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* [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (6 more replies)
  0 siblings, 7 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's and Eric Snowberg's
keys-cve-2020-26541-v3.

I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184
binary hashes and 2 certificates).

The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the
root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is useful
to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update this keyring
without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.

This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-cve-2020-26541-branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-cve-2020-26541-branch

Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210210120410.471693-1-mic@digikod.net/

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (5):
  tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
  certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
  certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
    keyring

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
 certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
 certs/Kconfig                                 |  17 +-
 certs/Makefile                                |  17 +-
 certs/blacklist.c                             | 218 ++++++++++++++----
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
 10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh


base-commit: ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-15 16:57   ` Eric Snowberg
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
hash from a given certificate.  This is useful to generate a blacklist
key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.

This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
available to understand how to effectively create such hash.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-2-mic@digikod.net
---

Changes since v5:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko.

Changes since v3:
* Explain in the commit message that this kind of formating is not new
  but it wasn't documented.

Changes since v1:
* Fix typo.
* Use "if" block instead of "||" .
---
 MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 00836f6452f0..773a362e807f 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -4120,6 +4120,7 @@ F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
 F:	certs/
 F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
 F:	scripts/sign-file.c
+F:	tools/certs/
 
 CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER
 M:	Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
diff --git a/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..c93df5387ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
+#
+# Compute and print the To Be Signed (TBS) hash of a certificate.  This is used
+# as description of keys in the blacklist keyring to identify certificates.
+# This output should be redirected, without newline, in a file (hash0.txt) and
+# signed to create a PKCS#7 file (hash0.p7s).  Both of these files can then be
+# loaded in the kernel with.
+#
+# Exemple on a workstation:
+# ./print-cert-tbs-hash.sh certificate-to-invalidate.pem > hash0.txt
+# openssl smime -sign -in hash0.txt -inkey builtin-private-key.pem \
+#               -signer builtin-certificate.pem -certfile certificate-chain.pem \
+#               -noattr -binary -outform DER -out hash0.p7s
+#
+# Exemple on a managed system:
+# keyctl padd blacklist "$(< hash0.txt)" %:.blacklist < hash0.p7s
+
+set -u -e -o pipefail
+
+CERT="${1:-}"
+BASENAME="$(basename -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
+
+if [ $# -ne 1 ] || [ ! -f "${CERT}" ]; then
+	echo "usage: ${BASENAME} <certificate>" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# Checks that it is indeed a certificate (PEM or DER encoded) and exclude the
+# optional PEM text header.
+if ! PEM="$(openssl x509 -inform DER -in "${CERT}" 2>/dev/null || openssl x509 -in "${CERT}")"; then
+	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse certificate" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# TBSCertificate starts at the second entry.
+# Cf. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280#section-4.1
+#
+# Exemple of first lines printed by openssl asn1parse:
+#    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 763 cons: SEQUENCE
+#    4:d=1  hl=4 l= 483 cons: SEQUENCE
+#    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
+#   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :02
+#   13:d=2  hl=2 l=  20 prim: INTEGER           :3CEB2CB8818D968AC00EEFE195F0DF9665328B7B
+#   35:d=2  hl=2 l=  13 cons: SEQUENCE
+#   37:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT            :sha256WithRSAEncryption
+RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE='
+2s/^\s*\([0-9]\+\):d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*\([0-9]\+\)\s\+cons:\s*SEQUENCE\s*$/\1 \2/p;
+7s/^\s*[0-9]\+:d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+prim:\s*OBJECT\s*:\(.*\)$/\1/p;
+'
+
+RANGE_AND_DIGEST=($(echo "${PEM}" | \
+	openssl asn1parse -in - | \
+	sed -n -e "${RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE}"))
+
+if [ "${#RANGE_AND_DIGEST[@]}" != 3 ]; then
+	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse TBSCertificate." >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+OFFSET="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[0]}"
+END="$(( OFFSET + RANGE_AND_DIGEST[1] ))"
+DIGEST="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[2]}"
+
+# The signature hash algorithm is used by Linux to blacklist certificates.
+# Cf. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo()
+DIGEST_MATCH=""
+while read -r DIGEST_ITEM; do
+	if [ -z "${DIGEST_ITEM}" ]; then
+		break
+	fi
+	if echo "${DIGEST}" | grep -qiF "${DIGEST_ITEM}"; then
+		DIGEST_MATCH="${DIGEST_ITEM}"
+		break
+	fi
+done < <(openssl list -digest-commands | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -ur)
+
+if [ -z "${DIGEST_MATCH}" ]; then
+	echo "ERROR: Unknown digest algorithm: ${DIGEST}" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "${PEM}" | \
+	openssl x509 -in - -outform DER | \
+	dd "bs=1" "skip=${OFFSET}" "count=${END}" "status=none" | \
+	openssl dgst "-${DIGEST_MATCH}" - | \
+	awk '{printf "tbs:" $2}'
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-13 18:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes.  This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.

This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.

Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-3-mic@digikod.net
---

Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David
  Howells.
* Enable to use a file path relative to the kernel source directory.
  This align with the handling of CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS,
  CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY and CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS.

Changes since v3:
* Improve commit description.
* Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help.
* Remove Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen because of the above changes.

Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.

Changes since v1:
* Prefix script path with $(scrtree)/ (suggested by David Howells).
* Fix hexadecimal number check.
---
 MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
 certs/.gitignore                   |  1 +
 certs/Kconfig                      |  7 ++++--
 certs/Makefile                     | 17 +++++++++++++-
 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 773a362e807f..a18fd3d283c6 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -4118,6 +4118,7 @@ L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
 F:	certs/
+F:	scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
 F:	scripts/sign-file.c
 F:	tools/certs/
diff --git a/certs/.gitignore b/certs/.gitignore
index 2a2483990686..42cc2ac24b93 100644
--- a/certs/.gitignore
+++ b/certs/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+blacklist_hashes_checked
 x509_certificate_list
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index ab88d2a7f3c7..cf3740c1b22b 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
 	help
 	  If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
 	  form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... .  This will be included into a C
-	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
-	  be a string of hex digits.
+	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> must be a
+	  string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and
+	  finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128).
+	  Certificate hashes can be generated with
+	  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
 
 config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
 	bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
index b6db52ebf0be..61e82b8eacd2 100644
--- a/certs/Makefile
+++ b/certs/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,22 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o c
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST) += revocation_certificates.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"")
+
+quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK   $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+      cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
+
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked
+
+CFLAGS_blacklist_hashes.o += -I$(srctree)
+
+targets += blacklist_hashes_checked
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
+
 else
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
 endif
@@ -30,7 +45,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF
 	$(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
 endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
-clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list blacklist_hashes_checked
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 ###############################################################################
diff --git a/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..107c1d3204d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/usr/bin/awk -f
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
+#
+# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of
+# hash strings.  Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a
+# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters
+# (up to 128).
+
+BEGIN {
+	RS = ","
+}
+{
+	if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) {
+		print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0;
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) {
+		print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) {
+		print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) > 128) {
+		print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) {
+		print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+}
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 3/5] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted.  This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.

Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-4-mic@digikod.net
---

Changes since v5:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko.

Changes since v2:
* Fix typo in blacklist_vet_description() comment, spotted by Tyler
  Hicks.
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.

Changes since v1:
* Return ENOPKG (instead of EINVAL) when a hash is greater than the
  maximum currently known hash (suggested by David Howells).
---
 certs/blacklist.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index c9a435b15af4..97a35cf9a62c 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@
 #include "blacklist.h"
 #include "common.h"
 
+/*
+ * According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(),
+ * the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits,
+ * which translates into 128 hex characters.
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_LEN	128
+
+static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
+static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
+
 static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
@@ -32,24 +42,40 @@ extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;
  */
 static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 {
-	int n = 0;
-
-	if (*desc == ':')
-		return -EINVAL;
-	for (; *desc; desc++)
-		if (*desc == ':')
-			goto found_colon;
+	int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
+
+	/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
+	prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+	for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
+		if (*desc == ':') {
+			if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			if (bin_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (i >= prefix_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
+			tbs_step++;
+		if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
+			bin_step++;
+	}
 	return -EINVAL;
 
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
-	for (; *desc; desc++) {
+	for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
 		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		n++;
 	}
+	if (*desc)
+		/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */
+		return -ENOPKG;
 
-	if (n == 0 || n & 1)
+	/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */
+	if (i == 0 || i & 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-13 18:54   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-5-mic@digikod.net
---

Changes since v6:
* Rebase on keys-cve-2020-26541-v3: commit ebd9c2ae369a ("integrity:
  Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring").

Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David
  Howells.
* Fix missing part to effectively handle UEFI DBX blacklisting.
* Remove Jarkko's Acked-by because of the above changes.

Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
---
 certs/blacklist.c                             | 76 ++++++++++++++-----
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |  3 +-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 14 +++-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 26 +------
 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index 97a35cf9a62c..b254c87ceb3a 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -109,11 +109,43 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
 	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
 };
 
+static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	size_t type_len;
+	const char *type_prefix;
+	char *buffer, *p;
+
+	switch (hash_type) {
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
+		type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
+		break;
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
+		type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = bin_prefix;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
+	p += type_len;
+	*p++ = ':';
+	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
+	p += hash_len * 2;
+	*p = '\0';
+	return buffer;
+}
+
 /**
- * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
+ * mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
  * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
  */
-int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
+static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 
@@ -133,29 +165,36 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	const char *buffer;
+	int err;
+
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
+	err = mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(buffer);
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return err;
+}
+
 /**
  * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
  * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
  * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
- * @type: Type of hash
+ * @hash_type: Type of hash
  */
-int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
+int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	key_ref_t kref;
-	size_t type_len = strlen(type);
-	char *buffer, *p;
+	const char *buffer;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	*p++ = ':';
-	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
-	p += hash_len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
 	kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
 			      &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
 	if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
@@ -170,7 +209,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
 
 int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
 {
-	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, "bin") == -EKEYREJECTED)
+	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
+			-EKEYREJECTED)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -243,7 +283,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
 
 	for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
-		if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
+		if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
 			pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index ae450eb8be14..3b7dba5e4cd9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_2;
 
-	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size,
+				  BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
 		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
 		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 875e002a4180..d2597f8d6d7e 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
 
+enum blacklist_hash_type {
+	/* TBSCertificate hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
+	/* Raw data hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
 extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -33,13 +40,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
 
 extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
+extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-			       const char *type);
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
 #else
 static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-				      const char *type)
+				      enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 5604bd57c990..9e4f156b356e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -15,35 +15,13 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
 	EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
 static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
 
-/*
- * Blacklist a hash.
- */
-static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
-				       size_t len, const char *type,
-				       size_t type_len)
-{
-	char *hash, *p;
-
-	hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!hash)
-		return;
-	p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-	p += len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
-	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-	kfree(hash);
-}
-
 /*
  * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
  */
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 					   const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -52,7 +30,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
 					 const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-12 17:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-15 16:59   ` Eric Snowberg
  2021-03-25 11:36 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update " Mickaël Salaün
  2021-04-07 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-12 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
  make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
  root user rights.

See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net
---

Changes since v6:
* Rebase on keys-cve-2020-26541-v3: commit ebd9c2ae369a ("integrity:
  Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring").

Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next, fix Kconfig conflict, and update the asymmetric
  key rights added to the blacklist keyring by the new
  add_key_to_revocation_list(): align with blacklist key rights by
  removing KEY_POS_WRITE as a safeguard, and add
  KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to not be subject to
  restrict_link_for_blacklist() that only allows blacklist key types to
  be added to the keyring.
* Change the return code for restrict_link_for_blacklist() from -EPERM
  to -EOPNOTSUPP to align with asymmetric key keyrings.

Changes since v3:
* Update commit message for print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .

Changes since v2:
* Add comment for blacklist_key_instantiate().
---
 certs/Kconfig     | 10 +++++
 certs/blacklist.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index cf3740c1b22b..3aa5e597cfae 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -103,4 +103,14 @@ config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS
 	  containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist
 	  keyring.
 
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys"
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
+	  they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
+	  keyring.  The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
+	  payload.  Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
+
 endmenu
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index b254c87ceb3a..486ce0dd8e9c 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "blacklist.h"
 #include "common.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,9 @@
  */
 #define MAX_HASH_LEN	128
 
+#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \
+			    KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW)
+
 static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
 static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
 
@@ -80,19 +84,51 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description.  There will
- * be no payload.
- */
-static int blacklist_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
+		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	if (prep->datalen > 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	int err;
+#endif
+
+	/* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */
+	key->perm = BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not
+	 * signed but still trusted.
+	 */
+	if (key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN))
+		goto out;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	/*
+	 * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
+	 * trusted keyring.
+	 */
+	err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
+			strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
+			NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+#else
+	/*
+	 * It should not be possible to come here because the keyring doesn't
+	 * have KEY_USR_WRITE and the only other way to call this function is
+	 * for builtin hashes.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return -EPERM;
+#endif
+
+out:
+	return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
 }
 
-static void blacklist_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_update(struct key *key,
+		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
+	return -EPERM;
 }
 
 static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
@@ -103,9 +139,8 @@ static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
 	.name			= "blacklist",
 	.vet_description	= blacklist_vet_description,
-	.preparse		= blacklist_preparse,
-	.free_preparse		= blacklist_free_preparse,
-	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.instantiate		= blacklist_key_instantiate,
+	.update			= blacklist_key_update,
 	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
 };
 
@@ -154,8 +189,7 @@ static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 				   hash,
 				   NULL,
 				   0,
-				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-				    KEY_USR_VIEW),
+				   BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM,
 				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
 				   KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
@@ -232,8 +266,10 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
 				   NULL,
 				   data,
 				   size,
-				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
-				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+				   KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH
+				   | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN
+				   | KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
 		pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
@@ -260,25 +296,43 @@ int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
 }
 #endif
 
+static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
+		const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload,
+		struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+	if (type == &key_type_blacklist)
+		return 0;
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /*
  * Initialise the blacklist
  */
 static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 {
 	const char *const *bl;
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
 
 	if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
 
+	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(*restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!restriction)
+		panic("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n");
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist;
+
 	blacklist_keyring =
 		keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
 			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
-			      (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
-			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
-			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+			      KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
+			      KEY_POS_WRITE |
+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+			      | KEY_USR_WRITE
+#endif
+			      , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
 			      KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
-			      NULL, NULL);
+			      restriction, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
 
-- 
2.30.2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-13 18:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-03-13 18:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 06:12:29PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
> builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
> effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes.  This is useful
> to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
> which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
> now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
> 
> This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
> by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
> 
> Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
> a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
> 
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-3-mic@digikod.net


Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

/Jarkko

> ---
> 
> Changes since v5:
> * Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David
>   Howells.
> * Enable to use a file path relative to the kernel source directory.
>   This align with the handling of CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS,
>   CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY and CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS.
> 
> Changes since v3:
> * Improve commit description.
> * Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help.
> * Remove Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen because of the above changes.
> 
> Changes since v2:
> * Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
> 
> Changes since v1:
> * Prefix script path with $(scrtree)/ (suggested by David Howells).
> * Fix hexadecimal number check.
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
>  certs/.gitignore                   |  1 +
>  certs/Kconfig                      |  7 ++++--
>  certs/Makefile                     | 17 +++++++++++++-
>  scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 773a362e807f..a18fd3d283c6 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -4118,6 +4118,7 @@ L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
>  S:	Maintained
>  F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
>  F:	certs/
> +F:	scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
>  F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
>  F:	scripts/sign-file.c
>  F:	tools/certs/
> diff --git a/certs/.gitignore b/certs/.gitignore
> index 2a2483990686..42cc2ac24b93 100644
> --- a/certs/.gitignore
> +++ b/certs/.gitignore
> @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
>  # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +blacklist_hashes_checked
>  x509_certificate_list
> diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
> index ab88d2a7f3c7..cf3740c1b22b 100644
> --- a/certs/Kconfig
> +++ b/certs/Kconfig
> @@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
>  	help
>  	  If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
>  	  form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... .  This will be included into a C
> -	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
> -	  be a string of hex digits.
> +	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> must be a
> +	  string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and
> +	  finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128).
> +	  Certificate hashes can be generated with
> +	  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
>  
>  config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
>  	bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
> diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
> index b6db52ebf0be..61e82b8eacd2 100644
> --- a/certs/Makefile
> +++ b/certs/Makefile
> @@ -7,7 +7,22 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o c
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o common.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST) += revocation_certificates.o
>  ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"")
> +
> +quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK   $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
> +      cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@
> +
> +$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
> +
> +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked
> +
> +CFLAGS_blacklist_hashes.o += -I$(srctree)
> +
> +targets += blacklist_hashes_checked
> +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE
> +	$(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
> +
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
> +
>  else
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
>  endif
> @@ -30,7 +45,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF
>  	$(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
>  endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>  
> -clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list
> +clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list blacklist_hashes_checked
>  
>  ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
>  ###############################################################################
> diff --git a/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
> new file mode 100755
> index 000000000000..107c1d3204d4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
> @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
> +#!/usr/bin/awk -f
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#
> +# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
> +#
> +# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> +#
> +# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of
> +# hash strings.  Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a
> +# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters
> +# (up to 128).
> +
> +BEGIN {
> +	RS = ","
> +}
> +{
> +	if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) {
> +		print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0;
> +		exit 1;
> +	}
> +	if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) {
> +		print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1];
> +		exit 1;
> +	}
> +	if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) {
> +		print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2];
> +		exit 1;
> +	}
> +	if (length(part3[1]) > 128) {
> +		print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1];
> +		exit 1;
> +	}
> +	if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) {
> +		print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1];
> +		exit 1;
> +	}
> +}
> -- 
> 2.30.2
> 
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-13 18:54   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-03-13 18:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg,
	Herbert Xu, James Morris, Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar,
	Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 06:12:31PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
> This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
> which help to manage them consistently.
> 
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-5-mic@digikod.net


Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

/Jarkko

> ---
> 
> Changes since v6:
> * Rebase on keys-cve-2020-26541-v3: commit ebd9c2ae369a ("integrity:
>   Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring").
> 
> Changes since v5:
> * Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David
>   Howells.
> * Fix missing part to effectively handle UEFI DBX blacklisting.
> * Remove Jarkko's Acked-by because of the above changes.
> 
> Changes since v2:
> * Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
> ---
>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 76 ++++++++++++++-----
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |  3 +-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 14 +++-
>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 26 +------
>  4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> index 97a35cf9a62c..b254c87ceb3a 100644
> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> @@ -109,11 +109,43 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
>  	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
>  };
>  
> +static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> +		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
> +{
> +	size_t type_len;
> +	const char *type_prefix;
> +	char *buffer, *p;
> +
> +	switch (hash_type) {
> +	case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
> +		type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
> +		type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
> +		break;
> +	case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
> +		type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
> +		type_prefix = bin_prefix;
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +	}
> +	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!buffer)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +	p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
> +	p += type_len;
> +	*p++ = ':';
> +	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
> +	p += hash_len * 2;
> +	*p = '\0';
> +	return buffer;
> +}
> +
>  /**
> - * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
> + * mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
>   * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
>   */
> -int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
> +static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
>  {
>  	key_ref_t key;
>  
> @@ -133,29 +165,36 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> +		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
> +{
> +	const char *buffer;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
> +	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
> +		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
> +	err = mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(buffer);
> +	kfree(buffer);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
>   * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
>   * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
> - * @type: Type of hash
> + * @hash_type: Type of hash
>   */
> -int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
> +int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> +		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
>  {
>  	key_ref_t kref;
> -	size_t type_len = strlen(type);
> -	char *buffer, *p;
> +	const char *buffer;
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> -	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!buffer)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -	p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len);
> -	p += type_len;
> -	*p++ = ':';
> -	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
> -	p += hash_len * 2;
> -	*p = 0;
> -
> +	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
> +	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
> +		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
>  	kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
>  			      &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
>  	if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
> @@ -170,7 +209,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
>  
>  int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
>  {
> -	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, "bin") == -EKEYREJECTED)
> +	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
> +			-EKEYREJECTED)
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -243,7 +283,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
>  		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
>  
>  	for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
> -		if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
> +		if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
>  			pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index ae450eb8be14..3b7dba5e4cd9 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		goto error_2;
>  
> -	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
> +	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size,
> +				  BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
>  	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
>  		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
>  		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
> diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> index 875e002a4180..d2597f8d6d7e 100644
> --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> @@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/key.h>
>  
> +enum blacklist_hash_type {
> +	/* TBSCertificate hash */
> +	BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
> +	/* Raw data hash */
> +	BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
> +};
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>  
>  extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
> @@ -33,13 +40,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
>  
>  extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
> -extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
> +extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> +			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
>  extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> -			       const char *type);
> +			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
>  extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
>  #else
>  static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
> -				      const char *type)
> +				      enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> index 5604bd57c990..9e4f156b356e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> @@ -15,35 +15,13 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
>  	EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
>  static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
>  
> -/*
> - * Blacklist a hash.
> - */
> -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
> -				       size_t len, const char *type,
> -				       size_t type_len)
> -{
> -	char *hash, *p;
> -
> -	hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!hash)
> -		return;
> -	p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
> -	p += type_len;
> -	bin2hex(p, data, len);
> -	p += len * 2;
> -	*p = 0;
> -
> -	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
> -	kfree(hash);
> -}
> -
>  /*
>   * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
>   */
>  static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
>  					   const void *data, size_t len)
>  {
> -	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
> +	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -52,7 +30,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
>  static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
>  					 const void *data, size_t len)
>  {
> -	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
> +	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> -- 
> 2.30.2
> 
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-15 16:57   ` Eric Snowberg
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Eric Snowberg @ 2021-03-15 16:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	David S . Miller, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module


> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> 
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
> hash from a given certificate.  This is useful to generate a blacklist
> key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
> keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
> 
> This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
> out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
> available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
> 
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-2-mic@digikod.net

Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

> ---
> 
> Changes since v5:
> * Add Reviewed-by Jarkko.
> 
> Changes since v3:
> * Explain in the commit message that this kind of formating is not new
>  but it wasn't documented.
> 
> Changes since v1:
> * Fix typo.
> * Use "if" block instead of "||" .
> ---
> MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
> tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
> create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 00836f6452f0..773a362e807f 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -4120,6 +4120,7 @@ F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
> F:	certs/
> F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
> F:	scripts/sign-file.c
> +F:	tools/certs/
> 
> CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER
> M:	Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
> diff --git a/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
> new file mode 100755
> index 000000000000..c93df5387ec9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
> @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
> +#!/bin/bash
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#
> +# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
> +#
> +# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> +#
> +# Compute and print the To Be Signed (TBS) hash of a certificate.  This is used
> +# as description of keys in the blacklist keyring to identify certificates.
> +# This output should be redirected, without newline, in a file (hash0.txt) and
> +# signed to create a PKCS#7 file (hash0.p7s).  Both of these files can then be
> +# loaded in the kernel with.
> +#
> +# Exemple on a workstation:
> +# ./print-cert-tbs-hash.sh certificate-to-invalidate.pem > hash0.txt
> +# openssl smime -sign -in hash0.txt -inkey builtin-private-key.pem \
> +#               -signer builtin-certificate.pem -certfile certificate-chain.pem \
> +#               -noattr -binary -outform DER -out hash0.p7s
> +#
> +# Exemple on a managed system:
> +# keyctl padd blacklist "$(< hash0.txt)" %:.blacklist < hash0.p7s
> +
> +set -u -e -o pipefail
> +
> +CERT="${1:-}"
> +BASENAME="$(basename -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
> +
> +if [ $# -ne 1 ] || [ ! -f "${CERT}" ]; then
> +	echo "usage: ${BASENAME} <certificate>" >&2
> +	exit 1
> +fi
> +
> +# Checks that it is indeed a certificate (PEM or DER encoded) and exclude the
> +# optional PEM text header.
> +if ! PEM="$(openssl x509 -inform DER -in "${CERT}" 2>/dev/null || openssl x509 -in "${CERT}")"; then
> +	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse certificate" >&2
> +	exit 1
> +fi
> +
> +# TBSCertificate starts at the second entry.
> +# Cf. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280#section-4.1
> +#
> +# Exemple of first lines printed by openssl asn1parse:
> +#    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 763 cons: SEQUENCE
> +#    4:d=1  hl=4 l= 483 cons: SEQUENCE
> +#    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
> +#   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :02
> +#   13:d=2  hl=2 l=  20 prim: INTEGER           :3CEB2CB8818D968AC00EEFE195F0DF9665328B7B
> +#   35:d=2  hl=2 l=  13 cons: SEQUENCE
> +#   37:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT            :sha256WithRSAEncryption
> +RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE='
> +2s/^\s*\([0-9]\+\):d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*\([0-9]\+\)\s\+cons:\s*SEQUENCE\s*$/\1 \2/p;
> +7s/^\s*[0-9]\+:d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+prim:\s*OBJECT\s*:\(.*\)$/\1/p;
> +'
> +
> +RANGE_AND_DIGEST=($(echo "${PEM}" | \
> +	openssl asn1parse -in - | \
> +	sed -n -e "${RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE}"))
> +
> +if [ "${#RANGE_AND_DIGEST[@]}" != 3 ]; then
> +	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse TBSCertificate." >&2
> +	exit 1
> +fi
> +
> +OFFSET="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[0]}"
> +END="$(( OFFSET + RANGE_AND_DIGEST[1] ))"
> +DIGEST="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[2]}"
> +
> +# The signature hash algorithm is used by Linux to blacklist certificates.
> +# Cf. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo()
> +DIGEST_MATCH=""
> +while read -r DIGEST_ITEM; do
> +	if [ -z "${DIGEST_ITEM}" ]; then
> +		break
> +	fi
> +	if echo "${DIGEST}" | grep -qiF "${DIGEST_ITEM}"; then
> +		DIGEST_MATCH="${DIGEST_ITEM}"
> +		break
> +	fi
> +done < <(openssl list -digest-commands | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -ur)
> +
> +if [ -z "${DIGEST_MATCH}" ]; then
> +	echo "ERROR: Unknown digest algorithm: ${DIGEST}" >&2
> +	exit 1
> +fi
> +
> +echo "${PEM}" | \
> +	openssl x509 -in - -outform DER | \
> +	dd "bs=1" "skip=${OFFSET}" "count=${END}" "status=none" | \
> +	openssl dgst "-${DIGEST_MATCH}" - | \
> +	awk '{printf "tbs:" $2}'
> -- 
> 2.30.2
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-15 16:59   ` Eric Snowberg
  2021-03-15 18:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Eric Snowberg @ 2021-03-15 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	David S . Miller, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module


> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> 
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
> 
> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
> trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
> key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
> provided as the key payload.
> 
> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
> is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
> 
> Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
>  make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
> * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
>  root user rights.
> 
> See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
> 
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net

I tried testing this, it doesn’t work as I would expect.  
Here is my test setup:

Kernel built with two keys compiled into the builtin_trusted_keys keyring

Generated a tbs cert from one of the keys and signed it with the other key

As root, added the tbs cert hash to the blacklist keyring

Verified the tbs hash is in the blacklist keyring

Enabled lockdown to enforce kernel module signature checking

Signed a kernel module with the key I just blacklisted

Load the kernel module 

I’m seeing the kernel module load, I would expect this to fail, since the 
key is now blacklisted.  Or is this change just supposed to prevent new keys 
from being added in the future?



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-15 16:59   ` Eric Snowberg
@ 2021-03-15 18:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-03-17 14:48       ` Eric Snowberg
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-15 18:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Snowberg
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	David S . Miller, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module


On 15/03/2021 17:59, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
>> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>
>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>
>> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
>> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
>> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
>> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
>> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
>>
>> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
>> trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
>> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
>> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
>> key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
>> provided as the key payload.
>>
>> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
>> is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
>>
>> Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
>> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
>>  make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
>> * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
>> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
>>  root user rights.
>>
>> See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
>>
>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
>> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net
> 
> I tried testing this, it doesn’t work as I would expect.  
> Here is my test setup:
> 
> Kernel built with two keys compiled into the builtin_trusted_keys keyring
> 
> Generated a tbs cert from one of the keys and signed it with the other key
> 
> As root, added the tbs cert hash to the blacklist keyring
> 
> Verified the tbs hash is in the blacklist keyring
> 
> Enabled lockdown to enforce kernel module signature checking
> 
> Signed a kernel module with the key I just blacklisted
> 
> Load the kernel module 
> 
> I’m seeing the kernel module load, I would expect this to fail, since the 
> key is now blacklisted.  Or is this change just supposed to prevent new keys 
> from being added in the future?

This is the expected behavior and the way the blacklist keyring is
currently used, as explained in the commit message:
"This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded
in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain."

If you want a (trusted root) key to be untrusted, you need to remove it
from the keyring, which is not allowed for the builtin trusted keyring.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-15 18:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-17 14:48       ` Eric Snowberg
  2021-03-17 15:45         ` Mickaël Salaün
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Eric Snowberg @ 2021-03-17 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mickaël Salaün
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	David S . Miller, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module


> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:01 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 15/03/2021 17:59, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> 
>>> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>> 
>>> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
>>> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
>>> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
>>> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
>>> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
>>> 
>>> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
>>> trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
>>> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
>>> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
>>> key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
>>> provided as the key payload.
>>> 
>>> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
>>> is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
>>> 
>>> Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
>>> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
>>> make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
>>> * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
>>> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
>>> root user rights.
>>> 
>>> See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
>>> 
>>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>>> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
>>> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net
>> 
>> I tried testing this, it doesn’t work as I would expect.  
>> Here is my test setup:
>> 
>> Kernel built with two keys compiled into the builtin_trusted_keys keyring
>> 
>> Generated a tbs cert from one of the keys and signed it with the other key
>> 
>> As root, added the tbs cert hash to the blacklist keyring
>> 
>> Verified the tbs hash is in the blacklist keyring
>> 
>> Enabled lockdown to enforce kernel module signature checking
>> 
>> Signed a kernel module with the key I just blacklisted
>> 
>> Load the kernel module 
>> 
>> I’m seeing the kernel module load, I would expect this to fail, since the 
>> key is now blacklisted.  Or is this change just supposed to prevent new keys 
>> from being added in the future?
> 
> This is the expected behavior and the way the blacklist keyring is
> currently used, as explained in the commit message:
> "This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded
> in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain."
> 
> If you want a (trusted root) key to be untrusted, you need to remove it
> from the keyring, which is not allowed for the builtin trusted keyring.

Is there a non technical reason why this can not be changed to also apply to
builtin trusted keys? If a user had the same tbs cert hash in their dbx and 
soon mokx, the hash would show up in the .blacklist keyring and invalidate 
any key in the builtin_trusted_keys keyring. After adding the same hash with 
this series, it shows up in the .blacklist_keyring but the value is ignored 
by operations using the builtin_trusted_keys keyring.  It just seems 
incomplete to me, or did I miss an earlier discussion on this topic?


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-17 14:48       ` Eric Snowberg
@ 2021-03-17 15:45         ` Mickaël Salaün
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-17 15:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Snowberg
  Cc: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	David S . Miller, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module


On 17/03/2021 15:48, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
>> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:01 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15/03/2021 17:59, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>>>
>>>> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
>>>> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
>>>> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
>>>> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
>>>> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
>>>>
>>>> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
>>>> trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
>>>> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
>>>> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
>>>> key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
>>>> provided as the key payload.
>>>>
>>>> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
>>>> is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
>>>>
>>>> Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
>>>> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
>>>> make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
>>>> * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
>>>> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
>>>> root user rights.
>>>>
>>>> See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
>>>>
>>>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>>>> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
>>>> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>>>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net
>>>
>>> I tried testing this, it doesn’t work as I would expect.  
>>> Here is my test setup:
>>>
>>> Kernel built with two keys compiled into the builtin_trusted_keys keyring
>>>
>>> Generated a tbs cert from one of the keys and signed it with the other key
>>>
>>> As root, added the tbs cert hash to the blacklist keyring
>>>
>>> Verified the tbs hash is in the blacklist keyring
>>>
>>> Enabled lockdown to enforce kernel module signature checking
>>>
>>> Signed a kernel module with the key I just blacklisted
>>>
>>> Load the kernel module 
>>>
>>> I’m seeing the kernel module load, I would expect this to fail, since the 
>>> key is now blacklisted.  Or is this change just supposed to prevent new keys 
>>> from being added in the future?
>>
>> This is the expected behavior and the way the blacklist keyring is
>> currently used, as explained in the commit message:
>> "This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded
>> in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain."
>>
>> If you want a (trusted root) key to be untrusted, you need to remove it
>> from the keyring, which is not allowed for the builtin trusted keyring.
> 
> Is there a non technical reason why this can not be changed to also apply to
> builtin trusted keys? If a user had the same tbs cert hash in their dbx and 
> soon mokx, the hash would show up in the .blacklist keyring and invalidate 
> any key in the builtin_trusted_keys keyring. After adding the same hash with 
> this series, it shows up in the .blacklist_keyring but the value is ignored 
> by operations using the builtin_trusted_keys keyring.  It just seems 
> incomplete to me, or did I miss an earlier discussion on this topic?

The purpose of the blacklist keyring is to block new keys from being
loaded in the kernel. For builtin and dbx/mokx hashes, they are loaded
in the blacklist keyring before builtin certificates are loaded in the
trusted builtin keyring, which can reject them if there is a match. I
think that being able to load a blocked hash at run time should not
change the semantic of the blacklist keyring, which is to block the
loading of certificates. If someone wants to change this semantic, I
think it should be configurable. Indeed, we should keep in mind the
temporal dimension and the hierarchy of trust: dbx/mokx -> builtin
hashes -> run time hashes.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-03-25 11:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-04-07 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-03-25 11:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, David Woodhouse, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module

Hi David,

What is the status of this patchset? Could you please push it to -next?

Regards,
 Mickaël

On 12/03/2021 18:12, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's and Eric Snowberg's
> keys-cve-2020-26541-v3.
> 
> I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
> https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184
> binary hashes and 2 certificates).
> 
> The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the
> root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is useful
> to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update this keyring
> without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
> 
> This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-cve-2020-26541-branch:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-cve-2020-26541-branch
> 
> Previous patch series:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210210120410.471693-1-mic@digikod.net/
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Mickaël Salaün (5):
>   tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>   certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
>   certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
>   certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
>   certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
>     keyring
> 
>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
>  certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
>  certs/Kconfig                                 |  17 +-
>  certs/Makefile                                |  17 +-
>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 218 ++++++++++++++----
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
>  scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
>  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
>  10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
>  create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
> 
> 
> base-commit: ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
  2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-03-25 11:36 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update " Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-04-07 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2021-05-04 10:31   ` Mickaël Salaün
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-04-07 17:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mickaël Salaün, Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn,
	Tyler Hicks, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity,
	linux-kernel, linux-security-module, David Woodhouse

Hi David and Jarkko,

What is the status of this patchset? Could someone take it to -next?

Regards,
 Mickaël


On 12/03/2021 18:12, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's and Eric Snowberg's
> keys-cve-2020-26541-v3.
> 
> I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
> https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184
> binary hashes and 2 certificates).
> 
> The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the
> root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is useful
> to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update this keyring
> without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
> 
> This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-cve-2020-26541-branch:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-cve-2020-26541-branch
> 
> Previous patch series:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210210120410.471693-1-mic@digikod.net/
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Mickaël Salaün (5):
>   tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>   certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
>   certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
>   certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
>   certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
>     keyring
> 
>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
>  certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
>  certs/Kconfig                                 |  17 +-
>  certs/Makefile                                |  17 +-
>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 218 ++++++++++++++----
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
>  scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
>  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
>  10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
>  create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
> 
> 
> base-commit: ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
  2021-04-07 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2021-05-04 10:31   ` Mickaël Salaün
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2021-05-04 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: David S . Miller, Eric Snowberg, Herbert Xu, James Morris,
	Mimi Zohar, Serge E . Hallyn, Tyler Hicks, keyrings,
	linux-crypto, linux-integrity, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, David Woodhouse

Are you waiting for the end of the merge window to push to linux-next?

On 07/04/2021 19:21, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi David and Jarkko,
> 
> What is the status of this patchset? Could someone take it to -next?
> 
> Regards,
>  Mickaël
> 
> 
> On 12/03/2021 18:12, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's and Eric Snowberg's
>> keys-cve-2020-26541-v3.
>>
>> I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
>> https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184
>> binary hashes and 2 certificates).
>>
>> The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the
>> root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is useful
>> to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update this keyring
>> without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
>>
>> This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-cve-2020-26541-branch:
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-cve-2020-26541-branch
>>
>> Previous patch series:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210210120410.471693-1-mic@digikod.net/
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Mickaël Salaün (5):
>>   tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>>   certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
>>   certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
>>   certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
>>   certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
>>     keyring
>>
>>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
>>  certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
>>  certs/Kconfig                                 |  17 +-
>>  certs/Makefile                                |  17 +-
>>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 218 ++++++++++++++----
>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
>>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
>>  scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
>>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
>>  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
>>  10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
>>  create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
>>  create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>>
>>
>> base-commit: ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b
>>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 16+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-03-12 17:12 [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-15 16:57   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-13 18:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-13 18:54   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-12 17:12 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-15 16:59   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-03-15 18:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-17 14:48       ` Eric Snowberg
2021-03-17 15:45         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-25 11:36 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update " Mickaël Salaün
2021-04-07 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-05-04 10:31   ` Mickaël Salaün

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