From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58077C43470 for ; Fri, 9 Apr 2021 11:13:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D5136100A for ; Fri, 9 Apr 2021 11:13:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233880AbhDILNX (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Apr 2021 07:13:23 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:27085 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233899AbhDILNR (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Apr 2021 07:13:17 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1617966784; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=m9DLwVwuEa/TUYn9CBVZYDMdn9III6hdDzVPKN/l5PE=; b=TNbu4hSgwSHyroeNGFXCAN0DgVkj5cj/YhmaRSzMSds4QH+CbNWghCdpfuRua5DBVe/7IU wAzbXhDckHUX9Vx9KGhyk38togowdDdVVuH7f8aoDFgXYSXqBiaJw6JpWHXMqzcXB5UKvb xk4E5orWNlSRzulWrGL6hWwXkd/6GY8= Received: from mail-ed1-f69.google.com (mail-ed1-f69.google.com [209.85.208.69]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-312-2TA2j7daNc291PvZ0muIaQ-1; Fri, 09 Apr 2021 07:13:03 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 2TA2j7daNc291PvZ0muIaQ-1 Received: by mail-ed1-f69.google.com with SMTP id bo11so2471969edb.21 for ; Fri, 09 Apr 2021 04:13:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=m9DLwVwuEa/TUYn9CBVZYDMdn9III6hdDzVPKN/l5PE=; b=Ap2/gyBzHKLfwPcOhFI0h7/H/nyTWlxDsdYZSmvjtvFvHOJ2YcjlvYOweO3niO89gX 7sLozWxtW7dBPMwRLhT9Ij/3/5iSI8YggiLb34lkslHxbDrHbNKk2s4L4YHx0OT9UUZp FKFL8riFvFzDSAY8bhmZErQLRTV75Jh13C/9Kk3PRLrXuRfTSJ5BmT3tCVSPQWZ79EGp QIpLbYIUClvCvIKLdjEETKv1qvSfZ5Q7Gef2e2u4SlM82qD8fBw4OO49mEUZ1/KtCtya n+T3fd+b+G64x7wpJ9BAYKuw2v71uWn6A0IFdA52s+zpQtZ0x9yLJZTyolQW45FRt7/G UBAg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5321wNTpl99+PqGsxUn0na9MuHWjhBmS/SjlEzvC/xIEJjOTFB4F xfrPB3mNczsa574MkUktYIiLLD600vbbtzqgmTk+rtZKNSiuUITEGF3Fwby0BHdBX7CfNXY8FPE Bk+uTQr6QUR4dw3UyxJkfjGWXIvoI1lBwSdILL/aEjYw2jCJ6XDYA+N036q/6wIAWw3UkTUpCUq Rzbz+IvOwVIhwE X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:fcc4:: with SMTP id qx4mr6751977ejb.42.1617966781403; Fri, 09 Apr 2021 04:13:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyN01aC0ArployKcFNzWC+455t509jtFprEos2SXUsaUxRWFCvmE9PBB5j0Mfpph1bCkHvNIw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:fcc4:: with SMTP id qx4mr6751940ejb.42.1617966781061; Fri, 09 Apr 2021 04:13:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a02:8308:b105:dd00:277b:6436:24db:9466]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id w18sm1046854ejq.58.2021.04.09.04.12.59 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 09 Apr 2021 04:13:00 -0700 (PDT) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore , Olga Kornievskaia , Al Viro , David Howells , Stephen Smalley Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag handling on double mount Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 13:12:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20210409111254.271800-3-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20210409111254.271800-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20210409111254.271800-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=omosnace@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Precedence: bulk List-ID: When mounting an NFS export that is a mountpoint on the host, doing the same mount a second time leads to a security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call on an already intialized superblock, which leaves the SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag unset even if it's provided by the FS. NFS then obediently clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL from its server capability set, leading to any newly created inodes for this superblock to end up without labels. To fix this, make sure to return the SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag when security_sb_set_mnt_opts() is called on an already initialized superblock with matching security options. While there, also do a sanity check to ensure that SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is set in kflags if and only if sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE. Minimal reproducer: # systemctl start nfs-server # exportfs -o rw,no_root_squash,security_label localhost:/ # mount -t nfs -o "nfsvers=4.2" localhost:/etc /mnt # mount -t nfs -o "nfsvers=4.2" localhost:/etc /mnt # ls -lZ /mnt [all labels are system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0] Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1daf7bec4bb0..b8efb14a1d1a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -741,7 +741,24 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts) goto out_double_mount; + + /* + * If we are checking an already initialized mount and the + * options match, make sure to return back the + * SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag if applicable. If the + * superblock has the NATIVE behavior set and the FS is not + * signaling its support (or vice versa), then it is a + * programmer error, so emit a WARNING and return -EINVAL. + */ rc = 0; + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { + if (WARN_ON(!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; + } else if (WARN_ON(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + } goto out; } -- 2.30.2