
> > 
> > n/m, the problem is still there.
> 
> Were you able to test my fix for this? I wonder if what I found was just
> a coincidence.

Seems to have fixed the oops I was seeing.


diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 4adf4d4a954b..e76dbeee979b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2875,7 +2875,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
        binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
        struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
        int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
-       struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
+       struct lsmcontext lsmctx = {};
 
        e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
        e->debug_id = t_debug_id;


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:33   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
> active.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
>  security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>  	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		0666),
>  	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
>  	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "display",		0666),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>  	DIR("smack",			0555,
>  	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>  
>  char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	.lbs_task = sizeof(int),	/* slot number for the "display" LSM */
> +};
>  
>  /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>  static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>  
>  /*
>   * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
>   */
>  static int lsm_slot;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>  
>  /**
>   * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>  		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>  			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> +		lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
>  		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>  		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>  			   lsmid->slot);
> @@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>   */
>  static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
> +	int *display;
> +
>  	if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
>  		task->security = NULL;
>  		return 0;
> @@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>  	task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (task->security == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> +	 * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> +	 * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> +	 */
> +	display = task->security;
> +	*display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>  
>  int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
>  {
> +	int *odisplay = current->security;
> +	int *ndisplay;
>  	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>  
> -	if (rc)
> +	if (unlikely(rc))
>  		return rc;
> +
>  	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> -	if (unlikely(rc))
> +	if (unlikely(rc)) {
>  		security_task_free(task);
> -	return rc;
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	ndisplay = task->security;
> +	if (ndisplay && odisplay)
> +		*ndisplay = *odisplay;
> +
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>  				char **value)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> +			slot = *display;
> +		*value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (*value)
> +			return strlen(*value);
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>  		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>  	}
>  	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	char *term;
> +	char *cp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int rc = -EINVAL;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (cp == NULL)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		memcpy(cp, value, size);
> +
> +		term = strchr(cp, ' ');
> +		if (term == NULL)
> +			term = strchr(cp, '\n');
> +		if (term != NULL)
> +			*term = '\0';
> +
> +		for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> +			if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> +				*display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> +				rc = size;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +		kfree(cp);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>  		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>  			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>  		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>  	}
>  	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					      secdata, seclen);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> +					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					secdata, seclen);
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> -					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> +						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
>  void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>  {
> -	call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +			return;
> +		}
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>  
> @@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>  				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> -				optval, optlen, len);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> +			     list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> +								 optlen, len);
> +	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>  }
>  
>  int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 10 +++++--
>  fs/kernfs/dir.c                         |  9 ++++--
>  fs/kernfs/inode.c                       |  7 +++--
>  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                       |  8 +++--
>  fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                       |  7 +++--
>  include/linux/security.h                | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  4 ++-
>  kernel/audit.c                          | 14 ++++++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 12 ++++++--
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  4 ++-
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         | 13 ++++++---
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 19 +++++++++---
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  4 ++-
>  security/security.c                     | 12 ++++----
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c              | 14 ++++++---
>  17 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 144ac4f1c24f..89e574be34cc 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2876,6 +2876,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3158,7 +3159,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
>  					    secctx, secctx_sz);
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  		secctx = NULL;
>  	}
>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
> @@ -3479,8 +3481,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> -	if (secctx)
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
> +	if (secctx) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> index b84d635567d3..92afad387237 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> @@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  	kfree_const(kn->name);
>  
>  	if (kn->iattr) {
> -		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
> -			security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> -						kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
> +		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
> +			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> +					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +		}
>  		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
>  		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
>  	}
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> index 0c1fd945ce42..02cde9dac5ee 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> @@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  {
>  	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
>  	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *secdata;
>  	u32 secdata_len = 0;
>  	int error;
> @@ -368,8 +369,10 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
>  	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
>  
> -	if (secdata)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
> +	if (secdata) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
> +	}
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index 4dbb0ee23432..af1c0db29c39 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -131,8 +131,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  static inline void
>  nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> -	if (label)
> -		security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +
> +	if (label) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  }
>  static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index 3de42a729093..bb3db033e144 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2420,6 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	__be32 status;
>  	int err;
>  	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  	void *context = NULL;
>  	int contextlen;
>  	bool contextsupport = false;
> @@ -2919,8 +2920,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  
>  out:
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> -	if (context)
> -		security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
> +	if (context) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
>  	kfree(acl);
>  	if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d310fa3942ce..046012a7255f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,41 @@ enum lsm_event {
>  	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * A "security context" is the text representation of
> + * the information used by LSMs.
> + * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
> + * it is useful for.
> + */
> +struct lsmcontext {
> +	char	*context;	/* Provided by the module */
> +	u32	len;
> +	int	slot;		/* Identifies the module */
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
> + * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
> + * @context: Initial context, or NULL
> + * @size: Size of context, or 0
> + * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
> + *
> + * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
> + * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
> + * lsmcontext integration is complete.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
> +				   u32 size, int slot)
> +{
> +	cp->slot = slot;
> +	cp->context = context;
> +
> +	if (context == NULL || size == 0)
> +		cp->len = 0;
> +	else
> +		cp->len = strlen(context);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Data exported by the security modules
>   *
> @@ -449,7 +484,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
> -void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> +void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
>  int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1240,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 31ae605fcc0a..6c7c3c229e4a 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secdata;
>  	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
> @@ -102,7 +103,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
>  
>  		if (!err) {
>  			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -			security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  	}
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 1b51e907f131..f844a2a642e6 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
>  	char			*ctx = NULL;
>  	u32			len;
> +	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>  	if (err)
> @@ -1437,15 +1438,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> -				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> +				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +			}
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>  			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  		}
>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> @@ -2074,6 +2078,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> @@ -2087,7 +2092,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	}
>  
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> -	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> +	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index c7aa39bda5cc..9fab0e7d90c3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	char *ctx = NULL;
>  	u32 len;
>  	int rc = 0;
> @@ -960,7 +961,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  		}
>  	}
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1172,6 +1174,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>  
>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -1205,7 +1208,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> +				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
>  		}
>  		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> @@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  		char *ctx = NULL;
>  		u32 len;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
> +		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> @@ -1360,7 +1365,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index e05f4ef68bd8..7834c357b60b 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	struct lsmblob lb;
>  	char *secdata;
>  	u32 seclen;
> @@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		return;
>  
>  	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -	security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  
>  static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index ca0968f13240..6954e6600583 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	int len, ret;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>  	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> @@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  
>  	ret = 0;
>  nla_put_failure:
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index c793103f3cd7..79158ad0486e 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	u32 len;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>  	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> @@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  
>  	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
>  
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 59211bff90ab..fe8403ef4e89 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
>  	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
>  	bool csum_verify;
> +	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>  	char *secdata = NULL;
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  
> @@ -629,8 +630,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
> -	if (seclen)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	if (seclen) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  	return skb;
>  
>  nla_put_failure:
> @@ -638,8 +641,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	kfree_skb(skb);
>  	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
>  nlmsg_failure:
> -	if (seclen)
> -		security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +	if (seclen) {
> +		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> +		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	}
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 2294aa9471e6..15b1945853be 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx = NULL;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -457,7 +458,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  					     &secctx,
>  					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			/* scaffolding */
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -516,7 +520,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			/* scaffolding */
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -553,6 +559,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -580,7 +587,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>  					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>  		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
> @@ -1094,6 +1102,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
>  	u32 secid;
>  	char *secctx;
> @@ -1161,7 +1170,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
>  			  secctx_len,
>  			  secctx);
> -	security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +	/* scaffolding */
> +	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 2ccc6567e2a2..94aea4985b74 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  					       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	char *secctx;
>  	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> @@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
>  	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> -		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> +		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	}
>  
>  	return audit_buf;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 82e29c477fa4..3563b1e2f8f9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2116,17 +2116,19 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>  
> -void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int *display = current->security;
>  
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> -		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> -			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +		if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
> +			memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>  			return;
>  		}
> +
> +	pr_warn("%s context \"%s\" from slot %d not released\n", __func__,
> +		cp->context, cp->slot);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>  
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index ad646b865295..3d571c438dfa 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4439,11 +4439,16 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -/*
> - * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
> - * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
> - * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
> +/**
> + * smack_release_secctx - do everything necessary to free a context
> + * @secdata: Unused
> + * @seclen: Unused
> + *
> + * Do nothing but hold a slot in the hooks list.
>   */
> +static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +{
> +}
>  
>  static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  {
> @@ -4685,6 +4690,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27 21:36     ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>  			return_error_param = ret;
>  			return_error_line = __LINE__;
>  			goto err_get_secctx_failed;
>  		}
> -		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  	}
>  
>  	trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
> @@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		t->buffer = NULL;
>  		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
>  	}
> -	if (secctx) {
> +	if (lsmctx.context) {
>  		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>  				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> -				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> +				    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>  
>  		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
> -					    secctx, secctx_sz);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -		secctx = NULL;
> +					    lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  	}
>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
>  	t->buffer->transaction = t;
> @@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> -	if (secctx) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (lsmctx.context)
> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 046012a7255f..7255825aa697 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>  			 size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>  void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  
>  static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> -					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 6c7c3c229e4a..4a6ad8caf423 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -93,17 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> -					       &seclen);
> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>  
>  		if (!err) {
> -			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> +				 context.len, context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  	}
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f844a2a642e6..436c23429319 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
>  	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
> -	char			*ctx = NULL;
>  	u32			len;
> -	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext	context;
>  
>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>  	if (err)
> @@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>  		len = 0;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> -						       &len);
> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> +						       &context);
>  			if (err)
>  				return err;
>  		}
>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (!sig_data) {
> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -			}
> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> +				security_release_secctx(&context);
>  			return -ENOMEM;
>  		}
>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> -			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> @@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>  
>  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  {
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	unsigned len;
>  	int error;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (error) {
>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>  			goto error_path;
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> -	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return 0;
>  
>  error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 9fab0e7d90c3..0478680cd0a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -	char *ctx = NULL;
> -	u32 len;
> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  	int rc = 0;
>  
>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>  
>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  {
> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
>  		if (osid) {
> -			char *ctx = NULL;
> -			u32 len;
> +			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
>  				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>  			}
>  		}
> @@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		char *ctx = NULL;
> -		u32 len;
>  		struct lsmblob blob;
> -		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> +		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 7834c357b60b..80ae0c5a1301 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	struct lsmblob lb;
> -	char *secdata;
> -	u32 seclen;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
>  	if (err)
>  		return;
>  
> -	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> +	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 6954e6600583..403307ff0fff 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> -	int len, ret;
> -	char *secctx;
> +	int ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  	if (!nest_secctx)
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
> -	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
> +	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>  
>  	ret = 0;
>  nla_put_failure:
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> @@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>  	int len, ret;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	len = context.len;
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
>  	return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
>  	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 79158ad0486e..fcb51ab2bb8b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>  static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	u32 len;
> -	char *secctx;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return;
>  
> -	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
> +	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>  
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  }
>  #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index fe8403ef4e89..6da00c7add5b 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  
>  	if (skb->secmark) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> +		*secdata = context.context;
>  	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> +	seclen = context.len;
>  #endif
>  	return seclen;
>  }
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 15b1945853be..4716e0011ba5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx = NULL;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> @@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx,
> -					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			/* scaffolding */
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  		if (entry != NULL)
>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> +					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>  		}
>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
>  	u32 secid;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> @@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	}
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
> -			  secctx_len,
> -			  secctx);
> -	/* scaffolding */
> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> +			  context.len,
> +			  context.context);
>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 94aea4985b74..2d1307f65250 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  {
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	char *secctx;
> -	u32 secctx_len;
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> @@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>  
>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> -		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3563b1e2f8f9..97b468f6e6a9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2081,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>  
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  	int *display = current->security;
> @@ -2089,10 +2089,13 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>  			continue;
> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
>  			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>  					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					secdata, seclen);
> +					&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
  2019-06-28 10:07   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_dentry_init_security() interface to
> fill an lsmcontext structure instead of a void * data area
> and a length. The lone caller of this interface is NFS4,
> which may make copies of the data using its own mechanisms.
> A rework of the nfs4 code to use the lsmcontext properly
> is a significant project, so the coward's way out is taken,
> and the lsmcontext data from security_dentry_init_security()
> is copied, then released directly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c        | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 +++----
>  security/security.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index af1c0db29c39..952f805965bb 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
>  nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (label == NULL)
> @@ -122,21 +123,26 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		return NULL;
>  
>  	err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
> -				&dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
> -	if (err == 0)
> -		return label;
> +					    &dentry->d_name, &context);
> +
> +	if (err)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	label->label = kmemdup(context.context, context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (label->label == NULL)
> +		label = NULL;
> +	else
> +		label->len = context.len;
> +
> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
> +	return label;
>  
> -	return NULL;
>  }
>  static inline void
>  nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -
> -	if (label) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	kfree(label->label);
>  }
>  static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 7255825aa697..2674eb70c2d7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>  int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
>  				int len, void **mnt_opts);
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -					u32 *ctxlen);
> +					const struct qstr *name,
> +					struct lsmcontext *ctx);
>  int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>  					struct qstr *name,
>  					const struct cred *old,
> @@ -724,8 +724,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
>  						 int mode,
>  						 const struct qstr *name,
> -						 void **ctx,
> -						 u32 *ctxlen)
> +						 struct lsmcontext *ctx)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 97b468f6e6a9..61cdc6bcd32e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1024,11 +1024,22 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  }
>  
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -					u32 *ctxlen)
> +				  const struct qstr *name,
> +				  struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
> -				name, ctx, ctxlen);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
> +			     list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> +			return hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode,
> +					name, (void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
> +
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-27 21:36     ` John Johansen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/27/19 2:34 PM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
>> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
>> along with the context and context length. This allows
>> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
>> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
>> returned data from the new structure.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> 
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

sorry, no I hit reply on the wrong patch. I want to see the
revision of this one.


> 
> 
>> ---
>>  drivers/android/binder.c                | 24 ++++++---------
>>  include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
>>  include/net/scm.h                       |  9 ++----
>>  kernel/audit.c                          | 29 +++++++-----------
>>  kernel/auditsc.c                        | 31 +++++++------------
>>  net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  7 ++---
>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    | 14 +++++----
>>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  7 ++---
>>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  5 +++-
>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       | 40 ++++++++-----------------
>>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  7 ++---
>>  security/security.c                     |  9 ++++--
>>  12 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
>> index 89e574be34cc..5d417a7b9bb3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
>> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
>> @@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>  	binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
>>  	struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
>>  	int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
>> -	char *secctx = NULL;
>> -	u32 secctx_sz = 0;
>> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>>  
>>  	e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
>>  	e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
>> @@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
>> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
>>  		if (ret) {
>>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
>>  			return_error_param = ret;
>>  			return_error_line = __LINE__;
>>  			goto err_get_secctx_failed;
>>  		}
>> -		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
>> +		extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>>  	}
>>  
>>  	trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
>> @@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>  		t->buffer = NULL;
>>  		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
>>  	}
>> -	if (secctx) {
>> +	if (lsmctx.context) {
>>  		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>>  				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
>>  				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
>> -				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
>> +				    ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>>  
>>  		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
>>  		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
>>  					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
>> -					    secctx, secctx_sz);
>> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
>> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>> -		secctx = NULL;
>> +					    lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
>> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>>  	}
>>  	t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
>>  	t->buffer->transaction = t;
>> @@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>>  	t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
>>  	binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
>>  err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
>> -	if (secctx) {
>> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
>> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>> -	}
>> +	if (lsmctx.context)
>> +		security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>>  err_get_secctx_failed:
>>  	kfree(tcomplete);
>>  	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 046012a7255f..7255825aa697 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>>  			 size_t size);
>>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>>  int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>>  int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>>  			     struct lsmblob *blob);
>>  void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
>> @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>  }
>>  
>>  static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
>> -					   char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>>  {
>>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>  }
>> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
>> index 6c7c3c229e4a..4a6ad8caf423 100644
>> --- a/include/net/scm.h
>> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
>> @@ -93,17 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>>  static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>>  {
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>> -	char *secdata;
>> -	u32 seclen;
>>  	int err;
>>  
>>  	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
>> -		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
>> -					       &seclen);
>> +		err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>>  
>>  		if (!err) {
>> -			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);/*scaffolding*/
>> +			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
>> +				 context.len, context.context);
>>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  		}
>>  	}
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index f844a2a642e6..436c23429319 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>>  	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
>>  	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
>>  	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
>> -	char			*ctx = NULL;
>>  	u32			len;
>> -	struct lsmcontext	scaff; /* scaffolding */
>> +	struct lsmcontext	context;
>>  
>>  	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
>>  	if (err)
>> @@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>>  	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
>>  		len = 0;
>>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>> -			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
>> -						       &len);
>> +			err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
>> +						       &context);
>>  			if (err)
>>  				return err;
>>  		}
>>  		sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>  		if (!sig_data) {
>> -			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>> -				lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
>> -				security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>> -			}
>> +			if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
>> +				security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>  		}
>>  		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
>>  		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
>>  		if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
>> -			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
>> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>> +			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
>> +			security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  		}
>>  		audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
>>  				 sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
>> @@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>>  
>>  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>  {
>> -	char *ctx = NULL;
>> -	unsigned len;
>>  	int error;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
>> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  
>>  	security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
>>  	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>>  		return 0;
>>  
>> -	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
>> +	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>>  	if (error) {
>>  		if (error != -EINVAL)
>>  			goto error_path;
>>  		return 0;
>>  	}
>>  
>> -	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
>> -	lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
>> -	security_release_secctx(&scaff);
>> +	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
>> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  	return 0;
>>  
>>  error_path:
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> index 9fab0e7d90c3..0478680cd0a8 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> @@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>>  				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
>>  {
>>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>> -	char *ctx = NULL;
>> -	u32 len;
>> +	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>>  	int rc = 0;
>>  
>>  	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
>> @@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
>>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
>> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
>>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
>>  			rc = 1;
>>  		} else {
>> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
>> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
>> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>>  		}
>>  	}
>>  	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
>> @@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>>  
>>  static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>>  {
>> -	struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>>  	struct audit_buffer *ab;
>>  	int i;
>>  
>> @@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>>  				 context->ipc.mode);
>>  		if (osid) {
>> -			char *ctx = NULL;
>> -			u32 len;
>> +			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>>  			struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
>> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
>>  				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
>>  				*call_panic = 1;
>>  			} else {
>> -				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
>> -				lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
>> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
>>  				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>>  			}
>>  		}
>> @@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
>>  	if (n->osid != 0) {
>> -		char *ctx = NULL;
>> -		u32 len;
>>  		struct lsmblob blob;
>> -		struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
>> +		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>>  
>>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
>> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
>>  			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
>>  			if (call_panic)
>>  				*call_panic = 2;
>>  		} else {
>> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>> -			security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
>> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
>> +			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
>>  		}
>>  	}
>>  
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
>> index 7834c357b60b..80ae0c5a1301 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
>> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>  {
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  	struct lsmblob lb;
>> -	char *secdata;
>> -	u32 seclen;
>>  	int err;
>>  
>>  	err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
>>  	if (err)
>>  		return;
>>  
>> -	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
>> +	err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
>>  	if (err)
>>  		return;
>>  
>> -	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
>> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
>> +	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
>>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  }
>>  
>> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
>> index 6954e6600583..403307ff0fff 100644
>> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
>> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
>> @@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>>  static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>>  {
>>  	struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
>> -	int len, ret;
>> -	char *secctx;
>> +	int ret;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  
>>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return 0;
>>  
>> @@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>>  	if (!nest_secctx)
>>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>>  
>> -	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
>> +	if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
>>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>>  	nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>>  
>>  	ret = 0;
>>  nla_put_failure:
>> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>> @@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
>>  	int len, ret;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  
>>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
>> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return 0;
>>  
>> +	len = context.len;
>> +	security_release_secctx(&context);
>> +
>>  	return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
>>  	       + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
>>  #else
>> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
>> index 79158ad0486e..fcb51ab2bb8b 100644
>> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
>> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
>> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>>  static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
>>  {
>>  	int ret;
>> -	u32 len;
>> -	char *secctx;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  
>>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
>> -	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
>> +	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return;
>>  
>> -	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
>> +	seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>>  
>> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
>>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  }
>>  #else
>> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
>> index fe8403ef4e89..6da00c7add5b 100644
>> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
>> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
>> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  
>>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>>  		return 0;
>> @@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>>  
>>  	if (skb->secmark) {
>>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
>> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
>> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>> +		*secdata = context.context;
>>  	}
>>  
>>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>> +	seclen = context.len;
>>  #endif
>>  	return seclen;
>>  }
>> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
>> index 15b1945853be..4716e0011ba5 100644
>> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
>> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
>> @@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>> -	char *secctx = NULL;
>> -	u32 secctx_len;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
>> @@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
>>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>> -					     &secctx,
>> -					     &secctx_len) == 0) {
>> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>> -			/* scaffolding */
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
>> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
>> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>> +					 context.context);
>>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  		}
>>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
>> @@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>>  	struct net_device *dev;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>> -	char *secctx;
>> -	u32 secctx_len;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>> @@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>>  		if (entry != NULL)
>>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>>  		if (entry != NULL &&
>> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>> -			/* scaffolding */
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
>> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
>> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>> +					 context.context);
>>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  		}
>>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>> @@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>>  	struct net_device *dev;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>> -	char *secctx;
>> -	u32 secctx_len;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>> @@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>>  		if (entry != NULL)
>>  			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>>  		if (entry != NULL &&
>> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
>> -					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>> -			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
>> -			lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
>> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
>> +			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>> +					 context.context);
>>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  		}
>>  		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
>> @@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>>  	void *data;
>>  	u32 secid;
>> -	char *secctx;
>> -	u32 secctx_len;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
>> @@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>>  	}
>>  
>>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
>> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
>> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
>>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
>>  			  NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
>> -			  secctx_len,
>> -			  secctx);
>> -	/* scaffolding */
>> -	lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
>> +			  context.len,
>> +			  context.context);
>>  	security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
>> index 94aea4985b74..2d1307f65250 100644
>> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
>> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
>> @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>>  {
>>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>> -	char *secctx;
>> -	u32 secctx_len;
>>  	struct lsmblob blob;
>>  
>>  	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
>> @@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>>  
>>  	lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
>>  	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
>> -	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
>> -		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
>> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
>> +	    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
>> +		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
>>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
>>  	}
>>  
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 3563b1e2f8f9..97b468f6e6a9 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -2081,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>>  
>> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>>  {
>>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>  	int *display = current->security;
>> @@ -2089,10 +2089,13 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>>  		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>  			continue;
>> -		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
>> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
>> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
>>  			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>>  					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
>> -					secdata, seclen);
>> +					&cp->context, &cp->len);
>> +		}
>>  	}
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>
> 
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:36   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
> a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
> This provides the information about which LSM created the
> context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
> correct hook. A lsmcontext is used within kernfs to store
> the security information as well.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  fs/kernfs/dir.c             |  8 ++------
>  fs/kernfs/inode.c           | 34 ++++++++++++----------------------
>  fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  3 +--
>  fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c           | 23 +++++++++--------------
>  include/linux/security.h    |  5 +++--
>  security/security.c         | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> index 92afad387237..1d000289d8b7 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> @@ -532,12 +532,8 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
>  	kfree_const(kn->name);
>  
>  	if (kn->iattr) {
> -		struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
> -			lsmcontext_init(&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
> -					kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len, 0);
> -			security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -		}
> +		if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context)
> +			security_release_secctx(&kn->iattr->ia_context);
>  		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
>  		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
>  	}
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> index 02cde9dac5ee..ffbf7863306d 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> @@ -135,21 +135,14 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
> -				  u32 *secdata_len)
> +static void kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,
> +				   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	void *old_secdata;
> -	size_t old_secdata_len;
> +	struct lsmcontext old_context;
>  
> -	old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
> -	old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
> -
> -	attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
> -	attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
> -
> -	*secdata = old_secdata;
> -	*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
> -	return 0;
> +	old_context = attrs->ia_context;
> +	attrs->ia_context = *cp;
> +	*cp = old_context;
>  }
>  
>  ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
> @@ -192,8 +185,8 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
>  		 * persistent copy in kernfs_node.
>  		 */
>  		set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
> -		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
> -					    attrs->ia_secdata_len);
> +		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_context.context,
> +					    attrs->ia_context.len);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
> @@ -350,8 +343,6 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
>  	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	void *secdata;
> -	u32 secdata_len = 0;
>  	int error;
>  
>  	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
> @@ -361,18 +352,17 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
> -	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
> +	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &context);
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
> -	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
> +	kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &context);
>  	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
>  
> -	if (secdata) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, secdata_len, 0);
> +	if (context.context)
>  		security_release_secctx(&context);
> -	}
> +
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> index 0b7d197a904c..844a028d282f 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
> @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
>  
>  struct kernfs_iattrs {
>  	struct iattr		ia_iattr;
> -	void			*ia_secdata;
> -	u32			ia_secdata_len;
> +	struct lsmcontext	ia_context;
>  
>  	struct simple_xattrs	xattrs;
>  };
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index bb3db033e144..1209083565dd 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
>  static inline __be32
>  nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> -			    void *context, int len)
> +			    struct lsmcontext *context)
>  {
>  	__be32 *p;
>  
> -	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> +	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
>  	if (!p)
>  		return nfserr_resource;
>  
> @@ -2318,13 +2318,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
>  	 */
>  	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
>  	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
> -	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
> +	p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline __be32
>  nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> -			    void *context, int len)
> +			    struct lsmcontext *context)
>  { return 0; }
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -2420,9 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	__be32 status;
>  	int err;
>  	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -	void *context = NULL;
> -	int contextlen;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	bool contextsupport = false;
>  	struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
>  	u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
> @@ -2479,7 +2477,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	     bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
>  		if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
>  			err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
> -						&context, &contextlen);
> +						       &context);
>  		else
>  			err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  		contextsupport = (err == 0);
> @@ -2908,8 +2906,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  	}
>  
>  	if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
> -		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
> -								contextlen);
> +		status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
>  		if (status)
>  			goto out;
>  	}
> @@ -2920,10 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>  
>  out:
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> -	if (context) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (context.context)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
>  	kfree(acl);
>  	if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2674eb70c2d7..c16aea55be97 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
>  int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
>  int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
>  #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>  
>  static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> @@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
> +					   struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
>  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 61cdc6bcd32e..45b9f905f5c0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2164,9 +2164,19 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
>  
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> +			return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode,
> +					(void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +		}
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
> pointers, and remove scaffolding.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 6da00c7add5b..69efb688383f 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -305,12 +305,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
>  	return -1;
>  }
>  
> -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
>  {
> -	u32 seclen = 0;
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
>  	struct lsmblob blob;
> -	struct lsmcontext context;
>  
>  	if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -318,15 +316,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
>  	read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>  
>  	if (skb->secmark) {
> +		/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */
>  		lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> -		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> -		*secdata = context.context;
> +		security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
>  	}
>  
>  	read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> -	seclen = context.len;
> +	return context->len;
> +#else
> +	return 0;
>  #endif
> -	return seclen;
>  }
>  
>  static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
> @@ -402,8 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
>  	struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
>  	bool csum_verify;
> -	struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -	char *secdata = NULL;
> +	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	u32 seclen = 0;
>  
>  	size =    nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
> @@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
> -		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
> +		seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
>  		if (seclen)
>  			size += nla_total_size(seclen);
>  	}
> @@ -605,7 +603,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	    nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
> -	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
> +	if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
>  		goto nla_put_failure;
>  
>  	if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
> @@ -633,10 +631,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	}
>  
>  	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
> -	if (seclen) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (seclen)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return skb;
>  
>  nla_put_failure:
> @@ -644,10 +640,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
>  	kfree_skb(skb);
>  	net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
>  nlmsg_failure:
> -	if (seclen) {
> -		lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> -		security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -	}
> +	if (seclen)
> +		security_release_secctx(&context);
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
> a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
> to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
> removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
> revision of LSM interfaces.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>



> ---
>  kernel/audit.h   |  6 +++---
>  kernel/auditsc.c | 40 +++++++++++++---------------------------
>  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
>  	kuid_t			uid;
>  	kgid_t			gid;
>  	dev_t			rdev;
> -	u32			osid;
> +	struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
>  	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
>  	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	kuid_t		    target_auid;
>  	kuid_t		    target_uid;
>  	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
> -	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
> +	struct lsmblob	    target_lsm;
>  	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>  
>  	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>  			kuid_t			uid;
>  			kgid_t			gid;
>  			umode_t			mode;
> -			u32			osid;
> +			struct lsmblob		olsm;
>  			int			has_perm;
>  			uid_t			perm_uid;
>  			gid_t			perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 0478680cd0a8..ec8872430fb6 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				/* Find files that match */
>  				if (name) {
> -					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&name->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule);
>  				} else if (ctx) {
>  					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> -						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
>  						if (security_audit_rule_match(
> -								&blob,
> +								&n->olsm,
>  								f->type,
>  								f->op,
>  								f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				/* Find ipc objects that match */
>  				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
>  					break;
> -				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> -				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> +				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
>  							      f->type, f->op,
>  							      f->lsm_rule))
>  					++result;
> @@ -955,7 +952,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>  			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
>  	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
>  		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  			rc = 1;
>  		} else {
>  			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> @@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>  				context->socketcall.args[i]);
>  		break; }
>  	case AUDIT_IPC: {
> -		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> +		struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
>  
>  		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
>  				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
>  				 context->ipc.mode);
> -		if (osid) {
> +		if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
>  			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> -			struct lsmblob blob;
>  
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> -			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> -				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> +			if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt)) {
> +				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  				*call_panic = 1;
>  			} else {
>  				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> @@ -1346,13 +1341,11 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
>  				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
>  				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
>  				 MINOR(n->rdev));
> -	if (n->osid != 0) {
> -		struct lsmblob blob;
> +	if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
>  		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>  
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> -			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
> +			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>  			if (call_panic)
>  				*call_panic = 2;
>  		} else {
> @@ -1906,17 +1899,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>  void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
>  {
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
> -
>  	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
>  	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
>  	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
>  	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
>  	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
> -	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> -	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
>  	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
>  		name->fcap_ver = -1;
>  		return;
> @@ -2266,14 +2255,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
>  void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
>  {
>  	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
>  	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
>  	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
>  	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> -	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> -	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> -	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
> +	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
>  	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
>  }
>  
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
> the internal storage is used to pass information between
> these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
> to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
> callers to accomodate the change. This requires that the
> modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
> correct secid when using netlabel.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>


> ---
>  include/net/netlabel.h              |  8 ++--
>  net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c               |  6 ++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c        |  6 +--
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c   | 57 +++++++++++------------------
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h   |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/hooks.c            |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/include/security.h |  1 +
>  security/selinux/netlabel.c         |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  4 +-
>  security/smack/smack.h              |  1 +
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  5 ++-
>  security/smack/smackfs.c            | 10 +++--
>  12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
> index 72d6435fc16c..6c550455e69f 100644
> --- a/include/net/netlabel.h
> +++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
> @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
>   * @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
>   * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
>   * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
> - * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
> + * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
> @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
>  			struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
>  			u32 lvl;
>  		} mls;
> -		u32 secid;
> +		struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  	} attr;
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  				const void *addr,
>  				const void *mask,
>  				u16 family,
> -				u32 secid,
> +				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
>  int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
>  				const char *dev_name,
> @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  					      const void *addr,
>  					      const void *mask,
>  					      u16 family,
> -					      u32 secid,
> +					      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	return -ENOSYS;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> index f0165c5f376b..eb4939f38a14 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
> @@ -1481,7 +1481,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
>  
>  	buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
>  	buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
> -	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
> +	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
> +	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0];
>  
>  	return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
>  }
> @@ -1501,7 +1502,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
>  				 const unsigned char *tag,
>  				 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
>  {
> -	secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
> +	/* only one netlabel user - the first */
> +	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0] = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
>  	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
>  
>  	return 0;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> index ee3e5b6471a6..724d44943543 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
> @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
>   * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
>   * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
>   * @family: address family
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
>   * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
>   *
>   * Description:
> @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  				const void *addr,
>  				const void *mask,
>  				u16 family,
> -				u32 secid,
> +				struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	u32 addr_len;
> @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
>  
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
>  				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> -				 secid, audit_info);
> +				 lsmblob, audit_info);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 4716e0011ba5..57ede7781c8f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
>  #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
>  	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
>  struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  
>  	struct netlbl_af4list list;
>  	struct rcu_head rcu;
> @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
>  #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
>  	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
>  struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
> -	u32 secid;
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  
>  	struct netlbl_af6list list;
>  	struct rcu_head rcu;
> @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
>   * @iface: the associated interface entry
>   * @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
>   * @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
> @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
>  static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  				   const struct in_addr *addr,
>  				   const struct in_addr *mask,
> -				   u32 secid)
> +				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
> @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  	entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
>  	entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
>  	entry->list.valid = 1;
> -	entry->secid = secid;
> +	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
> @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>   * @iface: the associated interface entry
>   * @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
>   * @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
> - * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
> + * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
>   *
>   * Description:
>   * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  				   const struct in6_addr *addr,
>  				   const struct in6_addr *mask,
> -				   u32 secid)
> +				   struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
>  	entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
>  	entry->list.mask = *mask;
>  	entry->list.valid = 1;
> -	entry->secid = secid;
> +	entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		      const void *addr,
>  		      const void *mask,
>  		      u32 addr_len,
> -		      u32 secid,
> +		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
>  	int ret_val;
> @@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  	struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
>  	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
> @@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
>  		const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
>  
> -		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
> +		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
>  		if (audit_buf != NULL)
>  			netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
>  						  dev_name,
> @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
>  		const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
>  
> -		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
> +		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
>  		if (audit_buf != NULL)
>  			netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
>  						  dev_name,
> @@ -451,8 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  unlhsh_add_return:
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> -		lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -487,7 +485,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
> @@ -507,10 +504,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
>  					  addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> -		if (entry != NULL)
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -551,7 +546,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
>  
>  	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
>  	list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -570,10 +564,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
>  					  addr, mask);
>  		if (dev != NULL)
>  			dev_put(dev);
> -		if (entry != NULL)
> -			lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
>  		if (entry != NULL &&
> -		    security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> +		    security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
>  			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
>  					 context.context);
>  			security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -927,9 +919,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> -	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> +				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
>  				 &audit_info);
>  }
>  
> @@ -977,10 +968,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		return ret_val;
>  
> -	/* scaffolding with the [0] */
>  	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> -				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> -				 &audit_info);
> +				 NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob, &audit_info);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -1092,8 +1081,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  	struct net_device *dev;
>  	struct lsmcontext context;
>  	void *data;
> -	u32 secid;
> -	struct lsmblob blob;
> +	struct lsmblob *lsmb;
>  
>  	data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
>  			   cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
> @@ -1131,7 +1119,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		if (ret_val != 0)
>  			goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> -		secid = addr4->secid;
> +		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
>  	} else {
>  		ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
>  					   NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
> @@ -1145,11 +1133,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
>  		if (ret_val != 0)
>  			goto list_cb_failure;
>  
> -		secid = addr6->secid;
> +		lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
>  	}
>  
> -	lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> -	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> +	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
>  	if (ret_val != 0)
>  		goto list_cb_failure;
>  	ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> @@ -1500,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					      &iface->addr4_list);
>  		if (addr4 == NULL)
>  			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
> -		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
> +		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
>  		break;
>  	}
>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> @@ -1513,7 +1500,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					      &iface->addr6_list);
>  		if (addr6 == NULL)
>  			goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
> -		secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
> +		secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
>  		break;
>  	}
>  #endif /* IPv6 */
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> index 3a9e5dc9511b..dcff99695c97 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
> @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
>  		      const void *addr,
>  		      const void *mask,
>  		      u32 addr_len,
> -		      u32 secid,
> +		      struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
>  		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
>  int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
>  			 const char *dev_name,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 8c93b07bb353..d90dfce15d44 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6622,7 +6622,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
>  };
>  
> -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { .lsm="selinux", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index b5b7c5aade8c..f0ca3879ba48 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
>  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
>  
>  extern int selinux_enabled;
> +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
>  
>  /* Policy capabilities */
>  enum {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index c40914a157b7..120d50c1bcac 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
>  		return NULL;
>  
>  	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
> -	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
> +	    (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
>  		return secattr;
>  
>  	return NULL;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index e3f5d6aece66..4ca0e006c3cc 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
>  	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
>  		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
>  	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
> -		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
> +		*sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
>  	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
>  		rc = -EIDRM;
>  		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
> @@ -3666,7 +3666,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
>  	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
> +	secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
>  	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
>  	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
>  	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index 7cc3a3382fee..039bf5de56b4 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
>   * Shared data.
>   */
>  extern int smack_enabled;
> +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
>  extern int smack_cipso_direct;
>  extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
>  extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 3d571c438dfa..a8d56ce00918 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3741,7 +3741,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
>  		/*
>  		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
>  		 */
> -		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
> +		return smack_from_secid(
> +				sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
>  	/*
>  	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
>  	 * for the packet fall back on the network
> @@ -4558,7 +4559,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>  };
>  
> -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
> +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = { .lsm="smack", .slot=LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index faf2ea3968b3..6a4c468c200c 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
>  static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>  {
> +	struct lsmblob lsmblob;
>  	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
>  	struct sockaddr_in newname;
>  	char *smack;
> @@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
>  	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
>  	 */
> -	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
> +	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
> +		lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
> +		lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
>  		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
> -			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
> -			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
> +			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
> +			&audit_info);
> +	}
>  
>  	if (rc == 0)
>  		rc = count;
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
> mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
> "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
> it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
> hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
> interferes in the multiple LSM case.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>


Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>



> ---
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 6d2eefc9b7c1..fb5798683ae1 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1079,22 +1079,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> -/**
> - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
> - * @sock: the peer socket
> - * @skb: packet data
> - * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
> - *
> - * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
> - */
> -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> -					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> -
> -{
> -	/* TODO: requires secid support */
> -	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> -}
> -
>  /**
>   * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
>   * @sk: child sock
> @@ -1195,8 +1179,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  #endif
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
>  		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> -		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
> @@ -1707,7 +1689,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>  
>  DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
>  	.name = "apparmor",
> -	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
> +	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
>  	.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
>  	.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
>  	.init = apparmor_init,
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27 22:33   ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
  25 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> This patchset provides the changes required for
> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> 

I have been doing some testing of this with Casey's suggested
fix of clearing the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx().

So far things are looking good. I have done smoke testing
on booting with the following combinations under an ubuntu
image. For the combinations that have apparmor I ran the
apparmor regression tests, where noted the display LSM
was set for the apparmor regression tests because they
are currently only testing the shared interface.

capability
yama
capability,yama
capability,yama,apparmor
capability,yama,selinux (no selinux policy)
capability,yama,apparmor,selinux (no selinux policy)
capability,yama,selinux,apparmor (no selinux policy) (tests that use shared interfaces fail without display LSM set, pass with it set to apparmor)
capability,yama,smack (no smack policy)
capability,yama,apparmor,smack (no smack policy)
capability,yama,smack,apparmor (no smack policy) (tests that use shared interfaces fail without display LSM set, pass with it set to apparmor)


I have more test combinations churning but figure I could report what I have so far



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-27 22:33   ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-27 22:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Johansen, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/27/2019 2:52 PM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 6/26/19 12:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
> I have been doing some testing of this with Casey's suggested
> fix of clearing the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx().

There are still cases where the lsmcontext needs local
initialization. If security_<fillscontext> isn't called,
and code later looks for context.context == NULL you can
get bitten. I am combing for those cases and will include
initializing them in v5.

>
> So far things are looking good. I have done smoke testing
> on booting with the following combinations under an ubuntu
> image. For the combinations that have apparmor I ran the
> apparmor regression tests, where noted the display LSM
> was set for the apparmor regression tests because they
> are currently only testing the shared interface.
>
> capability
> yama
> capability,yama
> capability,yama,apparmor
> capability,yama,selinux (no selinux policy)
> capability,yama,apparmor,selinux (no selinux policy)
> capability,yama,selinux,apparmor (no selinux policy) (tests that use shared interfaces fail without display LSM set, pass with it set to apparmor)
> capability,yama,smack (no smack policy)
> capability,yama,apparmor,smack (no smack policy)
> capability,yama,smack,apparmor (no smack policy) (tests that use shared interfaces fail without display LSM set, pass with it set to apparmor)
>
>
> I have more test combinations churning but figure I could report what I have so far
>
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
  2019-06-27 22:33   ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
  2019-06-27 23:44     ` John Johansen
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-27 23:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Johansen
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:

> I have more test combinations churning but figure I could report what I have so far

Do you have any way to test the nested scenario of say an AppArmor host 
with SELinux running in containers?

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-27 23:44     ` John Johansen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-27 23:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
	keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds

On 6/27/19 4:16 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
> 
>> I have more test combinations churning but figure I could report what I have so far
> 
> Do you have any way to test the nested scenario of say an AppArmor host 
> with SELinux running in containers?
> 


No, an selinux container doesn't really work atm. The issue is to do with
namespacing. I can boot an AppArmor host with selinux enabled, but the
container loading selinux policy gets interesting, and without namespacing
the container policy affects the host.

It is of course possible to label the system such that you can sort of
make it work, but it isn't really practical.

I have played with the selinuxns branch trying to get this to work, but
I ran into some issues I couldn't resolve. However it has been five
months since I tried that so I can look at it again.


The AppArmor container on an selinux host case is easier partly because of
how policy is applied, partly because namespacing of its policy is already
supported upstream, and partly because I just know it better.

I do have plans to test the apparmor container on selinux but I haven't
gotten that far and am planning on waiting for this one until Casey kicks
out v5.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-28 10:07   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Ondrej Mosnacek @ 2019-06-28 10:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler
  Cc: Casey Schaufler, James Morris, Linux Security Module list,
	SElinux list, Kees Cook, John Johansen, penguin-kernel,
	Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 9:23 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> Change the security_dentry_init_security() interface to
> fill an lsmcontext structure instead of a void * data area
> and a length. The lone caller of this interface is NFS4,
> which may make copies of the data using its own mechanisms.
> A rework of the nfs4 code to use the lsmcontext properly
> is a significant project, so the coward's way out is taken,
> and the lsmcontext data from security_dentry_init_security()
> is copied, then released directly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c        | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
>  include/linux/security.h |  7 +++----
>  security/security.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index af1c0db29c39..952f805965bb 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
>  nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>         struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> +       struct lsmcontext context;
>         int err;
>
>         if (label == NULL)
> @@ -122,21 +123,26 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>                 return NULL;
>
>         err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
> -                               &dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
> -       if (err == 0)
> -               return label;
> +                                           &dentry->d_name, &context);
> +
> +       if (err)
> +               return NULL;
> +
> +       label->label = kmemdup(context.context, context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (label->label == NULL)
> +               label = NULL;
> +       else
> +               label->len = context.len;
> +
> +       security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
> +       return label;
>
> -       return NULL;
>  }
>  static inline void
>  nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> -       struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> -
> -       if (label) {
> -               lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
> -               security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> -       }
> +       kfree(label->label);
>  }
>  static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
>  {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 7255825aa697..2674eb70c2d7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>  int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
>                                 int len, void **mnt_opts);
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -                                       const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -                                       u32 *ctxlen);
> +                                       const struct qstr *name,
> +                                       struct lsmcontext *ctx);
>  int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>                                         struct qstr *name,
>                                         const struct cred *old,
> @@ -724,8 +724,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
>                                                  int mode,
>                                                  const struct qstr *name,
> -                                                void **ctx,
> -                                                u32 *ctxlen)
> +                                                struct lsmcontext *ctx)
>  {
>         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 97b468f6e6a9..61cdc6bcd32e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1024,11 +1024,22 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  }
>
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> -                                       const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
> -                                       u32 *ctxlen)
> +                                 const struct qstr *name,
> +                                 struct lsmcontext *cp)
>  {
> -       return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
> -                               name, ctx, ctxlen);
> +       int *display = current->security;
> +       struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +       hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
> +                            list)
> +               if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +                   *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +                       cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> +                       return hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode,
> +                                       name, (void **)&cp->context, &cp->len);
> +               }

Sorry for chiming in only now, but does it really make sense to select
the per-task display LSM here? I'm not sure what exactly NFS does with
the returned context, but if it sends it to the server (it looks like
it does), wouldn't this mean that the server would potentially get
context from different LSMs, depending on the setting of the task
which is creating the file/directory?

> +
> +       return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>

--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
  2019-06-27 21:33   ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
  2019-06-28 16:15     ` Casey Schaufler
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-06-28 14:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul

On 6/26/19 3:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
> active.

IIUC, presently, at the end of the entire series,

1) Any process can change its display attribute to any enabled security 
module, and no security module can veto that change.

2) The display attribute is inherited across fork and exec, even execs 
that change credentials, and again no security module has control over 
the inheritance of this attribute.

3) Setting the display attribute affects more than just the contexts 
read or written by the process itself:
- Contexts reported in audit logs,
- Contexts passed across binder (generated in sender context, delivered 
to receiver),
- Contexts passed to NFS servers for new files,
- Contexts returned by NFS servers for existing files,
- Netlink-related contexts (?possibly generated in sender context rather 
than receiver context?),
- This list may not be complete.

4) A security_secid_to_secctx() in one process' context (e.g. sender) or 
with one display value followed later by a security_secctx_to_secid() 
call in a different process' context (e.g. receiver) or with a different 
display value may ask a different security module to perform the reverse 
translation of the context than the forward translation.

Is that correct?  If so, it seems problematic.
	
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>   fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
>   security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>   2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>   	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		0666),
>   	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
>   	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "display",		0666),
>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>   	DIR("smack",			0555,
>   	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>   static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>   
>   char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	.lbs_task = sizeof(int),	/* slot number for the "display" LSM */
> +};
>   
>   /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>   static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>   
>   /*
>    * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
>    */
>   static int lsm_slot;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>   
>   /**
>    * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>   	if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>   		if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>   			panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> +		lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
>   		lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>   		init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>   			   lsmid->slot);
> @@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>    */
>   static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>   {
> +	int *display;
> +
>   	if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
>   		task->security = NULL;
>   		return 0;
> @@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>   	task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
>   	if (task->security == NULL)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> +	 * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> +	 * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> +	 */
> +	display = task->security;
> +	*display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> @@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>   
>   int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
>   {
> +	int *odisplay = current->security;
> +	int *ndisplay;
>   	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>   
> -	if (rc)
> +	if (unlikely(rc))
>   		return rc;
> +
>   	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> -	if (unlikely(rc))
> +	if (unlikely(rc)) {
>   		security_task_free(task);
> -	return rc;
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	ndisplay = task->security;
> +	if (ndisplay && odisplay)
> +		*ndisplay = *odisplay;
> +
> +	return 0;
>   }
>   
>   void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>   				char **value)
>   {
>   	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> +			slot = *display;
> +		*value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (*value)
> +			return strlen(*value);
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>   
>   	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>   		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>   			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>   		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>   	}
>   	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>   			 size_t size)
>   {
>   	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	char *term;
> +	char *cp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	int rc = -EINVAL;
> +	int slot = 0;
> +
> +	if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> +		/*
> +		 * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> +		 */
> +		if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (cp == NULL)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		memcpy(cp, value, size);
> +
> +		term = strchr(cp, ' ');
> +		if (term == NULL)
> +			term = strchr(cp, '\n');
> +		if (term != NULL)
> +			*term = '\0';
> +
> +		for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> +			if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> +				*display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> +				rc = size;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +		kfree(cp);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
>   
>   	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>   		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>   			continue;
> +		if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> +		    *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			continue;
>   		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>   	}
>   	return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>   int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>   {
>   	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>   
>   	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>   		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>   			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> -					      secdata, seclen);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> +					blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> +					secdata, seclen);
>   	}
>   	return 0;
>   }
> @@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>   			     struct lsmblob *blob)
>   {
>   	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> -	int rc;
> +	int *display = current->security;
>   
>   	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>   	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
>   		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>   			continue;
> -		rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> -					      &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> -		if (rc != 0)
> -			return rc;
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> +						&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>   	}
>   	return 0;
>   }
> @@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>   
>   void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>   {
> -	call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> +		    *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> +			hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> +			return;
> +		}
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>   
> @@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>   int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>   				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>   {
> -	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> -				optval, optlen, len);
> +	int *display = current->security;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> +			     list)
> +		if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> +			return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> +								 optlen, len);
> +	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>   }
>   
>   int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-28 16:15     ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-06-28 18:08       ` John Johansen
       [not found]       ` <CAB9W1A1nwE7WBZqTe-GV8xNb83_B2ybV7cco++nfMjtDz9NJrg@mail.gmail.com>
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-28 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
	selinux
  Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, casey

On 6/28/2019 7:45 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 6/26/19 3:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
>> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
>> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
>> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
>> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
>> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
>> active.
>
> IIUC, presently, at the end of the entire series,
>
> 1) Any process can change its display attribute to any enabled security module, and no security module can veto that change.

That is correct. If a security module could hoard the display it
could prevent user space from functioning in a multiple module
environment.

> 2) The display attribute is inherited across fork and exec, even execs that change credentials, and again no security module has control over the inheritance of this attribute.

Also correct. Scripts don't work otherwise.

>
> 3) Setting the display attribute affects more than just the contexts read or written by the process itself:
> - Contexts reported in audit logs,
> - Contexts passed across binder (generated in sender context, delivered to receiver),
> - Contexts passed to NFS servers for new files,
> - Contexts returned by NFS servers for existing files,
> - Netlink-related contexts (?possibly generated in sender context rather than receiver context?),
> - This list may not be complete.

Any of which can be changed should a more rational behavior be proposed.
One possibility is to use lsm='value',lsm='value' encoding for internal
communications, but there's been considerable resistance to anything
like that.

> 4) A security_secid_to_secctx() in one process' context (e.g. sender) or with one display value followed later by a security_secctx_to_secid() call in a different process' context (e.g. receiver) or with a different display value may ask a different security module to perform the reverse translation of the context than the forward translation.

Do you have an example of where this might happen?
Contexts are rarely used within the kernel. The usual
behavior is to generate them, send them out to user space,
and delete them. They get cached in some networking code,
but not in cases where more than one (existing) security
module will ever use them. Binder may be an exception, but
only SELinux (currently) supports binder.


> Is that correct?  If so, it seems problematic.

Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
data in every record? Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
SELinux?

There is no user space that uses display, and it's going
to take some time to work out all the kinks before we even
think about teaching systemd about it.

>     
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>   fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
>>   security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>   2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>>       ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",        0666),
>>       ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",        0666),
>>       ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",    0666),
>> +    ATTR(NULL, "display",        0666),
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>>       DIR("smack",            0555,
>>           proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>>   static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>>     char *lsm_names;
>> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> +    .lbs_task = sizeof(int),    /* slot number for the "display" LSM */
>> +};
>>     /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>>   static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
>> @@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>>     /*
>>    * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
>>    */
>>   static int lsm_slot;
>> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>>     /**
>>    * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
>> @@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>>       if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>>           if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>>               panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>> +        lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
>>           lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>>           init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>>                  lsmid->slot);
>> @@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>>    */
>>   static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>>   {
>> +    int *display;
>> +
>>       if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
>>           task->security = NULL;
>>           return 0;
>> @@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>>       task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
>>       if (task->security == NULL)
>>           return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
>> +     * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
>> +     * default first registered LSM be displayed.
>> +     */
>> +    display = task->security;
>> +    *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
>> +
>>       return 0;
>>   }
>>   @@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>>     int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
>>   {
>> +    int *odisplay = current->security;
>> +    int *ndisplay;
>>       int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>>   -    if (rc)
>> +    if (unlikely(rc))
>>           return rc;
>> +
>>       rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
>> -    if (unlikely(rc))
>> +    if (unlikely(rc)) {
>>           security_task_free(task);
>> -    return rc;
>> +        return rc;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    ndisplay = task->security;
>> +    if (ndisplay && odisplay)
>> +        *ndisplay = *odisplay;
>> +
>> +    return 0;
>>   }
>>     void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>> @@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>>                   char **value)
>>   {
>>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>> +    int slot = 0;
>> +
>> +    if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
>> +        /*
>> +         * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
>> +         */
>> +        if (lsm_slot == 0)
>> +            return -EINVAL;
>> +        if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
>> +            slot = *display;
>> +        *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +        if (*value)
>> +            return strlen(*value);
>> +        return -ENOMEM;
>> +    }
>>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>>           if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>>               continue;
>> +        if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
>> +            *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +            continue;
>>           return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>>       }
>>       return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>>                size_t size)
>>   {
>>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +    char *term;
>> +    char *cp;
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>> +    int rc = -EINVAL;
>> +    int slot = 0;
>> +
>> +    if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
>> +        /*
>> +         * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
>> +         */
>> +        if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
>> +            return -EINVAL;
>> +        cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +        if (cp == NULL)
>> +            return -ENOMEM;
>> +        memcpy(cp, value, size);
>> +
>> +        term = strchr(cp, ' ');
>> +        if (term == NULL)
>> +            term = strchr(cp, '\n');
>> +        if (term != NULL)
>> +            *term = '\0';
>> +
>> +        for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
>> +            if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
>> +                *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
>> +                rc = size;
>> +                break;
>> +            }
>> +
>> +        kfree(cp);
>> +        return rc;
>> +    }
>>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>>           if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>>               continue;
>> +        if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
>> +            *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +            continue;
>>           return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>>       }
>>       return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>>   int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>   {
>>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> -    int rc;
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>>           if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>               continue;
>> -        rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
>> -                          secdata, seclen);
>> -        if (rc != 0)
>> -            return rc;
>> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +            return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>> +                    blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
>> +                    secdata, seclen);
>>       }
>>       return 0;
>>   }
>> @@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
>>                    struct lsmblob *blob)
>>   {
>>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> -    int rc;
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>>         lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>>       hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
>>           if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>               continue;
>> -        rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
>> -                          &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> -        if (rc != 0)
>> -            return rc;
>> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +            return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
>> +                        &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>       }
>>       return 0;
>>   }
>> @@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>>     void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>>   {
>> -    call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
>> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>> +
>> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
>> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
>> +            *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
>> +            hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
>> +            return;
>> +        }
>>   }
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>>   @@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>>   int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>>                         int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>>   {
>> -    return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>> -                optval, optlen, len);
>> +    int *display = current->security;
>> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +
>> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
>> +                 list)
>> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> +            return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
>> +                                 optlen, len);
>> +    return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>>   }
>>     int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
>>
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-28 16:15     ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-28 18:08       ` John Johansen
       [not found]       ` <CAB9W1A1nwE7WBZqTe-GV8xNb83_B2ybV7cco++nfMjtDz9NJrg@mail.gmail.com>
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-28 18:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Casey Schaufler, Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, jmorris,
	linux-security-module, selinux
  Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul

On 6/28/19 9:15 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/28/2019 7:45 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 6/26/19 3:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
>>> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
>>> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
>>> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
>>> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
>>> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
>>> active.
>>
>> IIUC, presently, at the end of the entire series,
>>
>> 1) Any process can change its display attribute to any enabled security module, and no security module can veto that change.
> 
> That is correct. If a security module could hoard the display it
> could prevent user space from functioning in a multiple module
> environment.
> 

It should be noted that this is also just for legacy, we agreed
last year that smack and apparmor would move to new none shared
interfaces by default, and ideally other LSMs would as well.
Smack has already added its process dir and apparmor has its
in apparmor-next

The display LSM allows for the current interfaces to be used
in a stacking situation for things like LSM in legacy container.

>> 2) The display attribute is inherited across fork and exec, even execs that change credentials, and again no security module has control over the inheritance of this attribute.
> 
> Also correct. Scripts don't work otherwise.
> 
>>
>> 3) Setting the display attribute affects more than just the contexts read or written by the process itself:
>> - Contexts reported in audit logs,
>> - Contexts passed across binder (generated in sender context, delivered to receiver),
>> - Contexts passed to NFS servers for new files,
>> - Contexts returned by NFS servers for existing files,
>> - Netlink-related contexts (?possibly generated in sender context rather than receiver context?),
>> - This list may not be complete.
> 
> Any of which can be changed should a more rational behavior be proposed.
> One possibility is to use lsm='value',lsm='value' encoding for internal
> communications, but there's been considerable resistance to anything
> like that.
> 

This is the part of the patchset that I am least happy with but
it is a hard problem, and so far using display has been the only
option that has been even sort of agreed to.


>> 4) A security_secid_to_secctx() in one process' context (e.g. sender) or with one display value followed later by a security_secctx_to_secid() call in a different process' context (e.g. receiver) or with a different display value may ask a different security module to perform the reverse translation of the context than the forward translation.
> 
> Do you have an example of where this might happen?
> Contexts are rarely used within the kernel. The usual
> behavior is to generate them, send them out to user space,
> and delete them. They get cached in some networking code,
> but not in cases where more than one (existing) security
> module will ever use them. Binder may be an exception, but
> only SELinux (currently) supports binder.
> 
> 
>> Is that correct?  If so, it seems problematic.
> 
> Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
> What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
> data in every record?

If we could it would be better, but again how to do it. Every
option presented has been rejected.

> Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
> SELinux?
> 
Yes. Just because it isn't currently used doesn't mean it isn't
a concern or desired. 

> There is no user space that uses display, and it's going
> to take some time to work out all the kinks before we even
> think about teaching systemd about it.
> 

I'm not even sure we want to teach systemd et al. about it,
it would be far better to teach them about
  /proc/*/attr/{smack,apparmor,...}/*


But yes its going to take time to get the userspace updated.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
       [not found]       ` <CAB9W1A1nwE7WBZqTe-GV8xNb83_B2ybV7cco++nfMjtDz9NJrg@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2019-06-29  1:01         ` Stephen Smalley
  2019-06-29 19:45           ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-06-29  1:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley, Schaufler, Casey, James Morris, LSM List,
	selinux, keescook, John Johansen, penguin-kernel, Paul Moore,
	Casey Schaufler

On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 12:15 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 6/28/2019 7:45 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 6/26/19 3:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
> >> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
> >> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
> >> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
> >> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
> >> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
> >> active.
> >
> > IIUC, presently, at the end of the entire series,
> >
> > 1) Any process can change its display attribute to any enabled security module, and no security module can veto that change.
>
> That is correct. If a security module could hoard the display it
> could prevent user space from functioning in a multiple module
> environment.
>
> > 2) The display attribute is inherited across fork and exec, even execs that change credentials, and again no security module has control over the inheritance of this attribute.
>
> Also correct. Scripts don't work otherwise.

It's a security hole waiting to happen. Unprivileged caller sets its
display value to Smack on a mostly SELinux system that happens to
enable Smack too, then exec's a credential-changing SELinux-aware
program that uses one of the libselinux APIs to set one of the
/proc/self/attr attributes to a different SELinux context. Due to the
change in display, the SELinux-aware program instead ends up setting
one of the Smack attributes and therefore the desired SELinux context
is never applied to the process or file or socket or whatever.

>
> >
> > 3) Setting the display attribute affects more than just the contexts read or written by the process itself:
> > - Contexts reported in audit logs,
> > - Contexts passed across binder (generated in sender context, delivered to receiver),
> > - Contexts passed to NFS servers for new files,
> > - Contexts returned by NFS servers for existing files,
> > - Netlink-related contexts (?possibly generated in sender context rather than receiver context?),
> > - This list may not be complete.
>
> Any of which can be changed should a more rational behavior be proposed.
> One possibility is to use lsm='value',lsm='value' encoding for internal
> communications, but there's been considerable resistance to anything
> like that.

These are also security holes waiting to happen.  Processes can use it
to hide their SELinux contexts from the audit logs, forge different
SELinux contexts on binder IPC, forge file contexts to which they have
no SELinux permissions on new files, ... All they need is stacking to
be enabled and one other module that helpfully lets them set attribute
values that look like SELinux contexts, and then they can set those
and switch their display at the right time.

>
> > 4) A security_secid_to_secctx() in one process' context (e.g. sender) or with one display value followed later by a security_secctx_to_secid() call in a different process' context (e.g. receiver) or with a different display value may ask a different security module to perform the reverse translation of the context than the forward translation.
>
> Do you have an example of where this might happen?
> Contexts are rarely used within the kernel. The usual
> behavior is to generate them, send them out to user space,
> and delete them. They get cached in some networking code,
> but not in cases where more than one (existing) security
> module will ever use them. Binder may be an exception, but
> only SELinux (currently) supports binder.

Haven't looked but I don't like the asymmetry of the interface.
Doesn't matter that only SELinux supports binder if  you ever want any
other security module other than SELinux enabled at the same time as
SELinux.

>
>
> > Is that correct?  If so, it seems problematic.
>
> Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
> What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
> data in every record? Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
> SELinux?

Yes to all on audit if stacking is going to be real.  And yes, I think
other security modules will care about NFS if they are serious.

>
> There is no user space that uses display, and it's going
> to take some time to work out all the kinks before we even
> think about teaching systemd about it.

That doesn't make it acceptable to introduce a mechanism that weakens
security now.

>
> >
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> ---
> >>   fs/proc/base.c      |   1 +
> >>   security/security.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> >>   2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> >> index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644
> >> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> >> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> >> @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> >>       ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",        0666),
> >>       ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",        0666),
> >>       ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",    0666),
> >> +    ATTR(NULL, "display",        0666),
> >>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> >>       DIR("smack",            0555,
> >>           proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> >> index 3180a6f30625..82e29c477fa4 100644
> >> --- a/security/security.c
> >> +++ b/security/security.c
> >> @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> >>   static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
> >>     char *lsm_names;
> >> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> >> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> >> +    .lbs_task = sizeof(int),    /* slot number for the "display" LSM */
> >> +};
> >>     /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> >>   static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> >> @@ -423,8 +425,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> >>     /*
> >>    * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> >> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
> >>    */
> >>   static int lsm_slot;
> >> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> >>     /**
> >>    * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> >> @@ -444,6 +448,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> >>       if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> >>           if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> >>               panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> >> +        lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
> >>           lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> >>           init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> >>                  lsmid->slot);
> >> @@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> >>    */
> >>   static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> >>   {
> >> +    int *display;
> >> +
> >>       if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
> >>           task->security = NULL;
> >>           return 0;
> >> @@ -572,6 +579,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> >>       task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
> >>       if (task->security == NULL)
> >>           return -ENOMEM;
> >> +
> >> +    /*
> >> +     * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> >> +     * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> >> +     * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> >> +     */
> >> +    display = task->security;
> >> +    *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> >> +
> >>       return 0;
> >>   }
> >>   @@ -1563,14 +1579,24 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
> >>     int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
> >>   {
> >> +    int *odisplay = current->security;
> >> +    int *ndisplay;
> >>       int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
> >>   -    if (rc)
> >> +    if (unlikely(rc))
> >>           return rc;
> >> +
> >>       rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> >> -    if (unlikely(rc))
> >> +    if (unlikely(rc)) {
> >>           security_task_free(task);
> >> -    return rc;
> >> +        return rc;
> >> +    }
> >> +
> >> +    ndisplay = task->security;
> >> +    if (ndisplay && odisplay)
> >> +        *ndisplay = *odisplay;
> >> +
> >> +    return 0;
> >>   }
> >>     void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> >> @@ -1967,10 +1993,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> >>                   char **value)
> >>   {
> >>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >> +    int slot = 0;
> >> +
> >> +    if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> >> +        /*
> >> +         * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> >> +         */
> >> +        if (lsm_slot == 0)
> >> +            return -EINVAL;
> >> +        if (*display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> >> +            slot = *display;
> >> +        *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> +        if (*value)
> >> +            return strlen(*value);
> >> +        return -ENOMEM;
> >> +    }
> >>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> >>           if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> >>               continue;
> >> +        if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> >> +            *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> >> +            continue;
> >>           return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> >>       }
> >>       return -EINVAL;
> >> @@ -1980,10 +2025,46 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> >>                size_t size)
> >>   {
> >>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> +    char *term;
> >> +    char *cp;
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >> +    int rc = -EINVAL;
> >> +    int slot = 0;
> >> +
> >> +    if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> >> +        /*
> >> +         * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> >> +         */
> >> +        if (lsm_slot == 0 || size == 0)
> >> +            return -EINVAL;
> >> +        cp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> +        if (cp == NULL)
> >> +            return -ENOMEM;
> >> +        memcpy(cp, value, size);
> >> +
> >> +        term = strchr(cp, ' ');
> >> +        if (term == NULL)
> >> +            term = strchr(cp, '\n');
> >> +        if (term != NULL)
> >> +            *term = '\0';
> >> +
> >> +        for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> >> +            if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> >> +                *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> >> +                rc = size;
> >> +                break;
> >> +            }
> >> +
> >> +        kfree(cp);
> >> +        return rc;
> >> +    }
> >>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> >>           if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> >>               continue;
> >> +        if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> >> +            *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> >> +            continue;
> >>           return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> >>       }
> >>       return -EINVAL;
> >> @@ -2003,15 +2084,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
> >>   int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> >>   {
> >>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> -    int rc;
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >>         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> >>           if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>               continue;
> >> -        rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> >> -                          secdata, seclen);
> >> -        if (rc != 0)
> >> -            return rc;
> >> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> >> +            return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> >> +                    blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> >> +                    secdata, seclen);
> >>       }
> >>       return 0;
> >>   }
> >> @@ -2021,16 +2102,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> >>                    struct lsmblob *blob)
> >>   {
> >>       struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> -    int rc;
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >>         lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> >>       hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> >>           if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>               continue;
> >> -        rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> >> -                          &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >> -        if (rc != 0)
> >> -            return rc;
> >> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> >> +            return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> >> +                        &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >>       }
> >>       return 0;
> >>   }
> >> @@ -2038,7 +2118,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
> >>     void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> >>   {
> >> -    call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> >> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >> +
> >> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> >> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID ||
> >> +            *display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> >> +            hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> >> +            return;
> >> +        }
> >>   }
> >>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
> >>   @@ -2163,8 +2251,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> >>   int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> >>                         int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> >>   {
> >> -    return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> >> -                optval, optlen, len);
> >> +    int *display = current->security;
> >> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >> +
> >> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> >> +                 list)
> >> +        if (*display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || *display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> >> +            return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> >> +                                 optlen, len);
> >> +    return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> >>   }
> >>     int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> >>
> >

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-29  1:01         ` Fwd: " Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-29 19:45           ` Casey Schaufler
  2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-29 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley, Stephen Smalley, Schaufler, Casey, James Morris,
	LSM List, selinux, keescook, John Johansen, penguin-kernel,
	Paul Moore

On 6/28/2019 6:01 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 12:15 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 6/28/2019 7:45 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On 6/26/19 3:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
>>>> which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
>>>> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
>>>> data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
>>>> the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
>>>> At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display
>>>> active.
>>> IIUC, presently, at the end of the entire series,
>>>
>>> 1) Any process can change its display attribute to any enabled security module, and no security module can veto that change.
>> That is correct. If a security module could hoard the display it
>> could prevent user space from functioning in a multiple module
>> environment.
>>
>>> 2) The display attribute is inherited across fork and exec, even execs that change credentials, and again no security module has control over the inheritance of this attribute.
>> Also correct. Scripts don't work otherwise.
> It's a security hole waiting to happen. Unprivileged caller sets its
> display value to Smack on a mostly SELinux system that happens to
> enable Smack too, then exec's a credential-changing SELinux-aware
> program that uses one of the libselinux APIs to set one of the
> /proc/self/attr attributes to a different SELinux context. Due to the
> change in display, the SELinux-aware program instead ends up setting
> one of the Smack attributes and therefore the desired SELinux context
> is never applied to the process or file or socket or whatever.

The credential-changing SELinux-aware program is getting
invoked by an unprivileged, Smack aware program? Would anyone
expect that to be a good idea? I'll admit it could happen,
but setting the Smack label of your SELinux-aware program
(which will need CAP_MAC_ADMIN, BTW) to "system_u:system_r:wheehee_t"
is unlikely to result in anything other than your SELinux-aware
program getting very frustrated. In the other direction, a
Smack-aware program that trys to set its SELinux context to "^"
is going to fail by SELinux policy. While I am willing to accept
that it is possible that there is a way to exploit this, it
would require convoluted SELinux and Smack policies. Anyone
who has reason to use a combination of Smack and SELinux on
a real system is already signing up for more configuration
headaches than I would wish on anyone.
 
I have strongly advocated addition of /proc/.../attr/
subdirectories for all LSMs, and that all user space migrate
to using them. /proc/.../attr/selinux/current would not be
affected by the display setting. We know, and have known for
years that so long as "current" is shared there will be this
sort of problem.


>
>>> 3) Setting the display attribute affects more than just the contexts read or written by the process itself:
>>> - Contexts reported in audit logs,
>>> - Contexts passed across binder (generated in sender context, delivered to receiver),
>>> - Contexts passed to NFS servers for new files,
>>> - Contexts returned by NFS servers for existing files,
>>> - Netlink-related contexts (?possibly generated in sender context rather than receiver context?),
>>> - This list may not be complete.
>> Any of which can be changed should a more rational behavior be proposed.
>> One possibility is to use lsm='value',lsm='value' encoding for internal
>> communications, but there's been considerable resistance to anything
>> like that.
> These are also security holes waiting to happen.  Processes can use it
> to hide their SELinux contexts from the audit logs, forge different
> SELinux contexts on binder IPC, forge file contexts to which they have
> no SELinux permissions on new files, ... All they need is stacking to
> be enabled and one other module that helpfully lets them set attribute
> values that look like SELinux contexts, and then they can set those
> and switch their display at the right time.

What would you propose as a more rational behavior?
Seriously, I could use some help here.


>>> 4) A security_secid_to_secctx() in one process' context (e.g. sender) or with one display value followed later by a security_secctx_to_secid() call in a different process' context (e.g. receiver) or with a different display value may ask a different security module to perform the reverse translation of the context than the forward translation.
>> Do you have an example of where this might happen?
>> Contexts are rarely used within the kernel. The usual
>> behavior is to generate them, send them out to user space,
>> and delete them. They get cached in some networking code,
>> but not in cases where more than one (existing) security
>> module will ever use them. Binder may be an exception, but
>> only SELinux (currently) supports binder.
> Haven't looked but I don't like the asymmetry of the interface.
> Doesn't matter that only SELinux supports binder if  you ever want any
> other security module other than SELinux enabled at the same time as
> SELinux.

Binder needs another look then.

>> Is that correct?  If so, it seems problematic.
>> Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
>> What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
>> data in every record? Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
>> SELinux?
> Yes to all on audit if stacking is going to be real.  And yes, I think
> other security modules will care about NFS if they are serious.

I would love to get feedback from the audit maintainers about
how they would like the multiple LSM data formatted.

NFS is ... challenging. It was supposed to work with Smack
when it went in, but to the best of my understanding never
actually demonstrated.

>> There is no user space that uses display, and it's going
>> to take some time to work out all the kinks before we even
>> think about teaching systemd about it.
> That doesn't make it acceptable to introduce a mechanism that weakens
> security now.

Agreed in principle, not necessarily in detail.



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-06-29  1:01         ` Fwd: " Stephen Smalley
  2019-06-29 19:45           ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
  2019-07-02  1:20             ` Casey Schaufler
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 96+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-07-02  0:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley
  Cc: Stephen Smalley, Schaufler, Casey, LSM List, selinux, keescook,
	John Johansen, penguin-kernel, Paul Moore, Casey Schaufler

On Fri, 28 Jun 2019, Stephen Smalley wrote:

> > Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
> > What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
> > data in every record? Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
> > SELinux?
> 
> Yes to all on audit if stacking is going to be real.  And yes, I think
> other security modules will care about NFS if they are serious.

Agreed.

There must better way to approach this, somehow...

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

* Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
@ 2019-07-02  1:20             ` Casey Schaufler
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 96+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-07-02  1:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Morris, Stephen Smalley
  Cc: Stephen Smalley, Schaufler, Casey, LSM List, selinux, keescook,
	John Johansen, penguin-kernel, Paul Moore, casey

On 7/1/2019 5:49 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Fri, 28 Jun 2019, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
>>> Balancing backward compatibility with new behavior is hard!
>>> What would you suggest for audit logs? Should we put all LSM
>>> data in every record? Is NFS a concern for anyone not using
>>> SELinux?
>> Yes to all on audit if stacking is going to be real.  And yes, I think
>> other security modules will care about NFS if they are serious.
> Agreed.
>
> There must better way to approach this, somehow...

It not like I haven't proposed a number of mechanisms!
The "display" mechanism has the best backward compatibility
story, at the cost of being awkward/dangerous in the face of
sophisticated user space environments. A combined string
(smack='System",AppArmor='unconfined') sucks at compatibility,
but provides the best information.

Right now I'm looking at a way to prevent internal confusion.
I think that may be possible.

I'll point out that lib<lsm> has the option of verifying
the display before doing scary writes, but that's a lot of
work that no one is looking forward to.



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 96+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-07-02  1:20 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 17:43     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:45   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:48   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:50   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:51   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:53   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:55   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:56   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:57   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:58   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 16:15     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 18:08       ` John Johansen
     [not found]       ` <CAB9W1A1nwE7WBZqTe-GV8xNb83_B2ybV7cco++nfMjtDz9NJrg@mail.gmail.com>
2019-06-29  1:01         ` Fwd: " Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 19:45           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
2019-07-02  1:20             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 17:17       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 17:36         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 21:36     ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-28 10:07   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:36   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:28     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
2019-06-27  3:49       ` James Morris
2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 23:04     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 21:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
2019-06-27  4:10       ` James Morris
2019-06-27 17:07         ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 18:10           ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:51     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 22:33   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:44     ` John Johansen

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).