From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE528C6379F for ; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 12:52:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232001AbjAaMwi (ORCPT ); Tue, 31 Jan 2023 07:52:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59388 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230146AbjAaMwh (ORCPT ); Tue, 31 Jan 2023 07:52:37 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3AC26234EE; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 04:52:26 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.227]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4P5l9N3FsTz9v7cG; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 20:44:08 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620 (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwCXHwvlDtljpffgAA--.10854S2; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 13:52:02 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: <412da9a9da2e75e896911f01bfd735dd4b5789f4.camel@huaweicloud.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read From: Roberto Sassu To: Fan Wu , corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 13:51:39 +0100 In-Reply-To: <1675119451-23180-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1675119451-23180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> <1675119451-23180-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.36.5-0ubuntu1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwCXHwvlDtljpffgAA--.10854S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3WrW8XF13Jry8Aw4DGF4xCrg_yoWfXw18pF 9xJ3ZxGrWDXF9a9r1xJa1UuanxK395Kr4UW3sxWFy8AanFqr10kr1aqF17ZFW5Grn5t3ZY v3W2vr42g34qyrDanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUkFb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26ryj6rWUM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4 vEj48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7Cj xVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxV AFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG 6I80ewAv7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUGwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFV Cjc4AY6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcVAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI 7VAKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxV Cjr7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVW8ZVWrXwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42IY 6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6x AIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Wr1j6rW3Jr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lIxAIcVC2z280 aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UZ18PUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj4hR2wAAs4 X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Mon, 2023-01-30 at 14:57 -0800, Fan Wu wrote: > From: Deven Bowers > > IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of > kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It > accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for > bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data, > and kernel_read_data. > > Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers > Signed-off-by: Fan Wu > --- > v2: > + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, > and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace > interface to pass mailing list character limit > > v3: > + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. > + Remove useless 0-initializations > + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ > + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are > exposed through sysctls. > + Add more prose to the IPE base config option > help text. > + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. > + Remove unnecessary caching system. > + Remove comments from headers > + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check > + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. > + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 > > v4: > + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes > + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now > exposed through securityfs. > + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. > > v5: > + fix minor grammatical errors > + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, > reconstruct the exact rule. > > v6: > + No changes > > v7: > + Further split lsm creation, the audit system, the evaluation loop > and access control hooks into separate commits. > > v8: > + Rename hook functions to follow the lsmname_hook_name convention > + Remove ipe_hook enumeration, can be derived from correlation with > syscall audit record. > > v9: > + Minor changes for adapting to the new parser > --- > security/ipe/hooks.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/ipe/hooks.h | 13 ++++ > security/ipe/ipe.c | 6 ++ > 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c > index 335b773c7ae1..fd5109e29c76 100644 > --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c > +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c > @@ -23,3 +23,172 @@ void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) > { > ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(mnt_sb); > } > + > +/** > + * ipe_bprm_check_security - ipe security hook function for bprm check. > + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file > + * being evaluated. > + * > + * This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec > + * family of system calls. > + * Return: > + * *0 - OK > + * *!0 - Error > + */ > +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +{ > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 }; > + > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, ipe_op_exec); > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); > +} > + > +/** > + * ipe_mmap_file - ipe security hook function for mmap check. > + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory. > + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. > + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and > + * system configuration. > + * @flags: Unused. > + * > + * This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap > + * family of system calls. > + * > + * Return: > + * * 0 - OK > + * * !0 - Error > + */ > +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, > + unsigned long flags) > +{ > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 }; > + > + if (prot & PROT_EXEC || reqprot & PROT_EXEC) { Since the kernel only adds flags and doesn't clear them, isn't safe to just consider prot? Oh, you mentioned it in the changelog, maybe just for ipe_file_mprotect(). > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, ipe_op_exec); > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); > + } Uhm, I think some considerations that IMA does for mmap() are relevant also for IPE. For example, look at mmap_violation_check(). It checks if there are writable mappings, and if yes, it denies the access. Similarly for mprotect(), is adding PROT_EXEC safe? > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * ipe_file_mprotect - ipe security hook function for mprotect check. > + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar. > + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. > + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and > + * system configuration. > + * > + * This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing > + * its protections via mprotect. > + * > + * Return: > + * * 0 - OK > + * * !0 - Error > + */ > +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot) > +{ > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 }; > + > + /* Already Executable */ > + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) > + return 0; > + > + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, ipe_op_exec); > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * ipe_kernel_read_file - ipe security hook function for kernel read. > + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk. > + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. > + * @contents: Unused. > + * > + * This LSM hook is called when a file is being read in from disk from > + * the kernel. > + * > + * Return: > + * 0 - OK > + * !0 - Error > + */ > +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > + bool contents) > +{ > + enum ipe_op_type op; > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx; > + > + switch (id) { > + case READING_FIRMWARE: > + op = ipe_op_firmware; > + break; > + case READING_MODULE: > + op = ipe_op_kernel_module; > + break; > + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: > + op = ipe_op_kexec_initramfs; > + break; > + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE: > + op = ipe_op_kexec_image; > + break; > + case READING_POLICY: > + op = ipe_op_ima_policy; > + break; > + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE: > + op = ipe_op_ima_x509; > + break; > + default: > + op = ipe_op_max; > + WARN(op == ipe_op_max, "no rule setup for enum %d", id); > + } > + > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op); > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); > +} > + > +/** > + * ipe_kernel_load_data - ipe security hook function for kernel load data. > + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. > + * @contents: Unused. > + * > + * This LSM hook is called when a buffer is being read in from disk. > + * > + * Return: > + * * 0 - OK > + * * !0 - Error > + */ > +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > +{ > + enum ipe_op_type op; > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 }; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: > + op = ipe_op_firmware; > + break; > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + op = ipe_op_kernel_module; > + break; > + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: > + op = ipe_op_kexec_initramfs; > + break; > + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: > + op = ipe_op_kexec_image; > + break; > + case LOADING_POLICY: > + op = ipe_op_ima_policy; > + break; > + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE: > + op = ipe_op_ima_x509; > + break; > + default: > + op = ipe_op_max; > + WARN(op == ipe_op_max, "no rule setup for enum %d", id); > + } > + > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op); > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); > +} > diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h > index 30fe455389bf..857cae69678c 100644 > --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h > +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h > @@ -11,4 +11,17 @@ > > void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb); > > +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm); > + > +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, > + unsigned long flags); > + > +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot); > + > +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > + bool contents); > + > +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); > + > #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ > diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c > index bef923026b50..7af2f942decd 100644 > --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c > +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > */ > > #include "ipe.h" > +#include "hooks.h" > > bool ipe_enabled; > > @@ -12,6 +13,11 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, ipe_sb_free_security), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data), > }; Uhm, maybe I would incorporate patch 1 with this. Roberto