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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Alexey Dobriyan" <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Salvatore Mesoraca" <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 04/38] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 15:29:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <60a53863-a05e-cbbd-d73e-5a0d2fc6567c@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com>

As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  |   1 -
 security/apparmor/lsm.c    |   6 ---
 security/security.c        | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  10 -----
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |   3 --
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c   |   2 -
 6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4e2e9cdf78c6..dabd2761acfc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2085,7 +2085,6 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
 #define __lsm_ro_after_init	__ro_after_init
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
 
-extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
 extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
 extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 127a540ef63a..d840c1ef3e4d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1662,12 +1662,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
-		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
-		apparmor_enabled = false;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	aa_secids_init();
 
 	error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0688dfd57e95..7562da854b62 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -52,33 +52,96 @@ static __initdata bool debug;
 			pr_info(__VA_ARGS__);			\
 	} while (0)
 
+static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	if (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
+static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
+static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
+static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
+	 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
+	 */
+	if (!lsm->enabled) {
+		if (enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+		else
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+	} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
+		if (!enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+	} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+		if (enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+	} else {
+		*lsm->enabled = enabled;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
+static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	/* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
+	if (!is_enabled(lsm))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Skip major-specific checks if not a major LSM. */
+	if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Disabled if this LSM isn't the chosen one. */
+	if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_lsm) != 0)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Check if LSM should be initialized. */
+static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
+
+	/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
+	set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
+
+	/* If selected, initialize the LSM. */
+	if (enabled) {
+		int ret;
+
+		init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
+		ret = lsm->init();
+		WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+	}
+}
+
 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 {
 	struct lsm_info *lsm;
-	int ret;
 
 	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
 		if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) != 0)
 			continue;
 
-		init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
-		ret = lsm->init();
-		WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+		maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
 	}
 }
 
 static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
 {
 	struct lsm_info *lsm;
-	int ret;
 
 	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
 		if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
 			continue;
 
-		init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
-		ret = lsm->init();
-		WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+		maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -168,29 +231,6 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
- * @module: the name of the module
- *
- * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
- * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
- * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
- *
- * Returns:
- *
- * true if:
- *
- * - The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- * - or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- *   choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
- *
- * Otherwise, return false.
- */
-int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
-{
-	return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
-}
-
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
  * @hooks: the hooks to add
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efc0ac1b5019..b81239a09dbb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7138,16 +7138,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 
 static __init int selinux_init(void)
 {
-	if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
-		selinux_enabled = 0;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (!selinux_enabled) {
-		pr_info("SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	pr_info("SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
 	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3639e55b1f4b..56a114c1d750 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4841,9 +4841,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 
-	if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
-		return 0;
-
 	smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
 	if (!smack_inode_cache)
 		return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 09f7af130d3a..a46f6bc1e97c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -540,8 +540,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
 
-	if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
-		return 0;
 	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
 	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
 	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
-- 
2.14.5



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-26 23:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-26 23:22 [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:26 ` [PATCH v5 01/38] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Casey Schaufler
2018-11-27  5:34   ` Kees Cook
2018-11-27 13:51     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-11-27 19:27     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:27 ` [PATCH v5 02/38] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:28 ` [PATCH v5 03/38] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:29 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-11-26 23:30 ` [PATCH v5 05/38] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:31 ` [PATCH v5 06/38] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:31 ` [PATCH v5 07/38] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:32 ` [PATCH v5 08/38] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:33 ` [PATCH v5 09/38] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:34 ` [PATCH v5 10/38] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:34 ` [PATCH v5 11/38] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:35 ` [PATCH v5 12/38] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:36 ` [PATCH v5 13/38] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:37 ` [PATCH v5 14/38] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:38 ` [PATCH v5 15/38] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:39 ` [PATCH v5 16/38] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:39 ` [PATCH v5 17/38] Yama: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:40 ` [PATCH v5 18/38] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:41 ` [PATCH v5 19/38] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:41 ` [PATCH v5 20/38] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:42 ` [PATCH v5 21/38] Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:43 ` [PATCH v5 22/38] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:44 ` [PATCH v5 23/38] SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:45 ` [PATCH v5 24/38] SELinux: Remove unused selinux_is_enabled Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:45 ` [PATCH v5 25/38] AppArmor: Abstract use of cred security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:46 ` [PATCH v5 26/38] TOMOYO: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:47 ` [PATCH v5 27/38] Infrastructure management of the " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:48 ` [PATCH v5 28/38] SELinux: Abstract use of file " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:49 ` [PATCH v5 29/38] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:50 ` [PATCH v5 30/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:51 ` [PATCH v5 31/38] SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:52 ` [PATCH v5 32/38] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:53 ` [PATCH v5 33/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:53 ` [PATCH v5 34/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:54 ` [PATCH v5 35/38] SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 36/38] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 37/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-11-26 23:57 ` [PATCH v5 38/38] TOMOYO: Update LSM flags to no longer be exclusive Casey Schaufler
2018-12-05  0:31 ` [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock Kees Cook
2018-12-05  2:37   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-05  2:52     ` John Johansen
2018-12-11 18:57   ` James Morris
2018-12-11 21:02     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-12-12 19:33       ` James Morris
2018-12-11 21:19     ` Kees Cook
2019-01-08  1:29       ` Kees Cook
2019-01-08 21:05         ` James Morris
2019-01-08 21:37           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-08 21:42             ` Kees Cook
2019-01-08 23:05               ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-11 22:42 Casey Schaufler
2018-12-11 22:42 ` [PATCH v5 04/38] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Casey Schaufler

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