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From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Sat, 28 May 2022 08:11:37 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220528001137.GL4162@linux-l9pv.suse> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191107082131.GI12016@linux-l9pv.suse>

Hi all,

On Thu, Nov 07, 2019 at 04:21:31PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> Hi experts,
> 
> On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 05:32:53PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
> > 
> > ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
> > the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
> > supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
> > way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
> > 
> > Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
> > indistinguishable from real hardware errors.  This can have undesirable
> > side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
> > replacement.
> > 
> > While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
> > the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
> > the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
> > the kernel is locked down.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
> > cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
> 
> I was looking at the lockdown pathes in v5.4-rc kernel and found that the
> "acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down" did not
> merged with lockdown patch set. This patch be sent with Matthew's pull
> request lockdown patches for 5.2:
>     http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2019-March/012033.html
> 
> But it didn't show in Morris's git:
>     https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git/log/?h=next-lockdown
> 
> Maybe I missed some detail of this patch. Could anyone point out the
> concern of this patch please?
>

After a couple of years, we still didn't have this patch in mainline. 
Does that mean the "APEI error injection" doesn't need to be locked down?

Actually this patch is against a CVE-2016-3695:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3695

It's before lockdown patchset be merged to kernel mainline. So this CVE
happened in downstream destro. Just search CVE-2016-3695 then we can see
many distros has this.

If mainline kernel doesn't have this patch, then I believe that the
CVE-2016-3695 is also in current mainline kernel.

Then why this patch not be acceptted?

Thanks!
Joey Lee
 
> > ---
> > 
> >  drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c |    3 +++
> >  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> > index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644
> > --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> > +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> > @@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
> >  	int rc;
> >  	u64 base_addr, size;
> >  
> > +	if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection"))
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +
> >  	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
> >  	if (flags && (flags &
> >  		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
> > 
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> > More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> 
> Thanks
> Joey Lee


  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-28  0:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-09 17:30 [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 11:59   ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:01     ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:02     ` [PATCH 08b/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Jiri Bohac
2018-01-16 16:31     ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE David Howells
2018-01-16 19:39       ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:34       ` David Howells
2018-01-19 12:54         ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-21 16:20         ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:43   ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 12:47   ` David Howells
2018-01-11 15:44     ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:16     ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2019-11-07  8:21   ` Joey Lee
2022-05-28  0:11     ` joeyli [this message]
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace David Howells
2017-11-10  9:23   ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:07   ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:15     ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:21     ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:23       ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 11:06       ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells
2018-02-22 13:07 ` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-02-22 18:44   ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 14:20 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime " David Howells
2018-02-22 19:08   ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 14:21 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 19:14   ` Jiri Bohac
2018-03-03  1:18 ` [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Andrew Morton

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