From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>, SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 12/19] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 14:36:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200724213640.389191-13-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724213640.389191-1-keescook@chromium.org>
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 8 ++++----
.../base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 7 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 20 +++++++++----------
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
index a196aacce22c..7cfdfdcb819c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
else
- rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
- fw_priv->data, fw_priv->size,
- READING_FIRMWARE);
+ rc = security_kernel_post_load_data(fw_priv->data,
+ fw_priv->size,
+ LOADING_FIRMWARE);
/*
* Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(u32 opt_flags)
return false;
/* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
- ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
+ ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (ret < 0)
return false;
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index a12c79d47efc..4d1157af0e86 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
- rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
+ rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = security_kernel_post_load_data((u8 *)data, size, LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (!fw_priv->data)
fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
if (!fw_priv->data)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 85000dc8595c..1a7bc4c7437d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -648,15 +648,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
- if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -706,7 +697,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
}
break;
case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
- if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
+ if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
@@ -739,6 +730,15 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
*/
int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id load_id)
{
+ if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-24 21:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-24 21:36 [PATCH v3 00/19] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 01/19] test_firmware: Test platform fw loading on non-EFI systems Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 02/19] selftest/firmware: Add selftest timeout in settings Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 03/19] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
2020-07-25 10:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-25 15:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-25 17:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 04/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
2020-07-27 13:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 05/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 06/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
2020-07-27 14:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 07/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
2020-07-27 14:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 08/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
2020-07-27 16:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 09/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
2020-07-27 16:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 10/19] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
2020-07-27 16:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 11/19] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Kees Cook
2020-07-27 10:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-28 19:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-07-27 10:57 ` [PATCH v3 12/19] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Mimi Zohar
2020-07-28 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-29 16:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-29 18:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-29 19:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 13/19] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 14/19] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 15/19] IMA: Add support for file reads without contents Kees Cook
2020-07-27 13:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-28 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-28 19:56 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-28 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 16/19] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 17/19] firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 18/19] firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf() Kees Cook
2020-07-29 1:17 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-07-29 6:22 ` Takashi Iwai
2020-07-29 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 21:36 ` [PATCH v3 19/19] test_firmware: Test partial read support Kees Cook
2020-07-25 5:14 ` [PATCH v3 00/19] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Scott Branden
2020-07-25 10:05 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-25 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-27 11:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-27 19:18 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-28 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-28 19:56 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-29 1:19 ` Luis Chamberlain
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