Linux-Security-Module Archive on lore.kernel.org
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>, Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>,
	Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>,
	<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] exec: Reduce bprm->per_clear to a single bit
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 10:41:22 -0500
Message-ID: <87eer4ysm5.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 28 May 2020 10:38:28 -0500")


The bprm->per_clear field only takes the values 0 and
PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID.  Reduce the field to a signle bit to make it clear
that the only question is should the dangerous personality bits be
cleared or not.

Update the documentation of the security lsm hooks.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 fs/exec.c                  | 7 ++++---
 include/linux/binfmts.h    | 4 +++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 4 ++++
 security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
 security/commoncap.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 2 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index c3c879a55d65..51fab62b9fca 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1354,7 +1354,8 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
 					PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
 	flush_thread();
-	me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
+	if (bprm->per_clear)
+		me->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 
 	/*
 	 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
@@ -1628,12 +1629,12 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return;
 
 	if (mode & S_ISUID) {
-		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->per_clear = 1;
 		bprm->cred->euid = uid;
 	}
 
 	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
-		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->per_clear = 1;
 		bprm->cred->egid = gid;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index 7fc05929c967..e7959a6a895a 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 	unsigned long p; /* current top of mem */
 	unsigned long argmin; /* rlimit marker for copy_strings() */
 	unsigned int
+		/* Should unsafe personality bits be cleared? */
+		per_clear:1,
+
 		/* Should an execfd be passed to userspace? */
 		have_execfd:1,
 
@@ -55,7 +58,6 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 	struct file * file;
 	struct cred *cred;	/* new credentials */
 	int unsafe;		/* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */
-	unsigned int per_clear;	/* bits to clear in current->personality */
 	int argc, envc;
 	const char * filename;	/* Name of binary as seen by procps */
 	const char * interp;	/* Name of the binary really executed. Most
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index d618ecc4d660..0ca68ad53592 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
  *	(e.g. for transitions between security domains).
  *	The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
  *	request libc enable secure mode.
+ *	The hook must set @bprm->per_clear to 1 if the dangerous personality
+ *	bits must be cleared from current->personality.
  *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  * @bprm_repopulate_creds:
@@ -55,6 +57,8 @@
  *	transitions between security domains).
  *	The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
  *	request libc enable secure mode.
+ *	The hook must set @bprm->per_clear to 1 if the dangerous personality
+ *	bits must be cleared from current->personality.
  *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  * @bprm_check_security:
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 0b870a647488..c6d00735a40a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
 			dbg_printk("\n");
 		}
-		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->per_clear = 1;
 	}
 	aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 77b04cb6feac..48b556046483 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
-		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->per_clear = 1;
 
 	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
 	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 718345dd76bb..6bea1b879fdb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2385,7 +2385,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		}
 
 		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
-		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->per_clear = 1;
 
 		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
 		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0ac8f4518d07..a0d2fad27b33 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
-	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+	bprm->per_clear = 1;
 
 	/* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
 	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
-- 
2.25.0


  reply index

Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
     [not found] ` <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2020-05-09 19:40   ` [PATCH 0/5] exec: Control flow simplifications Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 19:40     ` [PATCH 1/5] exec: Call cap_bprm_set_creds directly from prepare_binprm Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 20:04       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-09 19:41     ` [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 20:07       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-09 20:12         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 20:19           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-11  3:15       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-11 16:52         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-11 21:18           ` Kees Cook
2020-05-09 19:41     ` [PATCH 3/5] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 20:16       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-10  4:22       ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-05-10 19:38         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-11 14:33           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-11 19:10             ` Rob Landley
2020-05-13 21:59               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-14 18:46                 ` Rob Landley
2020-05-11 21:55             ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 18:42               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-12 19:25                 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 20:31                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-12 23:08                     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 23:47                       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 23:51                         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 14:56                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-14 16:56                             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-14 17:02                               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-13  0:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-13  2:39                   ` Rob Landley
2020-05-13 19:51                     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-14 16:49                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-09 19:42     ` [PATCH 4/5] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-11 22:09       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-09 19:42     ` [PATCH 5/5] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-11 22:24       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19  0:29     ` [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  0:29       ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 18:03         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 18:28           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-19 18:57             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  0:30       ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 15:34         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-05-19 18:10         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 21:28           ` James Morris
2020-05-19  0:31       ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 18:21         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 19:03           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 19:14             ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 20:22               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-20 20:53                 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 21:52         ` James Morris
2020-05-20 12:40           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  0:31       ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 18:27         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 19:08           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 19:17             ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19  0:32       ` [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 18:27         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 21:30         ` James Morris
2020-05-19  0:33       ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 19:08         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 19:19           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  0:33       ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Generic execfd support Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 19:46         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 19:54           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-19 20:20             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 21:59         ` Rob Landley
2020-05-20 16:05           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-21 22:50             ` Rob Landley
2020-05-22  3:28               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-22  4:51                 ` Rob Landley
2020-05-22 13:35                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  0:34       ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 20:37         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19  1:25       ` [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Control flow simplifications Linus Torvalds
2020-05-19 21:55       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 13:02         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-20 22:12       ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-20 23:43         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-21 11:53           ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:38       ` [PATCH 0/11] exec: cred calculation simplifications Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:41         ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2020-05-28 19:04           ` [PATCH 01/11] exec: Reduce bprm->per_clear to a single bit Linus Torvalds
2020-05-28 19:17             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:42         ` [PATCH 02/11] exec: Introduce active_per_clear the per file version of per_clear Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 19:05           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-28 15:42         ` [PATCH 03/11] exec: Compute file based creds only once Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:43         ` [PATCH 04/11] exec: Move uid/gid handling from creds_from_file into bprm_fill_uid Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:44         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:44         ` [PATCH 05/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid use CAP_SETGID to see if a gid change is safe Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:48         ` [PATCH 06/11] exec: Don't set secureexec when the uid or gid changes are abandoned Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:48         ` [PATCH 07/11] exec: Set saved, fs, and effective ids together in bprm_fill_uid Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:49         ` [PATCH 08/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid remove unnecessary no new privs check Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:49         ` [PATCH 09/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid only set per_clear when honoring suid or sgid Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 19:08           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-28 19:21             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:50         ` [PATCH 10/11] exec: In bprm_fill_uid set secureexec at same time as per_clear Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-28 15:50         ` [PATCH 11/11] exec: Remove the label after_setid from bprm_fill_uid Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-29 16:45         ` [PATCH 0/2] exec: Remove the computation of bprm->cred Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-29 16:46           ` [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-29 21:06             ` Kees Cook
2020-05-30  3:23               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-30  5:14                 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-29 16:47           ` [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-29 21:24             ` Kees Cook
2020-05-30  3:28               ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-30  5:18                 ` Kees Cook

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