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From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
	Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
	Nosh Minwalla <nosh@google.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 12:14:16 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200212171416.GD1083891@xz-x1> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0ogRxvCK1aCnviN+nBqp6gmbUD7NjaMKvA7bF=esAc1A@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 05:54:35PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 8:51 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 02:55:41PM -0800, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> > >   Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults
> > >   Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults
> >
> > Now this I'm very interested in. Can you go into more detail about two
> > things:
> [...]
> > - Why is this needed in addition to the existing vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd
> >   sysctl? (And should this maybe just be another setting for that
> >   sysctl, like "2"?)
> >
> > As to the mechanics of the change, I'm not sure I like the idea of adding
> > a UAPI flag for this. Why not just retain the permission check done at
> > open() and if kernelmode faults aren't allowed, ignore them? This would
> > require no changes to existing programs and gains the desired defense.
> > (And, I think, the sysctl value could be bumped to "2" as that's a
> > better default state -- does qemu actually need kernelmode traps?)
> 
> I think this might be necessary for I/O emulation? As in, if before
> getting migrated, the guest writes some data into a buffer, then the
> guest gets migrated, and then while the postcopy migration stuff is
> still running, the guest tells QEMU to write that data from
> guest-physical memory to disk or whatever; I think in that case, QEMU
> will do something like a pwrite() syscall where the userspace pointer
> points into the memory area containing guest-physical memory, which
> would return -EFAULT if userfaultfd was restricted to userspace
> accesses.
> 
> This was described in this old presentation about why userfaultfd is
> better than a SIGSEGV handler:
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzyAwvVlQckeSzlCSDFmRHVybzQ/view
> (slide 6) (recording at https://youtu.be/pC8cWWRVSPw?t=463)

Right. AFAICT QEMU uses it far more than disk IOs.  A guest page can
be accessed by any kernel component on the destination host during a
postcopy procedure.  It can be as simple as when a vcpu writes to a
missing guest page which still resides on the source host, then KVM
will get a page fault and trap into userfaultfd asking for that page.
The same thing happens to other modules like vhost, etc., as long as a
missing guest page is touched by a kernel module.

Thanks,

-- 
Peter Xu


  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-12 17:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com>
     [not found] ` <9ae20f6e-c5c0-4fd7-5b61-77218d19480b@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-02-11 23:27   ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 16:09     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-21 17:56     ` James Morris
2020-02-12  7:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-12 16:54   ` Jann Horn
2020-02-12 17:14     ` Peter Xu [this message]
2020-02-12 19:41       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 20:04         ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 23:41           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 17:12   ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26 ` [PATCH 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 16:39     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 17:21       ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 18:02         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 18:08           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 20:24             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:53     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:58     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 17:59       ` Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 17:37     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:49     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-03-26 18:14   ` [PATCH v3 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:00       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:02       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06     ` [PATCH v4 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:40         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:41         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39       ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-05-07 16:02           ` James Morris
2020-08-04 21:22           ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-08-04 21:16           ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-13 13:29         ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-22 16:55           ` James Morris
2020-04-22 17:12             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-23 22:24               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:18                 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:48                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:12                     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-29 17:02                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:15             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 19:40               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04  3:56         ` James Morris
2020-06-04 18:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04 19:24             ` Lokesh Gidra

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