From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Subject: [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 17:18:03 -0700 Message-ID: <20190820001805.241928-28-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open(). (Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in default_file_open()) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> --- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index a5bab190a297..761af8ce4015 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE 0700 @@ -27,6 +28,25 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount; static int tracefs_mount_count; static bool tracefs_registered; +static int default_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; + struct file_operations *real_fops; + int ret; + + if (!dentry) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS); + if (ret) + return ret; + + real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata; + if (!real_fops->open) + return 0; + return real_fops->open(inode, filp); +} + static ssize_t default_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -221,6 +241,12 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb) return 0; } +static void tracefs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + kfree(inode->i_fop); +} + static int tracefs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) { int err; @@ -257,6 +283,7 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .statfs = simple_statfs, .remount_fs = tracefs_remount, + .destroy_inode = tracefs_destroy_inode, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, }; @@ -387,6 +414,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, const struct file_operations *fops) { + struct file_operations *proxy_fops; struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode; @@ -402,8 +430,20 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, if (unlikely(!inode)) return failed_creating(dentry); + proxy_fops = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_operations), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!proxy_fops)) { + iput(inode); + return failed_creating(dentry); + } + + if (!fops) + fops = &tracefs_file_operations; + + dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops; + memcpy(proxy_fops, fops, sizeof(*proxy_fops)); + proxy_fops->open = default_open_file; inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations; + inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; inode->i_private = data; d_instantiate(dentry, inode); fsnotify_create(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 152824b6f456..429f9f03372b 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ, LOCKDOWN_PERF, + LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index edd1fff0147d..84df03b1f5a7 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", + [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -- 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-20 0:17 [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett 2019-08-30 14:26 ` Philipp Rudo 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 21:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-25 9:51 ` Pavel Machek 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 19:45 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2019-08-20 21:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 16:39 ` Jessica Yu 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:18 ` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:18 ` [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:18 ` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:18 ` Matthew Garrett [this message] 2019-08-20 0:18 ` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:18 ` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 6:45 ` [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality James Morris 2019-08-30 16:28 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM David Howells 2019-09-04 16:51 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-10 10:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-30 16:31 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2019-09-04 16:57 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-30 16:32 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode David Howells
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