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From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	"OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	"Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/40] capability: handle idmapped mounts
Date: Fri,  4 Dec 2020 00:57:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201203235736.3528991-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201203235736.3528991-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount we simply need to map
it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is
passed all operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a
change in behavior and will also not see any performance impact.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
/* v2 */
- Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>:
  - Don't pollute the vfs with additional helpers simply extend the existing
    helpers with an additional argument and switch all callers.

/* v3 */
unchanged

/* v4 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
  - Use "mnt_userns" to refer to a vfsmount's userns everywhere to make
    terminology consistent.
---
 fs/attr.c                  |  8 ++++----
 fs/exec.c                  |  2 +-
 fs/inode.c                 |  2 +-
 fs/namei.c                 | 13 ++++++++-----
 fs/overlayfs/super.c       |  2 +-
 fs/posix_acl.c             |  2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c         |  2 +-
 include/linux/capability.h |  7 +++++--
 kernel/capability.c        | 14 +++++++++-----
 security/commoncap.c       |  5 +++--
 10 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index b4bbdbd4c8ca..d270f640a192 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
 	    uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
-	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
 	if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
 	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
 	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
 		return true;
-	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
 	if (gid_eq(inode->i_gid, INVALID_GID) &&
 	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		/* Also check the setgid bit! */
 		if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
 				inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	}
 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
 		umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
 
 		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 		inode->i_mode = mode;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 547a2390baf5..8e75d7a33514 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 		/* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */
 		user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns;
 		while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
-		       !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, inode))
+		       !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, &init_user_ns, inode))
 			user_ns = user_ns->parent;
 
 		if (old != user_ns) {
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 9d78c37b00b8..7a15372d9c2d 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -2147,7 +2147,7 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
 			mode |= S_ISGID;
 		else if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP) &&
 			 !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-			 !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(dir, CAP_FSETID))
+			 !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, dir, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	} else
 		inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index d4a6dd772303..3f52730af6c5 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
 		/* DACs are overridable for directories */
 		if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
-			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
 						     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 				return 0;
-		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+					     CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -370,7 +371,8 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	 */
 	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 	if (mask == MAY_READ)
-		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+					     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 			return 0;
 	/*
 	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
@@ -378,7 +380,8 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	 * at least one exec bit set.
 	 */
 	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
-		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+					     CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 
 	return -EACCES;
@@ -2657,7 +2660,7 @@ int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
 		return 0;
 	if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
 		return 0;
-	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index 290983bcfbb3..196fe3e3f02b 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	if (unlikely(inode->i_mode & S_ISGID) &&
 	    handler->flags == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS &&
 	    !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
 		struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SGID };
 
 		err = ovl_setattr(dentry, &iattr);
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 95882b3f5f62..4ca6d53c6f0a 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
 	if (error == 0)
 		*acl = NULL;
 	if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
 		mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	*mode_p = mode;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index 3fbd98f61ea5..97bd29fc8c43 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
 	 */
 
 	if ((VFS_I(ip)->i_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
 		VFS_I(ip)->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
 
 	/* Change the ownerships and register project quota modifications */
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 1e7fe311cabe..b810392a5fba 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 	return true;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
-extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
-extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
+					struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					const struct inode *inode);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				     const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
 static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index de7eac903a2a..46a361dde042 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -484,10 +484,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
  *
  * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace.
  */
-bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode)
+bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
+				 struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				 const struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
-		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
+	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) &&
+	       kgid_has_mapping(ns, i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -499,11 +501,13 @@ bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *
  * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
  * mapped into the current user namespace.
  */
-bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			      const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, inode);
+	return ns_capable(ns, cap) &&
+	       privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, mnt_userns, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 59bf3c1674c8..4cd2bdfd0a8b 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!validheader(size, cap))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 		if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
@@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 		if (!inode)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+					      CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-12-04  0:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-03 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/40] idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/40] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/40] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/40] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 04/40] fs: split out functions to hold writers Christian Brauner
2020-12-07 17:08   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 05/40] fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper Christian Brauner
2020-12-07 17:10   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-08 10:07     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 06/40] fs: add mount_setattr() Christian Brauner
2020-12-07 17:14   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-08 10:37     ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-08 15:05       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-12-08 15:22         ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-08 15:26           ` Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 07/40] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 08/40] fs: add id translation helpers Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 09/40] mount: attach mappings to mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 11/40] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 12/40] inode: make init and " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 13/40] attr: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 14/40] acl: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 15/40] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 16/40] commoncap: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 17/40] stat: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 18/40] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 19/40] namei: introduce struct renamedata Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 20/40] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 21/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 22/40] open: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 23/40] af_unix: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 24/40] utimes: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 25/40] fcntl: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 26/40] notify: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 27/40] init: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 28/40] ioctl: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 29/40] would_dump: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 30/40] exec: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 32/40] apparmor: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 33/40] ima: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 34/40] fat: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 35/40] ext4: support " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 36/40] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 37/40] overlayfs: " Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 38/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP Christian Brauner
2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 39/40] tests: extend mount_setattr tests Christian Brauner

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