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From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode.
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 20:13:06 -0600
Message-ID: <62ccc074-ac6d-edea-10c6-925f99dfc592@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201911301035.74813D4533@keescook>

I should also mention the kernel itself thinks it is vulnerable with the
MSRs locked down:

[    7.367922] L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See
CVE-2018-3646 and
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for
details.

On 11/30/19 12:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:49:48AM -0600, Matt Parnell wrote:
>> From 452b8460e464422d268659a8abb93353a182f8c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
>> Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 00:44:09 -0600
>> Subject: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even
>>  in confidentiality mode.
>>
>> For Intel CPUs, some of the MDS mitigations utilize the new "flush" MSR, and
>> while this isn't something normally used in userspace, it does cause false
>> positives for the "Forshadow" vulnerability.
>>
>> Additionally, Intel CPUs use MSRs for voltage and frequency controls,
>> which in
>> many cases is useful for undervolting to avoid excess heat.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
> I would expect this to just be implemented via LSM policy, not ifdefs
> and Kconfig?
>
> -Kees
>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/msr.c     |  5 ++++-
>>  security/lockdown/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> index 1547be359d7f..4adce59455c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
>> @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const
>> char __user *buf,
>>      int err = 0;
>>      ssize_t bytes = 0;
>>  
>> +#if defined(LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR)
>>      err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR);
>>      if (err)
>>          return err;
>> -
>> +#endif
>>      if (count % 8)
>>          return -EINVAL;    /* Invalid chunk size */
>>  
>> @@ -135,9 +136,11 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
>> int ioc, unsigned long arg)
>>              err = -EFAULT;
>>              break;
>>          }
>> +#if defined(LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR)
>>          err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR);
>>          if (err)
>>              break;
>> +#endif
>>          err = wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(cpu, regs);
>>          if (err)
>>              break;
>> diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> index e84ddf484010..f4fe72c4bf8f 100644
>> --- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
>> @@ -44,4 +44,16 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
>>       code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
>>       disabled.
>>  
>> +config LOCK_DOWN_DENY_RAW_MSR
>> +    bool "Lock down and deny raw MSR access"
>> +    depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
>> +    default y
>> +    help
>> +      Some Intel based systems require raw MSR access to use the flush
>> +      MSR for MDS mitigation confirmation. Raw access can also be used
>> +      to undervolt many Intel CPUs.
>> +
>> +      Say Y to prevent access or N to allow raw MSR access for such
>> +      cases.
>> +
>>  endchoice
>> -- 
>> 2.24.0
>>
>>
>
>
>

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-30  6:49 Matt Parnell
2019-11-30 18:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-30 19:09   ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-01 20:53     ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 18:29       ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 22:55         ` Jordan Glover
2019-12-02 23:13           ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 23:29           ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 23:31             ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  2:13   ` Matt Parnell [this message]
2019-12-03  2:16     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-03  2:24       ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  2:50         ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  3:57           ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 19:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 20:39   ` Matt Parnell

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