From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v19 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 13:32:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200724203226.16374-22-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724203226.16374-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++---------------------------------
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 4693febcf41f..3cc02ddd7779 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern void audit_log_lsm(struct lsmblob *blob, bool exiting);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct lsmblob *blob);
+extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index a5403efc2fdf..753a69c6bbbe 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 777d8da41082..5d49dfed7674 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2177,6 +2177,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ bool sep = false;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 6ab012e5fe98..78bc11bfeba6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 55642a039632..7f1ee0de5b56 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -670,14 +670,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
- * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
- * until name->osid is converted to a
- * lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -685,7 +677,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -699,8 +690,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
@@ -982,7 +972,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -992,15 +981,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1227,26 +1208,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
+ *call_panic = 1;
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1386,20 +1355,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -1992,17 +1949,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2369,16 +2322,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
- /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
- * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
- * labels associated with the ipc object. */
- context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.24.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-24 20:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20200724203226.16374-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-07-27 16:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-27 21:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 19:50 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 10:34 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 10:57 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 11:11 ` John Johansen
2020-07-28 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-29 0:30 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-07-27 20:36 ` James Morris
2020-07-27 20:40 ` John Johansen
2020-07-28 18:29 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 20:13 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 20:28 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-07-27 20:37 ` James Morris
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-07-30 8:40 ` John Johansen
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-07-27 19:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-07-27 20:40 ` [PATCH v19 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " James Morris
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-07-30 10:03 ` John Johansen
2020-07-30 20:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-30 20:57 ` John Johansen
2020-07-30 22:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-07-30 9:23 ` John Johansen
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