* [GIT PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry
@ 2019-09-23 20:14 Casey Schaufler
2019-09-23 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-09-23 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: Linux Security Module list, LKML, casey
Hello Linus
Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.
I have four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.
The following changes since commit 0ecfebd2b52404ae0c54a878c872bb93363ada36:
Linux 5.2 (2019-07-07 15:41:56 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next.git tags/smack-for-5.4-rc1
for you to fetch changes up to e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0:
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock (2019-09-04 09:37:07 -0700)
----------------------------------------------------------------
I have four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Biggers (1):
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
Jann Horn (1):
Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
Jia-Ju Bai (1):
security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
luanshi (1):
smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
security/smack/smack_access.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [GIT PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry
2019-09-23 20:14 [GIT PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-09-23 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-23 21:38 ` Linus Torvalds
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2019-09-23 21:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler; +Cc: Linux Security Module list, LKML
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:14 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.
Looks fine, pulled.
That said, when I look closer:
> Jia-Ju Bai (1):
> security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
This one seems wrong.
Not seriously so, but the quoting the logic from the commit:
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.
and the fact is, skb _cannot_ be NULL, because when you test the
security of receiving an skb, you by definition always have an skb.
There is one single place that calls security_sock_rcv_skb(), and it
very much has a real skb.
So instead of adding a _new_ test for skb being NULL, the old test for
a NULL skb should just have been removed. It really doesn't make any
sense to have a NULL skb in that path - if some memory allocation had
failed on the receive path, that just means that the receive is never
done, it doesn't mean that you'd test a NULL skb for security policy
violations.
Anyway, it's pulled, but I think somebody should have checked and
thought about the automated tool reports a bit more..
Linus
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [GIT PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry
2019-09-23 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
@ 2019-09-23 21:38 ` Linus Torvalds
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2019-09-23 21:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler; +Cc: Linux Security Module list, LKML
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 2:35 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:14 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >
> > Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.
>
> Looks fine, pulled.
Oh, btw, can you get more signatures on your pgp key? I actually care
more about having a key than having a key with lots of signatures (*),
but signatures and a chain of trust would be good too.
Linus
(*) To me, keys are more of a "yeah, I'm the same person that usually
sends these pull requests" than some kind of hard identity.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2019-09-23 20:14 [GIT PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry Casey Schaufler
2019-09-23 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
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