From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 18:48:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191007164828.GB1090238@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7c610f92-5e1f-32ef-0a60-ed47ea999fe3@android.com>
On Mon, Oct 07, 2019 at 09:42:08AM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
>
> <sigh>
>
> Now what is the playbook, we have three options in order of preference:
>
> 1) #ifdef MODULE use capable() to preserve API, add a short comment about
> the side effects if overlayfs is used as a module.
>
> 2) export has_capability_nodaudit (proc and oom_kill use it, and are both
> built-in only), but affect the 3.18 API at near EOL. AFAIK no one wants
> that?
I'll just do this. 3.18 is EOL, this is only being done for a
distro-specific tree (i.e. AOSP).
> 3) Do nothing more. Make this a distro concern only. Leave this posted as a
> back-port for the record, but never merged, for those that are _interested_
> and declare 3.18 stable as noisy for sepolicy and overlayfs under some usage
> patterns with few user space mitigation unless they explicitly take this
> back-port into their tree (eg: android common kernel) if used built-in. This
> way, in 3.18.y at least the module and built-in version behave the _same_ in
> stable.
I'll just add the export to the patch and check this into AOSP, thanks!
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-07 16:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-07 16:09 [PATCH] ovl: filter of trusted xattr results in audit Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-07 16:43 ` Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:42 ` Mark Salyzyn
2019-10-07 16:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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