linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: B K Karthik <bkkarthik@pesu.pes.edu>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	skhan@linuxfoundation.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH] smack: fix slab-out-of-bounds by checking for overflow
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 18:28:00 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200725125800.vahdiagxilinzoqw@pesu.pes.edu> (raw)

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4857 bytes --]

add a barrier to smk_set_cipso() to check for overflow

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf+0x2666/0x2ef0 lib/vsprintf.c:3321
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888097d682b8 by task syz-executor980/6804

CPU: 0 PID: 6804 Comm: syz-executor980 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1f0/0x31e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x66/0x5a0 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 vsscanf+0x2666/0x2ef0 lib/vsprintf.c:3321
 sscanf+0x6c/0x90 lib/vsprintf.c:3527
 smk_set_cipso+0x374/0x6c0 security/smack/smackfs.c:908
 vfs_write+0x2dd/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:576
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4402d9
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffe89010db8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004402d9
RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401ae0
R13: 0000000000401b70 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 6804:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x103/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:494
 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline]
 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x249/0x320 mm/slab.c:3671
 memdup_user_nul+0x26/0xf0 mm/util.c:259
 smk_set_cipso+0xff/0x6c0 security/smack/smackfs.c:859
 vfs_write+0x2dd/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:576
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 4906:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:455
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kfree+0x10a/0x220 mm/slab.c:3757
 tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x525/0x690 security/tomoyo/file.c:736
 tomoyo_path_mknod+0x128/0x150 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:240
 security_path_mknod+0xdc/0x160 security/security.c:1077
 may_o_create fs/namei.c:2919 [inline]
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3060 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3169 [inline]
 path_openat+0xbe8/0x37f0 fs/namei.c:3357
 do_filp_open+0x191/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:3387
 do_sys_openat2+0x463/0x770 fs/open.c:1179
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1195 [inline]
 ksys_open include/linux/syscalls.h:1388 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1201 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1199 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x1af/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1199
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888097d68280
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
 64-byte region [ffff888097d68280, ffff888097d682c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00025f5a00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888097d68c80
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000288fe08 ffffea00026f38c8 ffff8880aa400380
raw: ffff888097d68c80 ffff888097d68000 000000010000001e 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888097d68180: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888097d68200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888097d68280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff888097d68300: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888097d68380: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Reported-and-testedby: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: B K Karthik <bkkarthik@pesu.pes.edu>
---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 58d3f43cc8bb..17809310d046 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
 		rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+		if (rule > data + count) {
+			rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
 		if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
 			goto out;
-- 
2.20.1


[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 659 bytes --]

             reply	other threads:[~2020-07-25 12:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-25 12:58 B K Karthik [this message]
2020-07-27 17:38 ` [PATCH] smack: fix slab-out-of-bounds by checking for overflow Casey Schaufler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200725125800.vahdiagxilinzoqw@pesu.pes.edu \
    --to=bkkarthik@pesu.pes.edu \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).