Linux-Security-Module Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
	SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>, KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 09/17] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:58:37 -0700
Message-ID: <20200729175845.1745471-10-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200729175845.1745471-1-keescook@chromium.org>

There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c       |  2 +-
 .../base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c  |  2 +-
 include/linux/ima.h                           | 12 +++++++++--
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                 |  4 +++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     |  9 ++++++++
 include/linux/security.h                      | 12 +++++++++--
 kernel/kexec.c                                |  2 +-
 kernel/module.c                               |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c             | 21 ++++++++++++++++++-
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                    |  2 +-
 security/security.c                           | 18 +++++++++++++---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                      |  2 +-
 12 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
index 5327bfc6ba71..a196aacce22c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(u32 opt_flags)
 		return false;
 
 	/* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
-	ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+	ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return false;
 
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index 6958ab1a8059..a12c79d47efc 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
 	if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+	rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 148636bfcc8f..502e36ad7804 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
+extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
+extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id id);
 extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -78,7 +80,13 @@ static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+				     enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index af998f93d256..7ed5d31ac9cc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -184,7 +184,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size,
+	 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_read_file, struct file *file,
 	 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_read_file, struct file *file, char *buf,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 95b7c1d32062..812d626195fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -635,7 +635,16 @@
  * @kernel_load_data:
  *	Load data provided by userspace.
  *	@id kernel load data identifier
+ *	@contents if a subsequent @kernel_post_load_data will be called.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_load_data:
+ *	Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer).
+ *	@buf pointer to buffer containing the data contents.
+ *	@size length of the data contents.
+ *	@id kernel load data identifier
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *	This must be paired with a prior @kernel_load_data call that had
+ *	@contents set to true.
  * @kernel_read_file:
  *	Read a file specified by userspace.
  *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 42df0d9b4c37..e748974c707b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -387,7 +387,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_load_data_id id);
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1014,7 +1016,13 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+						 enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index f977786fe498..c82c6c06f051 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
-	result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+	result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false);
 	if (result < 0)
 		return result;
 
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 16558bc842de..d773f32f8dfd 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2970,7 +2970,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
 	if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
-	err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE);
+	err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE, false);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index dab4a13221cf..85000dc8595c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -676,6 +676,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 /**
  * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
  * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
+ *	      call to ima_post_load_data().
  *
  * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
  * data provided by userspace.  Enforce policy rules requring a file
@@ -683,7 +685,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -723,6 +725,23 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy.  Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id load_id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
  * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 81bc95127f92..db320a43f42e 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 19d3150f68f4..568bb77e84f4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1695,17 +1695,29 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
-int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id);
+	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
+
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5de45010fb1a..1a5c68196faf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4019,7 +4019,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-29 17:58 [PATCH v4 00/17] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 01/17] test_firmware: Test platform fw loading on non-EFI systems Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 02/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 03/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 04/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
2020-07-30  2:22   ` James Morris
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 05/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 06/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
2020-07-30  2:25   ` James Morris
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 07/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
2020-07-30  2:25   ` James Morris
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 08/17] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
2020-07-30  2:26   ` James Morris
2020-07-29 17:58 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-08-06 21:59   ` [PATCH v4 09/17] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Mimi Zohar
2020-08-07  0:21   ` KP Singh
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 10/17] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-08-06 22:07   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 11/17] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-08-05 14:53   ` Jessica Yu
2020-08-07  0:22     ` KP Singh
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 12/17] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
2020-08-07  0:23   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 13/17] IMA: Add support for file reads without contents Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 14/17] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 15/17] firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 16/17] firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf() Kees Cook
2020-07-29 17:58 ` [PATCH v4 17/17] test_firmware: Test partial read support Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200729175845.1745471-10-keescook@chromium.org \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jeyu@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    --cc=scott.branden@broadcom.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sjpark@amazon.de \
    --cc=tiwai@suse.de \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Linux-Security-Module Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/0 linux-security-module/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 linux-security-module linux-security-module/ https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module \
		linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index linux-security-module

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git