From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
syzbot <syzbot+21016130b0580a9de3b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
tyhicks@canonical.com,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
SELinux <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>,
Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org>,
syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Allow syzbot to ignore security= parameter.
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 08:23:33 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54f15845-f256-f503-98ce-64a1b88a5f9f@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54c0ae39-f35c-bdcd-a217-8e62ef14e41b@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
On 2/8/2019 2:52 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2019/02/08 1:24, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> Then, I think that it is straightforward (and easier to manage) to ignore security= parameter
>>>>> when lsm= parameter is specified.
>>>> That reduces flexibility somewhat. If I am debugging security modules
>>>> I may want to use lsm= to specify the order while using security= to
>>>> identify a specific exclusive module. I could do that using lsm= by
>>>> itself, but habits die hard.
>>> "lsm=" can be used for identifying a specific exclusive module, and Ubuntu kernels would
>>> have to use CONFIG_LSM (or "lsm=") for identifying the default exclusive module (in order
>>> to allow enabling both TOMOYO and one of SELinux,Smack,AppArmor at the same time).
>>>
>>> Since "security=" can't be used for selectively enable/disable more than one of
>>> SELinux,Smack,TOMOYO,AppArmor, I think that recommending users to migrate to "lsm=" is the
>>> better direction. And ignoring "security=" when "lsm=" is specified is easier to understand.
>> I added Kees to the CC list. Kees, what to you think about
>> ignoring security= if lsm= is specified? I'm ambivalent.
>>
>>
> To help administrators easily understand what LSM modules are possibly enabled by default (which
> have to be fetched from e.g. /boot/config-`uname -r`)
$ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
> and specify lsm= parameter when they need,
> I propose changes shown below.
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3147785e..051d708 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -51,8 +51,6 @@
> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
>
> -static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
> -
> /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
> static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
> static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
> @@ -284,14 +282,22 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> {
> struct lsm_info **lsm;
> + const char *order = CONFIG_LSM;
> + const char *origin = "builtin";
>
> ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
> GFP_KERNEL);
>
> - if (chosen_lsm_order)
> - ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
> - else
> - ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
> + if (chosen_lsm_order) {
> + if (chosen_major_lsm) {
> + pr_info("security= is ignored because of lsm=\n");
> + chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
> + }
> + order = chosen_lsm_order;
> + origin = "cmdline";
> + }
> + pr_info("Security Framework initializing: %s\n", order);
> + ordered_lsm_parse(order, origin);
>
> for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
> prepare_lsm(*lsm);
> @@ -333,8 +339,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> int i;
> struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads;
>
> - pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n");
> -
> for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
> i++)
> INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
I'm not going to object to this, but I don't see it as important.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-08 16:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-30 2:17 WARNING in apparmor_secid_to_secctx syzbot
2018-08-30 2:21 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-08-31 16:03 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-08-31 16:07 ` Paul Moore
2018-08-31 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-08-31 16:17 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-08-31 22:38 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-04 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-04 13:16 ` Russell Coker
2018-09-04 14:53 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-05 17:13 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-04 15:02 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-04 15:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-04 15:38 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-04 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-05 1:21 ` Paul Moore
2018-09-05 11:08 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-05 17:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-06 10:59 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-06 11:19 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-06 19:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-29 11:32 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-01-30 14:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-30 16:30 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-31 0:22 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-01 10:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-02-01 10:11 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-02-01 10:43 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-01 10:50 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-02-01 13:09 ` [PATCH] LSM: Allow syzbot to ignore security= parameter Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-04 8:07 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-02-06 10:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-06 17:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-07 2:30 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-07 16:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-08 10:52 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-08 16:23 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-02-09 0:28 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-09 1:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-02-08 21:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-30 3:43 ` WARNING in apparmor_secid_to_secctx syzbot
2018-09-01 9:18 ` John Johansen
2018-09-02 4:33 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-02 4:52 ` John Johansen
2018-09-02 5:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-02 5:03 ` syzbot
2018-09-02 5:05 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-09-02 5:46 ` syzbot
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