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Date:   Wed, 10 Jul 2019 08:49:15 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Cc:     linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in
 SELinux
Message-ID: <20190710154915.GA4331@linux.intel.com>
References: <cover.1561588012.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
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On Sun, Jul 07, 2019 at 04:41:34PM -0700, Cedric Xing wrote:
> selinux_enclave_init() determines if an enclave is allowed to launch, using the
> criteria described earlier. This implementation does NOT accept SIGSTRUCT in
> anonymous memory. The backing file is also cached in struct
> file_security_struct and will serve as the base for decisions for anonymous
> pages.

Did we ever reach a consensus on whether sigstruct must reside in a file?

> +	/* Store SIGSTRUCT file for future use */
> +	if (atomic_long_cmpxchg(&fsec->encl_ss, 0, (long)src->vm_file))
> +		return -EEXIST;
> +
> +	get_file(src->vm_file);

My understanding is that Andy is strongly against pinning a file for the
duration of the enclave, has that changed?