From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 717A6C04EB8 for ; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FCFC206B6 for ; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:30 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3FCFC206B6 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726440AbeLDXf3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 18:35:29 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:40564 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725886AbeLDXfY (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 18:35:24 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id wB4NUKPD042464 for ; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 18:35:22 -0500 Received: from e34.co.us.ibm.com (e34.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.152]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2p635e8fcj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 04 Dec 2018 18:35:22 -0500 Received: from localhost by e34.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:17 -0000 Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.237]) by b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id wB4NZGdl24314094 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:16 GMT Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD520C6055; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:16 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BF6CC605A; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:12 +0000 (GMT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain (unknown [9.85.142.32]) by b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 23:35:12 +0000 (GMT) References: <20181116200712.14154-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> User-agent: mu4e 1.0; emacs 26.1 From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: James Morris Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , "Serge E. Hallyn" , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Jessica Yu , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jonathan Corbet , "AKASHI\, Takahiro" Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/14] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal In-reply-to: Date: Tue, 04 Dec 2018 21:35:07 -0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18120423-0016-0000-0000-0000095F714E X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00010172; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000270; SDB=6.01127061; UDB=6.00585382; IPR=6.00907195; MB=3.00024448; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-12-04 23:35:22 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18120423-0017-0000-0000-0000414B0F40 Message-Id: <87k1ko50ic.fsf@morokweng.localdomain> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-12-04_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1812040202 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hello James, Thanks for you interest in these patches. James Morris writes: > On Fri, 16 Nov 2018, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: > >> On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being >> implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. >> Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are >> signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature >> format as signed kernel modules. >> >> This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. > > Are you saying you use IMA to verify kernels during boot? From a Linux > bootloader? Yes to both. OpenPOWER machines have embedded in their firmware a Linux kernel and initramfs to use as bootloader, using Petitboot. kexec is used to load the OS and boot it. >> It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot >> kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the >> signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute. > > Just to clarify, with these patches, IMA will be able to verify the > native form of signed kernel modules? That wasn't my use case to develop the patches, but I just tested and it works. I just had to make a slight modification: there's a whitelist of IMA hooks that are allowed to use the module signature format (in the ima_hook_supports_modsig function), and I had to add MODULE_CHECK to it. The next version of the patches will have this change. The only difference is that IMA looks for a valid key in the IMA keyring, while the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG code looks for the module signing key in the builtin and secondary trusted keyrings. > i.e. without xattrs at all, and > this will work with existing signed modules? No xattrs at all, and yes. -- Thiago Jung Bauermann IBM Linux Technology Center