From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6EF2C636D4 for ; Sat, 11 Feb 2023 00:33:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229525AbjBKAdP (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Feb 2023 19:33:15 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54752 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229473AbjBKAdP (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Feb 2023 19:33:15 -0500 Received: from wind.enjellic.com (wind.enjellic.com [76.10.64.91]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E80C1ADC5 for ; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 16:33:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from wind.enjellic.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by wind.enjellic.com (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 31B0Wq8D032551; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 18:32:52 -0600 Received: (from greg@localhost) by wind.enjellic.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 31B0WpfE032550; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 18:32:51 -0600 Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 18:32:51 -0600 From: "Dr. Greg" To: "Serge Hallyn (shallyn)" Cc: "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/14] Implement CAP_TRUST capability. Message-ID: <20230211003251.GA32521@wind.enjellic.com> Reply-To: "Dr. Greg" References: <20230204050954.11583-1-greg@enjellic.com> <20230204050954.11583-5-greg@enjellic.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.3 (wind.enjellic.com [127.0.0.1]); Fri, 10 Feb 2023 18:32:52 -0600 (CST) Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Mon, Feb 06, 2023 at 05:28:06PM +0000, Serge Hallyn (shallyn) wrote: > On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 11:09:44PM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > > TSEM was designed to support a Trust Orchestration System (TOS) > > security architecture. A TOS based system uses the concept of a > > minimum Trusted Computing Base of utilities, referred to as trust > > orchestrators, that maintain workloads in a trusted execution > > state. The trust orchestrators are thus, from a security > > perspective, the most privileged assets on the platform. > > > > Introduce the CAP_TRUST capability that is defined as a > > capability that allows a process to alter the trust status of the > This sounds like CAP_MAC_ADMIN. Any reason not to re-use that? Hi Serge, thanks for passing along the question. Casey raised the same issue, will respond in more detail in a reply to his e-mail. Have a good weekend. As always, Dr. Greg The Quixote Project - Flailing at the Travails of Cybersecurity