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From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 09/30] security: add get, remove and set acl hook
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 13:56:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221018115700.166010-10-brauner@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221018115700.166010-1-brauner@kernel.org>

The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].

So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.

In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules
that do actually have restrictions on posix acls.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
---

Notes:
    /* v2 */
    unchanged
    
    /* v3 */
    Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>:
    - Add get, and remove acl hook
    
    /* v4 */
    unchanged
    
    /* v5 */
    unchanged

 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  6 ++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/security.h      | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c           | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..7f4aaddce298 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	 struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4ec80b96c22e..1d02d1170e21 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -435,6 +435,18 @@
  *	Check permission before removing the extended attribute
  *	identified by @name for @dentry.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_set_acl:
+ *	Check permission before setting posix acls
+ *	The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_get_acl:
+ *	Check permission before getting osix acls
+ *	The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_remove_acl:
+ *	Check permission before removing posix acls
+ *	The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_getsecurity:
  *	Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
  *	security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer.  Note that
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..2bfc2e1ce51f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -361,6 +361,13 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+			   struct posix_acl *kacl);
+int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
+int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
@@ -872,6 +879,28 @@ static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
+static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					 struct dentry *dentry,
+					 const char *acl_name,
+					 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					 struct dentry *dentry,
+					 const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					    struct dentry *dentry,
+					    const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 { }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..f972ee1f10eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1372,6 +1372,31 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
+int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-18 11:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-18 11:56 [PATCH v5 00/30] acl: add vfs posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 01/30] orangefs: rework posix acl handling when creating new filesystem objects Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 02/30] fs: pass dentry to set acl method Christian Brauner
2022-11-18 10:09   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-11-18 10:33     ` Christian Brauner
2022-11-18 12:32       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 03/30] fs: rename current get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 04/30] fs: add new " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 05/30] cifs: implement " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 06/30] cifs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 07/30] 9p: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 08/30] 9p: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 10/30] selinux: implement get, set and remove acl hook Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 11/30] smack: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 12/30] integrity: implement get and set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 19:17   ` Paul Moore
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 13/30] evm: add post " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 14/30] internal: add may_write_xattr() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 15/30] acl: add vfs_set_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 16/30] acl: add vfs_get_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 17/30] acl: add vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 18/30] ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 19/30] ecryptfs: implement get acl method Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 20/30] ecryptfs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 21/30] ovl: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 22/30] ovl: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 23/30] ovl: use posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 24/30] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 25/30] evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change() Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 26/30] ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 27/30] ovl: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 28/30] cifs: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:56 ` [PATCH v5 29/30] 9p: " Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 11:57 ` [PATCH v5 30/30] acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers Christian Brauner

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