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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	"Paul Turner" <pjt@google.com>,
	"Brendan Gregg" <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian@brauner.io>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>,
	"Martin KaFai Lau" <kafai@fb.com>,
	"Song Liu" <songliubraving@fb.com>, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nicolas Ferre" <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>,
	"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@google.com>,
	"Quentin Monnet" <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>,
	"Andrey Ignatov" <rdna@fb.com>, "Joe Stringer" <joe@wand.net.nz>
Subject: [RFC v1 14/14] krsi: Pin arg pages only when needed
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 13:55:27 +0200
Message-ID: <20190910115527.5235-15-kpsingh@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190910115527.5235-1-kpsingh@chromium.org>

From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>

Adds a callback which is called when a new program is attached
to a hook. The callback registered by the process_exection hook
checks if a program that has calls to a helper that requires pages to
be pinned (eg. krsi_get_env_var).

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
---
 include/linux/krsi.h              |  1 +
 security/krsi/include/hooks.h     |  5 ++-
 security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h |  7 ++++
 security/krsi/krsi.c              | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/krsi/ops.c               | 10 ++++-
 5 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/krsi.h b/include/linux/krsi.h
index c7d1790d0c1f..e443d0309764 100644
--- a/include/linux/krsi.h
+++ b/include/linux/krsi.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI
 int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog);
+extern const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto;
 #else
 static inline int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
 				   struct bpf_prog *prog)
diff --git a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
index e070c452b5de..38293125ff99 100644
--- a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
+++ b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *
  * Format:
  *
- *   KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN)
+ *   KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN, CALLBACK)
  *
  * KRSI adds one layer of indirection between the name of the hook and the name
  * it exposes to the userspace in Security FS to prevent the userspace from
@@ -18,4 +18,5 @@
 KRSI_HOOK_INIT(PROCESS_EXECUTION,
 	       process_execution,
 	       bprm_check_security,
-	       krsi_process_execution)
+	       krsi_process_execution,
+	       krsi_process_execution_cb)
diff --git a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
index 6152847c3b08..99801d5b273a 100644
--- a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
+++ b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct krsi_ctx {
 	};
 };
 
+typedef int (*krsi_prog_attach_t) (struct bpf_prog_array *);
+
 /*
  * The LSM creates one file per hook.
  *
@@ -61,6 +63,11 @@ struct krsi_hook {
 	 * The eBPF programs that are attached to this hook.
 	 */
 	struct bpf_prog_array __rcu	*progs;
+	/*
+	 * The attach callback is called before a new program is attached
+	 * to the hook and is passed the updated bpf_prog_array as an argument.
+	 */
+	krsi_prog_attach_t attach_callback;
 };
 
 extern struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[];
diff --git a/security/krsi/krsi.c b/security/krsi/krsi.c
index 00a7150c1b22..a4443d7aa150 100644
--- a/security/krsi/krsi.c
+++ b/security/krsi/krsi.c
@@ -5,15 +5,65 @@
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/krsi.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 
 #include "krsi_init.h"
 
+/*
+ * need_arg_pages is only updated in bprm_check_security_cb
+ * when a mutex on krsi_hook for bprm_check_security is already
+ * held. need_arg_pages avoids pinning pages when no program
+ * that needs them is attached to the hook.
+ */
+static bool need_arg_pages;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the instruction is a BPF_CALL to an eBPF helper located
+ * at the given address.
+ */
+static inline bool bpf_is_call_to_func(struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				       void *func_addr)
+{
+	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+
+	if (opcode != BPF_CALL)
+		return false;
+
+	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The BPF verifier updates the value of insn->imm from the
+	 * enum bpf_func_id to the offset of the address of helper
+	 * from the __bpf_call_base.
+	 */
+	return __bpf_call_base + insn->imm == func_addr;
+}
+
+static int krsi_process_execution_cb(struct bpf_prog_array *array)
+{
+	struct bpf_prog_array_item *item = array->items;
+	struct bpf_prog *p;
+	const struct bpf_func_proto *proto = &krsi_get_env_var_proto;
+	int i;
+
+	while ((p = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) {
+		for (i = 0; i < p->len; i++) {
+			if (bpf_is_call_to_func(&p->insnsi[i], proto->func))
+				need_arg_pages = true;
+		}
+		item++;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[] = {
-	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I) \
+	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I, CB) \
 		[TYPE] = { \
 			.h_type = TYPE, \
 			.name = #NAME, \
+			.attach_callback = CB, \
 		},
 	#include "hooks.h"
 	#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
@@ -75,9 +125,11 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		.bprm = bprm,
 	};
 
-	ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_arg_pages;
+	if (READ_ONCE(need_arg_pages)) {
+		ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out_arg_pages;
+	}
 
 	ret = krsi_run_progs(PROCESS_EXECUTION, &ctx);
 	kfree(ctx.bprm_ctx.arg_pages);
@@ -87,7 +139,7 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list krsi_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
-	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
+	#define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL, CB) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
 	#include "hooks.h"
 	#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
 };
diff --git a/security/krsi/ops.c b/security/krsi/ops.c
index 1db94dfaac15..2de682371eff 100644
--- a/security/krsi/ops.c
+++ b/security/krsi/ops.c
@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
+	if (h->attach_callback) {
+		ret = h->attach_callback(new_array);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			bpf_prog_array_free(new_array);
+			goto unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
 	rcu_assign_pointer(h->progs, new_array);
 	bpf_prog_array_free(old_array);
 
@@ -278,7 +286,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(krsi_get_env_var, struct krsi_ctx *, ctx, char *, name, u32, n_size,
 	return get_env_var(ctx, name, dest, n_size, size);
 }
 
-static const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
+const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
 	.func = krsi_get_env_var,
 	.gpl_only = true,
 	.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-10 11:55 [RFC v1 00/14] Kernel Runtime Security Instrumentation KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 01/14] krsi: Add a skeleton and config options for the KRSI LSM KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 02/14] krsi: Introduce types for KRSI eBPF KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 03/14] bpf: krsi: sync BPF UAPI header with tools KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 04/14] krsi: Add support in libbpf for BPF_PROG_TYPE_KRSI KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:09   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 05/14] krsi: Initialize KRSI hooks and create files in securityfs KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:26   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 06/14] krsi: Implement eBPF operations, attachment and execution KP Singh
2019-09-14 16:56   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-15  0:37     ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 07/14] krsi: Check for premissions on eBPF attachment KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 08/14] krsi: Show attached program names in hook read handler KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 09/14] krsi: Add a helper function for bpf_perf_event_output KP Singh
2019-09-14 18:23   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 10/14] krsi: Handle attachment of the same program KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 11/14] krsi: Pin argument pages in bprm_check_security hook KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 12/14] krsi: Add an eBPF helper function to get the value of an env variable KP Singh
2019-09-15  0:16   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-16 13:00     ` KP Singh
2019-09-17 16:58       ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-17 19:36         ` KP Singh
2019-09-10 11:55 ` [RFC v1 13/14] krsi: Provide an example to read and log environment variables KP Singh
2019-09-15  0:24   ` Yonghong Song
2019-09-10 11:55 ` KP Singh [this message]
2019-09-15  0:33   ` [RFC v1 14/14] krsi: Pin arg pages only when needed Yonghong Song
2019-09-15  1:40     ` KP Singh
2019-09-15 19:45       ` Yonghong Song

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