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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 17:18:01 -0700
Message-ID: <20190820001805.241928-26-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/ima.h                 |  9 ++++++
 kernel/kexec_file.c                 | 10 +++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 00036d2f57c3..8e2f324fb901 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -129,4 +129,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 43109ef4d6bf..7f4a618fc8c1 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -208,7 +208,15 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 			return ret;
 		}
 
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+		/* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
+		 * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
+		 * down.
+		 */
+		if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
+		    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		return 0;
 
 		/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
 		 * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ca10917b5f89..874bd77d3b91 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
 	u64 count;
 };
 
+extern const int read_idmap[];
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 #else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1cffda4412b7..1747bc7bcb60 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
 	[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 7b53f2ca58e2..b8773f05f9da 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1339,3 +1339,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
+ * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
+ * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
+ * loading additional keys.
+ */
+bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	bool found = false;
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+
+	if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+		return false;
+
+	func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+		if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
+		 * match the func we're looking for
+		 */
+		if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
+		 * hash.
+		 */
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
+			found = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
+		 * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
+		 * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
+		 */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return found;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-20  0:17 [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 14:26   ` Philipp Rudo
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 21:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-25  9:51   ` Pavel Machek
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 19:45   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2019-08-20 21:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:07   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 16:39   ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  6:45 ` [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality James Morris
2019-08-30 16:28 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM David Howells
2019-09-04 16:51   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-10 10:06     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:31 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2019-09-04 16:57   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:32 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode David Howells

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