From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2018 12:05:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <63410d08-d0d1-8cd9-5d9e-70d95a1a8ca0@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKFqtV_NFRaXPKVgNQt3F1pwFqopDLp1ZQJDGM_Bdid6Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/23/2018 11:50 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 9:48 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 10/12/2018 12:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Friday, October 12, 2018 3:19 AM, John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>> It isn't perfect but it manages consistency across distros as best as
>>>> can be achieved atm.
>>> Yeah, this is why I'm okay with the current series: it provides as
>>> consistent a view as possible, but leaves room for future improvements
>>> (like adding "+" or "!" or "all" or whatever).
>>>
>>> I'm curious to see what SELinux folks think of v5, though. I *think* I
>>> addressed all the concerns there, even Paul's "I want my distro
>>> default to not have extreme stacking" case too.
>>>
>>> -Kees
>> Looks like I should go on vacation more often. :)
>>
>> I am generally opposed to fancy specification languages.
>> I support the explicit lsm= list specification because you
>> don't have to know any context to create a boot line that
>> will work, and be as close to what you've specified as possible
>> for the kernel configuration. One need look no further than
>> the mechanisms for setting POSIX ACLs for an example of
>> how to ensure a feature isn't used.
>>
>> Had we the foresight to make security= take a list of
>> modules when Yama was added we might have avoided some of
>> this brouhaha, but there was no reason to expect that stacking
>> was ever going to happen back then.
> This sounds like an "Ack" for you? :) I'll harass everyone in person
> in a couple days.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Did you poke around at my combined series?
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=lsm/ordering-v6-blob-sharing
I hope to do that on the plane later today.
> -Kees
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-23 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-11 0:18 [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-11 3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52 ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 0:11 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 1:19 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 19:05 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-10-24 8:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-24 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-14 21:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-20 23:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-11 23:53 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 0:26 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11 ` John Johansen
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