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From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	NetFilter <netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>,
	David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Subject: Re: clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 12:44:41 -0700
Message-ID: <20200528194441.GQ17206@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200528193340.GR23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:22:08PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> 
> > Hard limits at 80 really don't work well, especially with
> > some of the 25+ character length identifiers used today.
> 
> IMO any such identifier is a good reason for a warning.
> 
> The litmus test is actually very simple: how unpleasant would it be
> to mention the identifiers while discussing the code over the phone?

Here's a good example of a function which should be taken out and shot:

int amdgpu_atombios_get_leakage_vddc_based_on_leakage_params(struct amdgpu_devic
e *adev,
...
        switch (frev) {
        case 2:
                switch (crev) {
...
                        if (profile->ucElbVDDC_Num > 0) {
                                for (i = 0; i < profile->ucElbVDDC_Num; i++) {
                                        if (vddc_id_buf[i] == virtual_voltage_id) {
                                                for (j = 0; j < profile->ucLeakageBinNum; j++) {
                                                        if (vbios_voltage_id <= leakage_bin[j]) {
                                                                *vddc = vddc_buf[j * profile->ucElbVDDC_Num + i];

I mean, I get it that AMD want to show off just how studly a monitor they
support, but good grief ...

  reply index

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-28  5:40 Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 01/14] cachefiles: switch to kernel_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 02/14] autofs: " Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 03/14] bpfilter: " Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 04/14] fs: unexport __kernel_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 05/14] fs: check FMODE_WRITE in __kernel_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 06/14] fs: remove the call_{read,write}_iter functions Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28 18:56   ` Al Viro
2020-05-29  5:51     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 07/14] fs: implement kernel_write using __kernel_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 08/14] fs: remove __vfs_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 09/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->write_iter in __kernel_write Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28 18:43   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-29 12:32     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-31 23:59       ` Logan Gunthorpe
2020-05-28 19:00   ` Al Viro
2020-05-29  5:57     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-29 13:37       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 10/14] fs: add a __kernel_read helper Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 11/14] integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 12/14] fs: implement kernel_read " Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 13/14] fs: remove __vfs_read Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28  5:40 ` [PATCH 14/14] fs: don't change the address limit for ->read_iter in __kernel_read Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-28 19:03   ` Al Viro
2020-05-28 18:51 ` clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2 Linus Torvalds
2020-05-28 18:57   ` Sedat Dilek
2020-05-28 19:22   ` Joe Perches
2020-05-28 19:33     ` Al Viro
2020-05-28 19:44       ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2020-05-28 20:06         ` Al Viro
2020-05-28 20:14           ` Deucher, Alexander
2020-05-28 20:18         ` Joe Perches
2020-05-28 20:29       ` Dave Airlie
2020-05-28 21:03     ` Joe Perches
2020-05-28 20:17 ` David Howells
2020-05-28 21:20   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-29 13:08     ` David Laight
2020-05-29 19:19       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-29 22:02         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-29 23:12         ` [PATCH] checkpatch/coding-style: Allow 100 column lines Joe Perches
2020-05-30 22:14           ` Andreas Dilger
2020-05-30 23:15             ` Joe Perches
2020-06-05  6:36         ` clean up kernel_{read,write} & friends v2 Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-05 15:00           ` Nicolas Pitre
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-05-13  6:56 Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-20 15:59 ` Christoph Hellwig

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