From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C251C61DA4 for ; Thu, 9 Feb 2023 22:21:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230212AbjBIWVp (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Feb 2023 17:21:45 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56096 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229746AbjBIWVo (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Feb 2023 17:21:44 -0500 Received: from wind.enjellic.com (wind.enjellic.com [76.10.64.91]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id D39DA6ADF2 for ; Thu, 9 Feb 2023 14:21:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from wind.enjellic.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by wind.enjellic.com (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 319ML70Y022738; Thu, 9 Feb 2023 16:21:07 -0600 Received: (from greg@localhost) by wind.enjellic.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 319ML6Cc022737; Thu, 9 Feb 2023 16:21:06 -0600 Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 16:21:06 -0600 From: "Dr. Greg" To: Casey Schaufler Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/14] Activate the configuration and build of the TSEM LSM. Message-ID: <20230209222106.GA22543@wind.enjellic.com> Reply-To: "Dr. Greg" References: <20230204050954.11583-1-greg@enjellic.com> <20230204050954.11583-15-greg@enjellic.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.3 (wind.enjellic.com [127.0.0.1]); Thu, 09 Feb 2023 16:21:07 -0600 (CST) Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Wed, Feb 08, 2023 at 02:15:26PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 2/3/2023 9:09 PM, Dr. Greg wrote: > > Complete the implementation by integrating the LSM into the > > configuration and kernel build infrastructure. > > > > Signed-off-by: Greg Wettstein > > --- > > security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- > > security/Makefile | 1 + > > security/tsem/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > > security/tsem/Makefile | 2 ++ > > 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 security/tsem/Kconfig > > create mode 100644 security/tsem/Makefile > > > > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > > index e6db09a779b7..98c538ad6790 100644 > > --- a/security/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/Kconfig > > @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" > > source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" > > source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" > > source "security/landlock/Kconfig" > > +source "security/tsem/Kconfig" > > > > source "security/integrity/Kconfig" > > > > @@ -246,11 +247,11 @@ endchoice > > > > config LSM > > string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" > > - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK > > - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR > > - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO > > - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC > > - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" > > + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selin ux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,tsem" Hi Casey, thanks for the note, I hope your week is going well. > Better check with the BPF team to see if they're OK with TSEM > following BPF in loading order. We can do that, however, as we noted in the documentation, TSEM, being the first LSM to be based on a narratival security logic philosophy, should be largely ambivalent with respect to its stacking order. We would thus, happily, entertain suggestions from the community as to where it would like us to stand in line. As an example, without going off into the weeds, since TSEM is a generic security modeling architecture, it can implement any integrity policies, including validation of extended security attributes. Placing it first in line would allow a security workload architect to reject any modifications to expected MAC security labels as an invalid security model state point before the event got to the deontological handlers. However, being the new kid on the block, we would never presume to be first or last, given that they may be coveted positions. So we will remain open to suggestions for the second spin of the patches. Have a good afternoon. As always, Dr. Greg The Quixote Project - Flailing at the Travails of Cybersecurity