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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible
Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 12:57:50 -0700
Message-ID: <30fe30e1-2315-5e15-5371-d4b7f532401a@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190405133458.4809-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de>

On 4/5/19 6:34 AM, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior wrote:
> After removing preempt_disable() from get_buffers() it is possible to
> replace a few GFP_ATOMIC allocations with GFP_KERNEL.
> 
> Replace GFP_ATOMIC allocations with GFP_KERNEL where the context looks
> to bee preepmtible.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

I am pulling this one is as well


> ---
>  security/apparmor/domain.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
>  security/apparmor/file.c   |  2 +-
>  security/apparmor/mount.c  |  2 +-
>  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 1f4a6e420b6d3..b8114d9988bac 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
>  				label = &new_profile->label;
>  			continue;
>  		}
> -		label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_ATOMIC,
> +		label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_KERNEL,
>  				       true, false);
>  		if (IS_ERR(label))
>  			label = NULL;
> @@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
>  		/* base the stack on post domain transition */
>  		struct aa_label *base = new;
>  
> -		new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_ATOMIC, true, false);
> +		new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
>  		if (IS_ERR(new))
>  			new = NULL;
>  		aa_put_label(base);
> @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
>  		if (DEBUG_ON) {
>  			dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment variables"
>  				   " for %s profile=", name);
> -			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
>  			dbg_printk("\n");
>  		}
>  		*secure_exec = true;
> @@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
>  		if (DEBUG_ON) {
>  			dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment "
>  				   "variables for %s label=", xname);
> -			aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +			aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_KERNEL);
>  			dbg_printk("\n");
>  		}
>  		*secure_exec = true;
> @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
>  					       bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
>  		if (error)
>  			return ERR_PTR(error);
> -		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
> +		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
>  				aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
>  				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
>  						   cond, unsafe));
> @@ -834,9 +834,9 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
>  					       buffer, cond, unsafe));
>  		if (error)
>  			return ERR_PTR(error);
> -		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
> +		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
>  				aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
> -					       GFP_ATOMIC),
> +					       GFP_KERNEL),
>  				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
>  						   cond, unsafe));
>  	}
> @@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  		new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
>  				    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
>  	else
> -		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
> +		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
>  				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
>  						   &cond, &unsafe));
>  
> @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  		if (DEBUG_ON) {
>  			dbg_printk("scrubbing environment variables for %s "
>  				   "label=", bprm->filename);
> -			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
>  			dbg_printk("\n");
>  		}
>  		bprm->secureexec = 1;
> @@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  		if (DEBUG_ON) {
>  			dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality "
>  				   "bits. %s label=", bprm->filename);
> -			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
>  			dbg_printk("\n");
>  		}
>  		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
> index e422a3f59e80c..3eb2c5369711c 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/file.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
>  	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
>  		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
> -				FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +				FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL);
>  	} else if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
>  		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
> index 8a6cf1c14e82a..d73bc3ceaf9f5 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
> @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
>  
>  	old_buffer = aa_get_buffer();
>  	new_buffer = aa_get_buffer();
> -	target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
> +	target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
>  			build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer,
>  					old_path, old_buffer));
>  	if (!target) {
> 


  reply index

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-05 13:34 [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-05 13:34 ` [PATCH 2/2] apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-07 19:57   ` John Johansen [this message]
2019-04-15 10:50 ` [PATCH 1/2] apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-04-28 23:56 ` John Johansen
2019-04-30 14:47   ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-01 21:29     ` John Johansen
2019-05-02 10:51       ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-02 13:17         ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-05-02 13:47           ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-02 14:10             ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-05-03 11:48               ` [PATCH v2] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-03 11:51                 ` [PATCH v3] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-03 12:41                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-05-03 14:12                     ` [PATCH v4] " Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-07 19:57                       ` John Johansen
2019-10-02  8:59                         ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-10-02 15:47                           ` John Johansen
2019-10-02 15:52                             ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-05-02 19:33         ` [PATCH 1/2] " John Johansen

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