From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com,
containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com,
lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
jpenumak@redhat.com,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 21/26] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:16:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220530011610.GA7909@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220420140633.753772-22-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:28AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
> namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
> host is also created for the namespacing case.
>
> The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
> IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
> system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.
>
> Introduce a variable ima_policy_removed in ima_namespace that is used to
> remember whether the policy file has previously been removed and thus
> should not be created again in case of unmounting and again mounting
> securityfs inside an IMA namespace.
>
> This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:
>
> mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/
>
> The following directories, symlinks, and files are available
> when IMA namespacing is enabled, otherwise it will be empty:
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
> total 0
> lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
> drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
> total 0
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
> -rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
but a nit below
>
> ---
>
> v9:
> - rename policy_dentry_removed to ima_policy_removed
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 13 ++++++++++
> security/inode.c | 6 ++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
> 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index b9301e2aaa8b..0cbf0434bc93 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> const char *event_name,
> const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
> bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
> +extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
> @@ -227,6 +228,12 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
>
> void ima_free_ns_status_list(struct list_head *head, rwlock_t *ns_list_lock);
>
> +static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
> + struct dentry *root)
> +{
> + return ima_fs_ns_init(user_ns, root);
> +}
> +
> #else
>
> static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> @@ -238,6 +245,12 @@ static inline void ima_free_ns_status_list(struct list_head *head,
> {
> }
>
> +static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *ns,
> + struct dentry *root)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index 84c9396792a9..e81f55f054dc 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/namei.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> @@ -82,7 +83,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
> sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
>
> - return 0;
> + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> + error = ima_securityfs_init(ns, sb->s_root);
> +
> + return error;
> }
>
> static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index cb48fc1d5b80..801dc3c8bfde 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct ima_namespace {
> int valid_policy;
>
> struct dentry *ima_policy;
> + bool ima_policy_removed;
>
> struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier;
> } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index c41aa61b7393..84cd02a9e19b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
> #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> #include <linux/parser.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>
> #include "ima.h"
>
> @@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
> securityfs_remove(ns->ima_policy);
> ns->ima_policy = NULL;
> + ns->ima_policy_removed = true;
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
> clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
> @@ -449,9 +451,11 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
> .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> };
>
> -static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
> {
> - struct dentry *ima_dir;
> + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_user_ns(user_ns);
> + struct dentry *int_dir;
> + struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
> struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
> struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
> struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
> @@ -459,11 +463,22 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> struct dentry *violations = NULL;
> int ret;
>
> - ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
> - if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
> - return PTR_ERR(ima_dir);
> + /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
> + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
> + int_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
> + if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
> + return PTR_ERR(int_dir);
> + } else {
> + int_dir = integrity_dir;
> + }
>
> - ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
> + ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", int_dir);
> + if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(ima_dir);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", root, "integrity/ima",
> NULL);
> if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(ima_symlink);
> @@ -505,12 +520,15 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - ns->ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
> - ima_dir, NULL,
> - &ima_measure_policy_ops);
> - if (IS_ERR(ns->ima_policy)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ns->ima_policy);
> - goto out;
> + if (!ns->ima_policy_removed) {
It would be nicer to avoid this indent level by just doing
if (ns->ima_policy_removed)
return 0;
above the securityfs_create_file().
> + ns->ima_policy =
> + securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
> + ima_dir, NULL,
> + &ima_measure_policy_ops);
> + if (IS_ERR(ns->ima_policy)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(ns->ima_policy);
> + goto out;
> + }
> }
>
> return 0;
> @@ -522,11 +540,13 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
> securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
> securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
> + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> + securityfs_remove(int_dir);
>
> return ret;
> }
>
> int __init ima_fs_init(void)
> {
> - return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_ima_ns);
> + return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_user_ns, NULL);
> }
> --
> 2.34.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-30 1:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-20 14:06 [PATCH v12 00/26] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 01/26] securityfs: rework dentry creation Stefan Berger
2022-05-09 19:54 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-09 20:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 8:43 ` Amir Goldstein
2022-05-10 10:38 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 14:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 10:26 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 10:25 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 14:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 15:51 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 18:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 20:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-06-09 14:27 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-10 16:50 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 02/26] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 2:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-21 9:38 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-21 15:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:34 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 03/26] ima: Define ima_namespace struct and start moving variables into it Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 2:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 14:57 ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-24 15:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 16:18 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 04/26] ima: Move arch_policy_entry into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 2:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-21 3:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:12 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 05/26] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 2:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 06/26] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 2:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 07/26] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 3:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 08/26] ima: Move IMA securityfs files into ima_namespace or onto stack Stefan Berger
2022-05-21 3:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 09/26] ima: Move ima_lsm_policy_notifier into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 2:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 10/26] ima: Switch to lazy lsm policy updates for better performance Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 11/26] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 14:17 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 12/26] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 13:25 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 13/26] userns: Add pointer to ima_namespace to user_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 18:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-23 9:59 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-23 11:31 ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 12:41 ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-23 12:58 ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 14:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:14 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 14/26] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 0:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 15/26] ima: Implement ima_free_policy_rules() for freeing of an ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 0:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 16/26] ima: Add functions for creating and " Stefan Berger
2022-05-30 1:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 17/26] integrity/ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 18/26] integrity: Add optional callback function to integrity_inode_free() Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 19/26] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 20/26] ima: Remove unused iints from the integrity_iint_cache Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 21/26] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-30 1:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2022-05-31 19:26 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 22/26] ima: Introduce securityfs file to activate an " Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 23/26] ima: Show owning user namespace's uid and gid when displaying policy Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:54 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 13:19 ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 24/26] ima: Limit number of policy rules in non-init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 25/26] ima: Restrict informational audit messages to init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 26/26] ima: Enable IMA namespaces Stefan Berger
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