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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	"OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	"Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, fstests@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, "Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 08/38] capability: handle idmapped mounts
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2020 16:34:02 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201128223402.GA22812@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201128213527.2669807-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

On Sat, Nov 28, 2020 at 10:34:57PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given inode the
> capability framework exposes the two helpers privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and
> capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former verifies that the inode has a mapping in
> the caller's user namespace and the latter additionally verifies that the caller
> has the requested capability in their current user namespace.
> If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount we simply need to map it
> according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
> non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all operations are
> a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in behavior and will also not
> see any performance impact.
> 
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> ---
> /* v2 */
> - Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>:
>   - Don't pollute the vfs with additional helpers simply extend the existing
>     helpers with an additional argument and switch all callers.
> 
> /* v3 */
> unchanged
> ---
>  fs/attr.c                  |  8 ++++----
>  fs/exec.c                  |  2 +-
>  fs/inode.c                 |  2 +-
>  fs/namei.c                 | 13 ++++++++-----
>  fs/overlayfs/super.c       |  2 +-
>  fs/posix_acl.c             |  2 +-
>  fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c         |  2 +-
>  include/linux/capability.h |  7 +++++--
>  kernel/capability.c        | 14 +++++++++-----
>  security/commoncap.c       |  5 +++--
>  10 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index b4bbdbd4c8ca..d270f640a192 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
>  	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
>  	    uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
>  		return true;
> -	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
>  		return true;
>  	if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
>  	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
>  	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
>  	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
>  		return true;
> -	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
>  		return true;
>  	if (gid_eq(inode->i_gid, INVALID_GID) &&
>  	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  		/* Also check the setgid bit! */
>  		if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
>  				inode->i_gid) &&
> -		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
> +		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
>  			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
>  	}
>  
> @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
>  		umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
>  
>  		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
> -		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
> +		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
>  			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
>  		inode->i_mode = mode;
>  	}
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 547a2390baf5..8e75d7a33514 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
>  		/* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */
>  		user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns;
>  		while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
> -		       !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, inode))
> +		       !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, &init_user_ns, inode))
>  			user_ns = user_ns->parent;
>  
>  		if (old != user_ns) {
> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
> index 9d78c37b00b8..7a15372d9c2d 100644
> --- a/fs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/inode.c
> @@ -2147,7 +2147,7 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
>  			mode |= S_ISGID;
>  		else if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP) &&
>  			 !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
> -			 !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(dir, CAP_FSETID))
> +			 !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, dir, CAP_FSETID))
>  			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
>  	} else
>  		inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index d4a6dd772303..3f52730af6c5 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
>  		/* DACs are overridable for directories */
>  		if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
> -			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
> +			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
>  						     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>  				return 0;
> -		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
> +		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
> +					     CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
>  			return 0;
>  		return -EACCES;
>  	}
> @@ -370,7 +371,8 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  	 */
>  	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
>  	if (mask == MAY_READ)
> -		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> +		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
> +					     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>  			return 0;
>  	/*
>  	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
> @@ -378,7 +380,8 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  	 * at least one exec bit set.
>  	 */
>  	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
> -		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
> +		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
> +					     CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
>  			return 0;
>  
>  	return -EACCES;
> @@ -2657,7 +2660,7 @@ int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
>  		return 0;
>  	if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
>  		return 0;
> -	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
> +	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index 290983bcfbb3..196fe3e3f02b 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
>  	if (unlikely(inode->i_mode & S_ISGID) &&
>  	    handler->flags == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS &&
>  	    !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
> -	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
> +	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
>  		struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SGID };
>  
>  		err = ovl_setattr(dentry, &iattr);
> diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
> index 95882b3f5f62..4ca6d53c6f0a 100644
> --- a/fs/posix_acl.c
> +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
> @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
>  	if (error == 0)
>  		*acl = NULL;
>  	if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
> -	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
> +	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
>  		mode &= ~S_ISGID;
>  	*mode_p = mode;
>  	return 0;
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> index 3fbd98f61ea5..97bd29fc8c43 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> @@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
>  	 */
>  
>  	if ((VFS_I(ip)->i_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
> -	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
> +	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
>  		VFS_I(ip)->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
>  
>  	/* Change the ownerships and register project quota modifications */
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 1e7fe311cabe..041e336f3369 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  	return true;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
> -extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
> -extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
> +extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
> +					struct user_namespace *mnt_user_ns,
> +					const struct inode *inode);
> +extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_user_ns,
> +				     const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>  extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>  static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index de7eac903a2a..28e3a599ff7a 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -484,10 +484,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
>   *
>   * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace.
>   */
> -bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode)
> +bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
> +				 struct user_namespace *mnt_user_ns,
> +				 const struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
> -		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
> +	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_user_ns, inode)) &&
> +	       kgid_has_mapping(ns, i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_user_ns, inode));
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -499,11 +501,13 @@ bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *
>   * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
>   * mapped into the current user namespace.
>   */
> -bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
> +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_user_ns,
> +			      const struct inode *inode, int cap)
>  {
>  	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
>  
> -	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, inode);
> +	return ns_capable(ns, cap) &&
> +	       privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, mnt_user_ns, inode);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
>  
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 59bf3c1674c8..4cd2bdfd0a8b 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	if (!validheader(size, cap))
>  		return -EINVAL;
> -	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> +	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
>  		if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
> @@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
>  		if (!inode)
>  			return -EINVAL;
> -		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> +		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
> +					      CAP_SETFCAP))
>  			return -EPERM;
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> -- 
> 2.29.2

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-28 22:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-28 21:34 [PATCH v3 00/38] idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 01/38] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:09     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 02/38] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:32   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:11     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 03/38] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:32   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:14     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 04/38] fs: add mount_setattr() Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:49   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:42     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-02  9:47       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:55         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:57           ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-02 10:01             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 05/38] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 06/38] fs: add id translation helpers Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:49   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:16     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 07/38] mount: attach mappings to mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:50   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-01 13:25     ` Tycho Andersen
2020-12-02  9:24     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 08/38] capability: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 22:34   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 09/38] namei: add idmapped mount aware permission helpers Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 22:47   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-12-01 10:58     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:51   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-01 10:58     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v3 10/38] inode: add idmapped mount aware init and " Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:51   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:17     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 11/38] attr: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 12/38] acl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 13/38] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 14/38] commoncap: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 15/38] stat: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 16/38] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 17/38] namei: introduce struct renamedata Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-02  9:18     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 18/38] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 19/38] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 20/38] open: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 21/38] af_unix: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 22/38] utimes: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 23/38] fcntl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 24/38] notify: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 25/38] init: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 26/38] ioctl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 27/38] would_dump: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 28/38] exec: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 30/38] apparmor: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 31/38] ima: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 32/38] fat: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-30 22:50   ` Mauricio Vásquez Bernal
2020-12-01 10:24     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 33/38] ext4: support " Christian Brauner
2020-11-30 22:52   ` Mauricio Vásquez Bernal
2020-12-01 10:28     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 10:54   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-01 11:02     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-01 11:13       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-01 11:14         ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 34/38] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 35/38] overlayfs: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 36/38] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 21:35 ` [PATCH v3 37/38] tests: extend mount_setattr tests Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 22:54 ` [PATCH v3 00/38] idmapped mounts Serge E. Hallyn
2020-12-01 10:18   ` Christian Brauner

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