From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>, Dave Olsthoorn <dave@bewaar.me>,
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>,
Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:43:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200717174309.1164575-7-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200717174309.1164575-1-keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
size_t in_size,
const void *in_buffer))
{
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int i, len;
int rc = -ENOENT;
char *path;
@@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
fw_priv->size = 0;
/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
- &size, msize,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
READING_FIRMWARE);
- if (rc) {
+ if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -ENOENT)
dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
path, rc);
@@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
path);
continue;
}
+ size = rc;
dev_dbg(device, "Loading firmware from %s\n", path);
if (decompress) {
dev_dbg(device, "f/w decompressing %s\n",
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index 54d972d4befc..dc28a8def597 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
+ if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
@@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
}
ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
- if (!ret)
- *size = pos;
out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -72,11 +70,11 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
out:
allow_write_access(file);
- return ret;
+ return ret == 0 ? pos : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -89,14 +87,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -115,13 +113,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
@@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
if (!f.file)
goto out;
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
index 78cf3d7dc835..0ca0bdbed1bd 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 1358069ce9e9..a201bbb19158 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -220,13 +220,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
{
int ret;
void *ldata;
- loff_t size;
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
- &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
- if (ret)
+ INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- image->kernel_buf_len = size;
+ image->kernel_buf_len = ret;
/* Call arch image probe handlers */
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
@@ -243,11 +242,11 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
- &size, INT_MAX,
+ INT_MAX,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
- if (ret)
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- image->initrd_buf_len = size;
+ image->initrd_buf_len = ret;
}
if (cmdline_len) {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index e9765803601b..b6fd4f51cc30 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3988,7 +3988,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
{
struct load_info info = { };
- loff_t size;
void *hdr = NULL;
int err;
@@ -4002,12 +4001,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
return -EINVAL;
- err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
+ err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX,
READING_MODULE);
- if (err)
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
info.hdr = hdr;
- info.len = size;
+ info.len = err;
return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index f8869be45d8f..97661ffabc4e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -171,16 +171,17 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e13ffece3726..9ba145d3d6d9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
char *datap;
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
char *p;
@@ -284,11 +284,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
datap = data;
while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-17 17:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:08 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:09 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:10 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 04/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:11 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-07-17 19:04 ` [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Scott Branden
2020-07-17 19:55 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 22:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-18 5:44 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-21 21:43 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-21 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
2020-07-20 8:34 ` David Laight
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 08/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 09/13] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 10/13] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 11/13] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 12/13] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 13/13] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:17 ` [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Scott Branden
2020-07-17 22:10 ` Kees Cook
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