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From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	pavel@ucw.cz, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 23:43:06 +0200
Message-ID: <2636170.u2GatYtffq@kreacher> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190820001805.241928-11-matthewgarrett@google.com>

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 2:17:46 AM CEST Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> 
> There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
> from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
> so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
> kernel is locked down.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
> Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
> cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
>  kernel/power/hibernate.c     | 3 ++-
>  security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
>  3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b607a8ac97fe..80ac7fb27aa9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>  	LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
>  	LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
>  	LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
> +	LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
>  	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
>  	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
>  };
> diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> index cd7434e6000d..3c0a5a8170b0 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <linux/ctype.h>
>  #include <linux/genhd.h>
>  #include <linux/ktime.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <trace/events/power.h>
>  
>  #include "power.h"
> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
>  
>  bool hibernation_available(void)
>  {
> -	return (nohibernate == 0);
> +	return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index aaf30ad351f9..3462f7edcaac 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
>  	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
> +	[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
>  };
> 





  reply index

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-20  0:17 [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 14:26   ` Philipp Rudo
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 21:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki [this message]
2019-08-25  9:51   ` Pavel Machek
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 19:45   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2019-08-20 21:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:07   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 16:39   ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:17 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  0:18 ` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20  6:45 ` [PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality James Morris
2019-08-30 16:28 ` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM David Howells
2019-09-04 16:51   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-10 10:06     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:31 ` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2019-09-04 16:57   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-30 16:32 ` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode David Howells

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