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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: commoncap: clean up kernel-doc comments
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 07:54:12 -0500
Message-ID: <20210412125412.GA30881@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210412005528.3326-1-rdunlap@infradead.org>

On Sun, Apr 11, 2021 at 05:55:28PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c.
> 
> Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code.
> Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments.
> Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values.
> 
> Fixes these kernel-doc warnings:
> 
> ../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead
> ../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead
> 
> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

thanks,
-serge

> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  security/commoncap.c |   50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> --- linux-next-20210409.orig/security/commoncap.c
> +++ linux-next-20210409/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(
>  /**
>   * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
>   * @cred: The credentials to use
> - * @ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
> + * @targ_ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
>   * @cap: The capability to check for
>   * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
>   *
> @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
>   * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
>   * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected.
>   *
> - * Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
> + * Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
>   * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required.
>   */
>  int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentr
>   * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
>   * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
>   *
> - * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
> + * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
>   */
>  int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry)
>  {
> @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static bool validheader(size_t size, con
>   * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
>   * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
>   *
> - * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
> + * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
>   */
>  int cap_convert_nscap(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		      const void **ivalue, size_t size)
> @@ -881,7 +881,9 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(str
>   *
>   * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
>   * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
> - * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
> + * which won't take effect immediately.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
>   */
>  int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
>  {
> @@ -1117,7 +1119,9 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(s
>   * @flags: Indications of what has changed
>   *
>   * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
> - * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
> + * actually applied.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
>   */
>  int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
>  {
> @@ -1187,7 +1191,9 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_str
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   *
>   * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
> - * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> + * specified task.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
>   */
>  int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
>  {
> @@ -1195,12 +1201,14 @@ int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_st
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
> + * cap_task_setioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
>   *
>   * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
> - * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> + * task.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
>   */
>  int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
>  {
> @@ -1208,12 +1216,14 @@ int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struc
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
> + * cap_task_setnice - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   * @nice: The nice value to set
>   *
>   * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
> - * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> + * specified task.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
>   */
>  int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  {
> @@ -1243,12 +1253,15 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long
>  /**
>   * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
>   * @option: The process control function requested
> - * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
> + * @arg2: The argument data for this function
> + * @arg3: The argument data for this function
> + * @arg4: The argument data for this function
> + * @arg5: The argument data for this function
>   *
>   * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
>   * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
>   *
> - * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
> + * Return: 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
>   * here, other -ve on error.  If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
>   * modules will consider performing the function.
>   */
> @@ -1383,7 +1396,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned
>   * @pages: The size of the mapping
>   *
>   * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
> - * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
> + * task is permitted.
> + *
> + * Return: 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
>   */
>  int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  {
> @@ -1396,14 +1411,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struc
>  	return cap_sys_admin;
>  }
>  
> -/*
> +/**
>   * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
>   * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
>   *
>   * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
>   * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
> - * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
> - * -EPERM if not.
> + * capability security module.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if this mapping should be allowed or -EPERM if not.
>   */
>  int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>  {

  reply index

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-12  0:55 Randy Dunlap
2021-04-12 12:54 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2021-04-15 16:19 ` James Morris

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