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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Silviu Vlasceanu <Silviu.Vlasceanu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 15:34:14 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200512123414.GA2056@kadam> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <267804d00f2e457186509a6ae40c9c7f@huawei.com>

On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 11:31:53AM +0000, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:dan.carpenter@oracle.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PM
> > 
> > Hello Roberto Sassu,
> > 
> > The patch 53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer
> > in init_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static
> > checker warning:
> > 
> > 	security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119 init_desc()
> > 	error: '*tfm' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
> > 
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> >     89
> >     90                  tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
> >     91                  algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
> >     92          }
> >     93
> >     94          if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {
> > 
> > This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
> > 
> >     95                  mutex_lock(&mutex);
> >     96                  if (*tfm)
> >     97                          goto out;
> > 
> > Then we test again with the lock held.  But in the new code if "*tfm"
> > is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the
> > next line.  I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
> 
> Hello Dan
> 
> you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
> 
> if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
> 	goto out;

No.  I was wrong.

> 
> >     98                  *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
> >     99                  if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
> >    100                          rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
> >    101                          pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
> >    102                          *tfm = NULL;
> >    103                          mutex_unlock(&mutex);
> >    104                          return ERR_PTR(rc);
> >    105                  }
> >    106                  if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
> >    107                          rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
> >    108                          if (rc) {
> >    109                                  crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
> >    110                                  *tfm = NULL;
> >    111                                  mutex_unlock(&mutex);
> >    112                                  return ERR_PTR(rc);
> >    113                          }
> >    114                  }
> >    115  out:
> >    116                  mutex_unlock(&mutex);
> >    117          }
> >    118
> >    119          desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
> >                                                                      ^^^^
> > I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all
> > anyway.
> 
> I think the purpose of the mutex is just to  prevent two concurrent
> allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
> 

Actually by the time we take the lock then *tfm is either valid or NULL
so this code works.  It's confusing though.

regards,
dan carpenter


  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-12 12:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-12 10:48 [bug report] evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc() Dan Carpenter
2020-05-12 11:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2020-05-12 12:34   ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
2020-05-12 12:45     ` Roberto Sassu
2020-05-12 13:04       ` Dan Carpenter
2020-05-12 13:08         ` Roberto Sassu
2020-05-12 13:19         ` [PATCH] evm: Fix a small race " Dan Carpenter
2020-05-12 13:43           ` Roberto Sassu
2020-05-12 17:47             ` [PATCH v2] " Dan Carpenter
2020-05-14  6:47               ` Roberto Sassu
2020-05-14  7:11                 ` Krzysztof Struczynski
2020-05-14 18:21                   ` Mimi Zohar

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