From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v17 00/10] Landlock LSM
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 21:21:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200511192156.1618284-1-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
Hi,
This new patch series brings some improvements and add new tests:
Use smaller userspace structures (attributes) to save space, and check
at built time that every attribute don't contain hole and are 8-bits
aligned.
Allow enforcement of empty ruleset, which enables deny-all policies
(useful for strict sandboxes).
I found that UML may not keep the same internal struct inode for an open
file. Because the Landlock filesystem access-control relies on internal
kernel states, special architectures such as UML can't support Landlock.
Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_STATES to identify such architectures.
Add a size_attr_features field to struct landlock_attr_features for
self-introspection
Switch syscall attribute pointer and size arguments to follow similar
syscalls argument order (e.g. bpf, clone3, openat2).
The SLOC count is 1288 for security/landlock/ and 1740 for
tools/testing/selftest/landlock/ . Test coverage for security/landlock/
is 93.6% of lines. The code not covered only deals with internal kernel
errors (e.g. memory allocation) and race conditions.
The compiled documentation is available here:
https://landlock.io/linux-doc/landlock-v17/security/landlock/index.html
This series can be applied on top of v5.7-rc5. This can be tested with
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK and CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK. This patch series
can be found in a Git repository here:
https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/commits/landlock-v17
I would really appreciate constructive comments on this patch series.
# Landlock LSM
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a
stackable LSM [2], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes
as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide
access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the
security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space
applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged
ones, to securely restrict themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls
and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel
objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic.
Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU
Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil.
Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200416103955.145757-1-mic@digikod.net/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e07fe473-1801-01cc-12ae-b3167f95250e@digikod.net/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (10):
landlock: Add object management
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control
landlock: Add syscall implementation
arch: Wire up landlock() syscall
selftests/landlock: Add initial tests
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst | 18 +
Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst | 69 +
Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst | 268 +++
MAINTAINERS | 12 +
arch/Kconfig | 7 +
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/um/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
fs/super.c | 2 +
include/linux/fs.h | 5 +
include/linux/landlock.h | 22 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 302 +++
kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 +
samples/Kconfig | 7 +
samples/Makefile | 1 +
samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 +
samples/landlock/Makefile | 15 +
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 228 +++
security/Kconfig | 11 +-
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/landlock/Kconfig | 18 +
security/landlock/Makefile | 4 +
security/landlock/common.h | 20 +
security/landlock/cred.c | 46 +
security/landlock/cred.h | 58 +
security/landlock/fs.c | 601 ++++++
security/landlock/fs.h | 42 +
security/landlock/object.c | 66 +
security/landlock/object.h | 91 +
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 ++
security/landlock/ptrace.h | 14 +
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 342 ++++
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 161 ++
security/landlock/setup.c | 39 +
security/landlock/setup.h | 18 +
security/landlock/syscall.c | 532 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 29 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 170 ++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 108 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 1729 +++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 293 +++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c | 5 +
64 files changed, 5509 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst
create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscall.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c
--
2.26.2
next reply other threads:[~2020-05-11 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-11 19:21 Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 01/10] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 3:09 ` James Morris
2020-05-14 10:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 03/10] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 04/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 3:37 ` James Morris
2020-05-14 10:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 15:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-14 18:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 17:31 ` James Morris
2020-05-14 18:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 19:37 ` James Morris
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 06/10] landlock: Add syscall implementation Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 07/10] arch: Wire up landlock() syscall Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 08/10] selftests/landlock: Add initial tests Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 09/10] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v17 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-11 21:54 ` [PATCH v17 00/10] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200511192156.1618284-1-mic@digikod.net \
--to=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr \
--cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).