From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
jlayton@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
eparis@parisplace.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
brauner@kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stefanb@linux.ibm.com, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 16/28] security: Introduce file_post_open hook
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 19:18:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230303181842.1087717-17-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230303181842.1087717-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 2 ++
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index b4c52c4890b..41f7fdf4657 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3558,6 +3558,8 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
error = may_open(idmap, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
+ if (!error)
+ error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error)
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error && do_truncate)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index e7462b5e5f1..4b86c158ffb 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -852,6 +852,12 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
goto out_nfserr;
}
+ host_err = security_file_post_open(file, may_flags);
+ if (host_err) {
+ fput(file);
+ goto out_nfserr;
+ }
+
host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
if (host_err) {
fput(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 2ae5224d967..5d4e256e250 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b511f608958..4fdc62a1b42 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
@@ -1043,6 +1044,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6bf4a92db94..e252c87df4f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2906,6 +2906,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}
+/**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Recheck access to a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Recheck access with mask after the file has been opened. The hook is useful
+ * for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to make
+ * decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_post_open, 0, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
/**
* security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
* @file: file
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-03 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-03 18:18 [PATCH 00/28] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 01/28] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:46 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 02/28] ima: Align ima_post_path_mknod() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:52 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 03/28] ima: Align ima_post_create_tmpfile() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:53 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-09 9:11 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 04/28] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:56 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 05/28] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:57 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 06/28] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:58 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 07/28] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:59 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 08/28] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:00 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 09/28] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:01 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 10/28] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:02 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 11/28] evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr() Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:04 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-07 8:58 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 12/28] fs: Fix description of vfs_tmpfile() Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 10:28 ` Christian Brauner
2023-03-06 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 13/28] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-03-05 0:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-06 17:06 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 14/28] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:08 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 15/28] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:17 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-09 13:07 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-08-30 9:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-08-30 9:53 ` Christian Brauner
2023-03-03 18:18 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-03-06 19:24 ` [PATCH 16/28] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 17/28] security: Introduce file_pre_free_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:26 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 18/28] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:29 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:47 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 19/28] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:35 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 20/28] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:45 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 21/28] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 15:22 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-06 15:34 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:16 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-06 16:50 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 22/28] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 17:48 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 23/28] security: Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 18:04 ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 8:06 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 13:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 13:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 14:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 14:35 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 15:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 24/28] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 25/28] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 26/28] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-04 21:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-06 9:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 16:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-07 16:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 27/28] integrity: Move integrity functions to the " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 28/28] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 15:14 ` [PATCH 00/28] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 16:23 ` Roberto Sassu
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