From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Pavel Emelyanov" <ovzxemul@gmail.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Dmitry Safonov" <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
"Andrei Vagin" <avagin@gmail.com>,
"Nicolas Viennot" <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>,
"Michał Cłapiński" <mclapinski@google.com>,
"Kamil Yurtsever" <kyurtsever@google.com>,
"Dirk Petersen" <dipeit@gmail.com>,
"Christine Flood" <chf@redhat.com>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
"Radostin Stoyanov" <rstoyanov1@gmail.com>,
"Cyrill Gorcunov" <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 16:14:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200527141403.GC250149@dcbz.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <877dwybxvi.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 08:59:29AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com> writes:
>
> > On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:40:37AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> >> What are the other blockers? Are you going to suggest additional new
> >> capabilities to clear them?
> >
> > As mentioned somewhere else access to /proc/<pid>/map_files/ would be
> > helpful. Right now I am testing with a JVM and it works without root
> > just with the attached patch. Without access to /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> > not everything CRIU can do will actually work, but we are a lot closer
> > to what our users have been asking for.
>
> The current permission checks on /proc/<pid>/map_files/ are simply
> someone being over-cautious.
>
> Someone needs to think through the threat landscape and figure out what
> permission checks are actually needed.
>
> Making the permission check ns_capable instead of capable is a
> no-brainer. Figuring out which user_ns to test against might be a
> we bit harder.
>
> We could probably even allow the owner of the process to open the files
> but that requires someone doing the work of thinking through how
> being able to opening files that you have mmaped might be a problem.
As mentioned in the other thread, CRIU can work with read access to
map_files.
> >> > There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
> >> > to run checkpoint/restore as non-root,
> >>
> >> If you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN anyway you're not gaining anything by
> >> separating out CAP_RESTORE.
> >
> > No, as described we can checkpoint and restore a JVM with this patch and
> > it also solves the problem the set_ns_last_pid fork() loop daemon tries
> > to solve. It is not enough to support the full functionality of CRIU as
> > map_files is also important, but we do not need CAP_SYS_ADMIN and
> > CAP_RESTORE. Only CAP_RESTORE would be necessary.
> >
> > With a new capability users can enable checkpoint/restore as non-root
> > without giving CRIU access to any of the other possibilities offered by
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Setting a PID and map_files have been introduced for CRIU
> > and used to live behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. Having a capability
> > for checkpoint/restore would make it easier for CRIU users to run it as
> > non-root and make it very clear what is possible when giving CRIU the
> > new capability. No other things would be allowed than necessary for
> > checkpoint/restore. Setting a PID is most important for the restore part
> > and reading map_files would be helpful during checkpoint. So it actually
> > should be called CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE as Christian mentioned in
> > another email.
>
> Please if one is for checkpoint and one is for restore asking for a pair
> of capabilities is probably more appropriate.
I will send out a v2 with a renamed capability soon and also include
map_files to be readable with that capability.
> >> > but by applying this patch I can
> >> > already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
> >> > already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
> >> > kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
> >>
> >> You've presented a couple of really inappropriate implementations
> >> that would qualify as workarounds. But the other two are completely
> >> appropriate within the system security policy. They don't "get around"
> >> the problem, they use existing mechanisms as they are intended.
> >
> > I agree with the user namespace approach to be appropriate, but not the
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN approach as CRIU only needs a tiny subset (2 things) of
> > what CAP_SYS_ADMIN allows.
>
>
> If we are only talking 2 things can you please include in your patchset
> a patch enabling those 2 things?
The two things are setting a PID via ns_last_pid/clone3() and reading
map_files.
> But even more than this we need a request that asks not for the least
> you can possibly ask for but asks for what you need to do a good job.
Also in this thread Kamil mentioned that they also need calling prctl
with PR_SET_MM during restore in their production setup.
> I am having visions of a recurring discussion that says can we add one
> more permission check to CAP_RESTORE or CAP_CHECKPOINT when they are
> things we could know today.
I will prepare a new version of this patch using CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
for ns_last_pid/clone3(), map_files, and prctl with PR_SET_MM.
Adrian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-27 14:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-22 5:53 [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE Adrian Reber
2020-05-22 7:53 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-22 18:02 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-05-22 13:41 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-22 16:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-23 4:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-05-25 2:01 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-25 8:05 ` Adrian Reber
2020-05-25 18:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-27 13:48 ` Adrian Reber
2020-05-27 15:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-27 16:37 ` Nicolas Viennot
2020-05-27 16:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-26 13:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CALKUemw0UZ67yaDwAomHh0n8QZfjd52QvgEXTJ4R3JSrQjZX9g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-05-26 19:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-26 19:51 ` Jann Horn
2020-05-27 14:14 ` Adrian Reber [this message]
2020-05-27 15:29 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-27 18:05 ` Nicolas Viennot
2020-05-28 9:48 ` Christian Brauner
2020-06-08 2:09 ` Andrei Vagin
2020-05-25 21:53 ` Jann Horn
2020-05-26 9:09 ` Radostin Stoyanov
2020-06-12 0:17 ` Matt Helsley
2020-06-12 14:39 ` Christian Brauner
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