From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 09:09:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191007160918.29504-1-salyzyn@android.com> (raw)
When filtering xattr list for reading, presence of trusted xattr
results in a security audit log. However, if there is other content
no errno will be set, and if there isn't, the errno will be -ENODATA
and not -EPERM as is usually associated with a lack of capability.
The check does not block the request to list the xattrs present.
Switch to has_capability_noaudit to reflect a more appropriate check.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18
Fixes: upstream a082c6f680da ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
Fixes: 3.18 4bcc9b4b3a0a ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
---
Replaced ns_capable_noaudit with 3.18.y tree specific
has_capability_noaudit present in original submission to kernel.org
commit 5c2e9f346b815841f9bed6029ebcb06415caf640
("ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit")
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index a01ec1836a72..1175efa5e956 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ static bool ovl_can_list(const char *s)
return true;
/* Never list trusted.overlay, list other trusted for superuser only */
- return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) &&
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
--
2.23.0.581.g78d2f28ef7-goog
next reply other threads:[~2019-10-07 16:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-07 16:09 Mark Salyzyn [this message]
2019-10-07 16:16 ` [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:43 ` Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:42 ` Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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